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Abstract
This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and three self-contained essays
that apply insights from the microeconomic theory of corporate finance in a
macroeconomic setting in order to explain and understand various market
failures that were at the roots of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. In
particular, I study various forms of incomplete information in the credit mar-
ket, and their implications on financial stability and on business cycles in the
aggregate economy. I also seek to understand how monetary and macropru-
dential policies can be used to maintain financial stability, and how these two
policies interact.
In the first essay, I set up and analyse a New Keynesian dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) model where the financing of investments is
affected by a double moral hazard problem. I then solve for jointly Ramsey-
optimal monetary and macroprudential policies. In the main contribution of
this essay, I find that the optimal policy can achieve an efficient allocation if the
social planner can conduct both monetary and macroprudential policy. Using
monetary policy alone is not enough: in this case a short-run policy trade-off
between stabilising inflation and output gap arises. The second contribution is
a systematic assessment of the performance of simple policy rules in compa-
rison with the optimal policy. When policy follows simple rules instead of the
Ramsey-optimal policy, the source of fluctuations is relevant for the choice of
the appropriate policy mix. I find that following a monetary policy rule that
reacts to asset prices performs well in stabilising cyclical fluctuations. A sepa-
rate macroprudential policy rule, in the form of countercyclical bank capital
regulation, is useful in counteracting shocks that arise from the financial sec-
tor itself. However, it can be counterproductive in mitigating the impacts of
shocks that arise from the real sector but affect the financial sector.
In the second essay, I study the link between house prices, lending stan-
dards, and aggregate over-investment in housing. I develop an overlapping ge-
i
nerations model of the housing market. In the model, the market for housing
loans is affected by asymmetric information: borrowers have private informa-
tion on their idiosyncratic income risk. Selection is towards less creditworthy
borrowers. I show that this adverse selection together with strategic comple-
mentarity in housing demand and deadweight costs of default can create en-
dogenous boom-bust cycles in house prices. I also show that lending standards
are loose and the incentives for less-than-creditworthy borrowers to apply for
loans are particularly strong, first, when future house values are expected to
be high, which leads to high leverage of borrowers; and second, when safe
interest rates are low, which implies low costs of borrowing. However, the-
re are strong non-linearities in the relationship between borrowing incentives
and economic fundamentals. The results shed light on incentive mechanisms
that can help explain the developments in the U.S. housing market in the ear-
ly 2000s that led to the subprime crisis. They also imply that monetary po-
licy has a direct impact on the stability of the housing market and on default
incentives through the cost of borrowing and the opportunity cost of housing
investment.
A prominent explanation for the subprime crisis of 2007–2009 in the U.S.
states that it was fuelled by a loosening of lending standards and an expansion
of credit supply, as financiers believed that house prices would keep rising and
that investment in the housing market was safe. In the final essay, I estima-
te a conditional capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) with Bayesian learning
on returns in the residential housing market in the U.S. in 1987–2016. In the
model, I assume that the true systematic risk of the housing portfolio is unob-
servable, and the investors update their beliefs on the true risk based on ob-
served returns. I show evidence in the data that financiers’ perceptions about
systematic risk in the housing market were relatively low in the 1990’s and the
early 2000’s, in the period where house prices were increasing. At the onset
of the subprime crisis, the beliefs about this risk were updated upward most
swiftly in regions that had experienced the strongest house price appreciation.
These empirical results lend support to the above-mentioned narrative on the
causes of the crisis.
Keywords: financial stability, credit cycles, housing market, subprime crisis,
monetary policy, macroprudential policy
JEL codes: E32, E44, E52, E61, G11, G12, G21, R31
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Tiivistelmä
Tämä väitöskirja koostuu johdantoluvusta sekä kolmesta itsenäisestä essees-
tä, joissa tarkastellaan vuonna 2007 Yhdysvalloissa puhjenneen finanssikrii-
sin taustalla vaikuttaneita markkinahäiriöitä. Tutkimuksessani selvitän, miten
erilaiset informaatio-ongelmat markkinaosapuolten välillä voivat johtaa rahoi-
tusmarkkinoiden epävakauteen ja siten talouden suhdannevaihteluihin. Tut-
kin myös, miten näiden häiriöiden aiheuttamia luottosyklejä voidaan ehkäis-
tä tai hillitä. Tällaista koko rahoitusmarkkinoiden vakauttamiseen tähtäävää
sääntelyä kutsutaan makrovakauspolitiikaksi. Lisäksi tarkastelen rahapolitiikan
ja makrovakauspolitiikan välisiä kytköksiä sekä sitä, miten korkopolitiikka
osaltaan vaikuttaa rahoitusmarkkinoiden vakauteen.
Menetelmällisesti tämän väitöskirjan kaksi ensimmäistä esseetä ovat teo-
reettisia tutkielmia, joissa sovellan vakiintuneita mikrotalousteorian informaa-
tiomalleja rahoitusmarkkinoiden tasapainon ja makrotaloudellisten suhdan-
teiden tarkastelussa. Kolmannessa esseessä tutkin tilastollisin menetelmin si-
joittajien odotuksia Yhdysvaltain asuntomarkkinoilla.
Ensimmäisessä esseessä tarkastelen ohjauskorkoon perustuvan rahapolitii-
kan sekä pankkisektorin vakauteen tähtäävän makrovakauspolitiikan vuoro-
vaikutusta talouden suhdannevaihteluiden tasaamisessa. Käyttämässäni ylei-
sen tasapainon mallissa pankkien pääoma on keskeisessä asemassa, sillä se
määrää yritysrahoituksen ja edelleen investointien tason taloudessa. Koska
pankit toimivat rahoituksen välittäjinä talouden eri sektorien — kotitalouk-
sien ja yritysten — välillä, ne voivat levittää talouden sokkien vaikutuksia
sektorilta toiselle.
Käyttämässäni mallissa yritysrahoitus ei allokoidu tehokkaasti rahoitus-
markkinaosapuolten kannustinongelmien vuoksi. Tästä syystä rahapolitiikka
ei yksin pysty tasoittamaan talouden suhdanteita: vaikka sillä voidaankin va-
kauttaa hinnat, rahoituksen tehoton jakautuminen vaikuttaa investointien ko-
konaistasoon ja siten tuotantoon. Tämä tulos eroaa aiemmasta rahapolitiikan
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tutkimuksesta, jossa rahoitusmarkkinahäiriöitä ei ole otettu huomioon ja jossa
korkopolitiikka on sen seurauksena riittävä työkalu suhdanteiden vakauttami-
sessa. Toisaalta osoitan, että raha- ja makrovakauspolitiikka yhdessä mahdol-
listavat inflaation ja tuotannon vakauttamisen samanaikaisesti. Makrovakaus-
politiikka näyttäytyy erityisen hyödyllisenä, kun sokkien lähde on pankkisek-
tori itse, jolloin sopivilla vastasyklisillä pääomavaatimuksilla voidaan koko-
naan ehkäistä rahoitussektorin häiriöiden leviäminen reaalitalouteen.
Väitöskirjan toisessa esseessä käsittelen asuntohintojen, luottoehtojen ja
ylivelkaantumisen yhteyttä kokonaistalouden kannalta. Tulokset perustuvat
teoreettiseen malliin, jossa luottomarkkinoihin vaikuttaa epäsymmetrinen in-
formaatio lainanhakijoiden tuloriskin suhteen. Lainanantajat eivät mallissa
havaitse täydellisesti yksittäisten lainanhakijoiden tuloriskiä ja siihen perustu-
vaa lainan takaisinmaksukykyä. Velallisiksi valikoituu siten myös kotitalouk-
sia, jotka eivät ole luottokelpoisia suuren tuloriskin vuoksi.
Näytän, että tämä epäsymmetrinen informaatio yhdessä asuntojen kysyn-
tää vahvistavan komplementaarisuuden sekä maksuhäiriöiden tehokkuustap-
pioiden kanssa synnyttävät mallissa endogeenisia syklejä asuntojen hintoihin.
Esseessä osoitan myös, että kun asuntojen tulevien hintojen odotetaan ole-
van korkeita ja korkotaso on matala, lainanantajien luottoehdot löystyvät ja
suuririskisten lainanhakijoiden kannustimet hakea asuntolainoja ovat erityi-
sen voimakkaat. Tämä johtaa kotitalouksien korkeaan velkaantumisasteeseen.
Sen sijaan asuntojen hintojen maltillinen nousu sekä kohtuullinen korkotaso
voivat päinvastoin johtaa asuntovelallisten keskimääräisen tuloriskin pienen-
tymiseen ja velkaantumisasteen laskuun. Talouden perustekijöiden ja kannus-
tinvaikutusten välinen yhteys on siten epälineaarinen. Nämä tulokset auttavat
ymmärtämään velkaantumisen kannustimia, jotka johtivat osaltaan Yhdysval-
loista alkunsa saaneeseen asunto- ja rahoitusmarkkinakriisiin 2000-luvun puo-
livälin jälkeen. Tulokset osoittavat myös, että rahapolitiikalla on suoria vaiku-
tuksia asuntomarkkinoiden vakauteen lainojen korkomarginaalien ja velkaan-
tumisen vaihtoehtoiskustannusten kautta.
Yleisen käsityksen mukaan Yhdysvaltain asuntomarkkinat ylikuumenivat
2000-luvulla, koska asuntohintojen uskottiin laajasti jatkavan nousuaan, ja
asuntosijoitusten ajateltiin siksi olevan lähes riskittömiä. Hintojen nousu mah-
dollisti samanaikaisesti myös luottoehtojen löystymisen ja luottojen tarjonnan
kasvun, mikä johti korkeariskisten subprime-luottojen määrän voimakkaaseen
kasvuun 2000-luvun alkupuoliskon aikana. Hintojen käännyttyä laskuun ja ta-
louden ajauduttua taantumaan näiden luottojen riskit realisoituivat.
Viimeisessä esseessä tutkin sijoittajien odotuksia asuntosijoitusten tuotto-
jen tulevasta kehityksestä hinnoittelumallin avulla. Yleisesti sijoittajien tuotto-
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odotukset asuntomarkkinoilla riippuvat sekä kokonaistaloudellisista että ha-
jautettavissa olevista riskeistä, mutta käyttämässäni mallissa oletan, että sijoit-
tajat havaitsevat ainoastaan toteutuneet tuotot. Pystyäkseen muodostamaan
tuottovaatimuksia asuntosijoituksille he joutuvat siten estimoimaan eri läh-
teistä syntyvien riskien vaikutuksen tuottoihin. Osoitan Yhdysvaltain asun-
tohintaindeksejä käyttäen, että sijoittajat uskoivat 1990-luvulla ja vielä 2000-
luvun alussa kokonaistaloudellisten riskien olevan asuntomarkkinoilla pie-
niä. Samalla ajanjaksolla asuntohinnat nousivat voimakkaasti monilla alueilla.
Hintojen käännyttyä maanlaajuisesti laskuun vuonna 2005 näkemyksiä koko-
naistaloudellisista riskeistä nostettiin voimakkaasti. Nämä empiiriset tulokset
tukevat käsitystä finanssikriisiin johtaneista syistä.
Asiasanat: rahoitusvakaus, luottosyklit, asuntomarkkinat, subprime-kriisi, ra-
hapolitiikka, makrovakauspolitiikka
JEL-luokittelu: E32, E44, E52, E61, G11, G12, G21, R31
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1 Introduction
1.1 The financial crisis and recession of 2007–2009
The era of relatively steady growth and low macroeconomic volatility in the
United States that had started in the mid-1980’s, termed the Great Moderation
by Stock and Watson (2002), came to an end in 2007. Problems in a small
segment of the financial market — the subprime mortgage market — spread to
the rest of the market, and subsequently to the whole economy. This caused a
severe downturn that has since come to be known as the Great Recession. The
turmoil quickly spread to the international financial markets and eventually
caused a global recession.
In the United States, the recession spanned the years 2007–2009. The devel-
opment of selected macroeconomic variables are depicted in Figures 1.1 and
1.2. First, Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of the real gross domestic product
(GDP) and real private residential and non-residential fixed investment in the
United States over the period 1987–2017 as percentage deviations from their
respective long-run trends. Private residential investment peaked in 2005 at
a staggering 25 percent above its long-run trend, and abruptly contracted to
25 percent below trend over the crisis period. The GDP and private non-
residential investment started to contract in 2007, marking the beginning of
the recession.
Second, Figure 1.2 shows the development of the private credit to GDP
ratio and the national house price index. House prices peaked in early 2006,
after a period of strong and accelerating growth in the early 2000’s. Private
sector indebtedness, as measured by the credit-to-GDP ratio, peaked two years
later in 2007 at almost 170%, after also having grown steadily since the mid-
1990’s. It then contracted sharply before levelling off at 150% by 2012. These
data illustrate that developments in the real estate market led the general busi-
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Figure 1.1: Real gross domestic product and real private investment in the
United States in 1987–2017
Note: Percentage deviations from trend. The data series are quarterly and deflated with the GDP deflator. The
trend is extracted with the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter l = 1600. Shaded areas indicate
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recessions. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National
Income and Product Account tables.
ness cycle, and that the recession was characterised by strong deleveraging of
the private sector.
What led to such a dramatic downturn? According to the Financial Cri-
sis Inquiry Commission (2011), an environment of low interest rates and an
expanding credit supply, enabled by new financial instruments and increas-
ing securitisation, fuelled the real estate boom of the early 2000’s. As real
estate prices eventually started to fall and private sector indebtedness was at
record levels, the subsequent contraction was made much worse by private
sector deleveraging. Risks that were not well understood had built up in the
financial system; their unravelling led to a freeze of the financial market. The
recession of 2007–2009 was thus tightly linked to the house price and credit
cycles.1
1The report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) offers a detailed account of the
boom and the subsequent crisis. See e.g. Gorton (2008) and Calomiris (2009) for descriptions of
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(a) Private credit to GDP ratio
Note: The data are quarterly, and computed as the ratio of the end-of-quarter stock of outstanding credit to the
quarterly gross domestic product (GDP). The measure of private credit includes all loans to and debt securities
issued by the non-financial private sector. Shaded areas indicate National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
recessions. Source: Bank for International Settlements, Total Credit to Private Non-Financial Sector, Adjusted
for Breaks.
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(b) National house price index
Note: The data are quarterly. 2000Q1=100. Shaded areas indicate National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) recessions. Source: Case & Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index.
Figure 1.2: Private credit and house prices in the United States in 1987–2017
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1.2 Financial frictions in macroeconomics
In the following sections, I first summarise the macroeconomic research
literature on financial frictions and credit cycles. Next, I describe the semi-
nal models of agency problems in corporate finance and the signal extraction
model that I apply in the three essays that constitute the main body of this
thesis, and link my research to the macro-financial literature. Finally, I sum-
marise in more detail the models and the main findings in each of the essays.
1.2 Financial frictions in macroeconomics
The financial crisis seemed to catch many policymakers and economists alike
by surprise. However, it has been understood for decades that incomplete in-
formation causes significant market failures in financial markets. For example,
there may be asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers about
the true creditworthiness of the borrower; returns on investment projects may
depend on actions of the borrower that are unobserved by financiers; or the
true structure of risks and pay-offs to investments may simply be unknown
to investors. Compared to a situation of complete information, these features
may lead to an excessive amount of debt or risk-taking, to credit rationing,
or to a sensitivity of financing to the balance sheet conditions of both lenders
and borrowers. At the heart of all of these issues are incentives. Seminal con-
tributions to this literature were made by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), De Meza
and Webb (1987), and Holmström and Tirole (1997). They are discussed in
more detail below in Sections 1.3 and 1.4.
These market failures manifested themselves in an evident manner in the
crisis. Banks and financiers had taken on excessive risk; financial institutions
were very highly levered and hence vulnerable to capital losses; financial in-
struments had become so complex that their true risks were no longer well
understood; risk that was thought to be well-diversified turned out to be any-
thing but — in particular in the market for subprime mortgages in the United
States. Examples of such market failures were plentiful both in the United
States and in Europe. When losses started to accumulate, first in the subprime
market and soon in other parts of the financial system, financial intermediaries
sharply cut back lending, not only to households and non-financial firms, but
also to each other. This finally led to an international financial market freeze
fuelled by mistrust in the balance sheet conditions of the market participants.2
the market for mortgage finance and the subprime crisis.
2See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011).
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Banks and financial institutions are vital for the functioning of a modern
economy. They intermediate funds between sectors of the economy and pool
risks, among other important functions. Both households’ and non-financial
firms’ financing — be it for housing investment or investment into productive
capital — depend on the banking sector and more generally on the financial
markets. This is also why a financial crisis can have such devastating effects
on an economy. If the banking sector’s ability to intermediate funds is im-
paired, it has direct consequences on private consumption and investment.
Moreover, the financial sector can amplify shocks to the economy or make
their effects more persistent — in other words, exacerbate booms and reces-
sions — precisely because they act as a link between the various sectors of the
real economy, while themselves being vulnerable to these shocks.
Starting from the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, macroeconomic models of
financial frictions have been developed to study the potentially disruptive ef-
fects of these market failures on the aggregate economy. Seminal general
equilibrium models of financial frictions include Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999), and Iacoviello (2005). The latter is the first to consider
the aggregate impacts of frictions in the housing market and fluctuations in
house prices, while the others focus on various frictions in the financing of
productive investment.
Since the crisis, the literature on financial frictions in the macroeconomy
and on policies that can curb them has proliferated. Influential examples of
this more recent literature include, among others, Gerali, Neri, Nessa, and Sig-
noretti (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014),
and Cúrdia and Woodford (2016), who study the role of bank capital in busi-
ness cycle fluctuations. Regarding the housing market — in particular the in-
teractions of house prices, household leverage, and foreclosures with the rest
of the economy —, important contributions have been made, for example, by
Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Kaplan and Violante (2014), Justiniano, Primiceri,
and Tambalotti (2015), and Corbae and Quintin (2015).
This thesis contributes to this growing literature by exploring ways in
which various forms of incomplete information and financial frictions in the
intermediation of funds can create instability in the credit market. In the
macroeconomic literature, the term financial friction itself refers to some depar-
ture from the assumptions of complete asset markets, complete information
among parties in a financial contract, and perfect competition in the financial
market. This leads to distortions in the aggregate amount of saving, borrow-
ing, and investment in the economy relative to the efficient outcome.
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In this thesis, I focus on specific forms of financial frictions: in the first
essay, the friction is caused by a moral hazard problem, and in the second one,
by adverse selection. Both of these are agency problems caused by private
information of one or more of the parties in a financial contract. The third
essay builds on a problem of partial information about the true riskiness of
investments, which leads to a signal extraction problem for the investors.
In the first essay, I analyse a New Keynesian general equilibrium model
where the investment in physical capital is affected by a particular double
moral hazard problem. As a consequence, business cycles in the model are
sensitive to the availability of bank capital. This creates a role for a policy that
can smooth credit cycles caused by fluctuations in bank capital. In the essay,
I explore the interactions of such a policy and conventional monetary policy
that focuses on stabilising inflation.
The second and third essays focus on the supbrime crisis in the United
States from the borrowers’ and the financiers’ perspectives, respectively. The
subprime crisis acted as a trigger for the global financial crisis. In a series
of influential empirical studies by Mian and Sufi (2009, 2011) and Mian, Rao,
and Sufi (2013), the authors present evidence for a credit supply driven mort-
gage lending boom. Lenders expanded their supply of mortgage lending and
relaxed their lending standards in the run-up to the subprime crisis of 2007–
2009. The shift in supply was tightly connected to the expansion of mortgage
securitisation since the early 2000’s. In hindsight, it was clear that lending
standards had been much too loose during the years preceding the crisis, as
households who did not have strong income prospects had been encouraged
to apply for home loans. As long as house prices would keep increasing, both
borrowers and lenders would benefit from these loans.
The second essay concentrates on the incentives of different households to
apply for housing loans, and on how these incentives are affected by expected
house prices and the interest rate environment. I build an overlapping gener-
ations model of housing investment. In the model, lenders are unable to ex-
actly observe the creditworthiness of an individual loan applicant because of
private information on income risk of the borrowers. This information asym-
metry leads to an undesirably large amount of borrowing, as households who
have a high income risk are able to receive loans that they would not if their
types were publicly observable.
Finally, the third essay shifts the focus to the perceptions and beliefs of
financiers about the riskiness of the borrower pool in the housing market. I
depart from the assumption of complete information. Instead, I assume that
financiers do not fully observe the state of the economy, and are thus unable
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to disentangle aggregate and idiosyncratic risk from each other. Using data
on national and regional home price indices in the United States, I estimate
an empirical capital asset pricing model with learning to study the extent to
which lenders truly believed that the overall risk in the borrower pool was
low — or in other words, the extent to which idiosyncratic risks could be
diversified away in large portfolios of housing loans.
1.3 The Holmström-Tirole double moral hazard
The double moral hazard model of Holmström and Tirole (1997) describes a
situation where the capital positions of both the financial intermediary and
the borrower matter for the terms of financing of an investment project. I
present here the variable investment scale version of the model.
The model has three types of agents: firms, financial intermediaries, and
investors. Firms are endowed with investment projects that turn invested
funds into final goods. In order to realise a project, a firm needs external
funding from an investor and a financial intermediary. Investors and inter-
mediaries are endowed with funds they can invest in projects. The model has
two time periods. In the first period, the three parties — a firm, a financial in-
termediary, and an outside investor — agree on a financial contract to fund a
project, and investment decisions are made. In the second period, the returns
to investment are realised and observed by all parties, and all financial claims
are settled.
It is assumed that all agents are risk neutral and protected by limited liabil-
ity. All firms are assumed to be identical, i.e. endowed with the same projects.
Each firm can choose between three projects: a good one, a bad one, and an
ugly one. Each project yields a gross return R per unit invested with prob-
ability p, and nothing with probability 1  p. They differ, however, in their
success probability p: the good project has a success probability p = pH (with
0 < pH < 1), and the bad and ugly projects both have a success probability
p = pL < pH (with 0 < pL < 1). Denote by Dp = pH   pL > 0 the difference
in success probabilities. The projects also differ in terms of the private benefit
that accrues to the firm. The good project offers no private benefit, while the
bad and ugly projects entail a private benefit of b and B per unit invested
in the project, respectively, with 0 < b < B. It is furthermore assumed that
only the good project is economically viable, i.e. its expected excess return is
positive:
(pHR  g)I > 0 > (pLR  g+ b)I,
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where I denotes the overall size of the investment project, and g the expected
outside return of the funds.
Under these assumptions, a firm may be tempted to choose a non-viable
project in order to enjoy a positive private benefit. This is not desirable from
the point of view of the investors and the intermediaries, because it leads to
a lower success probability for the project. It is assumed that the investors
can only verify the realised return on the project, but not which project was
chosen.
A financial intermediary can monitor a firm in order to prevent it from
choosing the ugly project, but this entails a cost proportional to the size of the
project, cI, with c > 0. This cost is non-veriafiable to the outside investors.
This, in turn, creates a second moral hazard problem, as an intermediary may
be tempted to forego proper monitoring. In this sense, the outside investors
are uninformed, while the intermediaries are informed.
Denote by A0 the initial assets available to a given firm, by A the amount
that the firm invests into the project, by Im the assets available to the inter-
mediary, and by Iu the assets available to the uninformed outside investors.
Further, let R f denote the share of the project’s total returns RI going to the
firm, Rm to the intermediary, and Ru to the investor. The problem of a firm
with initial assets A0 is then:
max pHR f + g(A  A0)
s.t. A+ Im + Iu  I (1.1)
A  A0 (1.2)
R f + Rm + Ru  RI (1.3)
pHRu  gI (1.4)
pHRm  bI (1.5)
pHRm   cI  pLRm (1.6)
pHR f  pLR f + bI (1.7)
where b is the required minimum return on the intermediary’s funds.
In this problem, equations (1.1) and (1.2) are feasibility constraints and
equation (1.3) the “cake-sharing” constraint. Equation (1.4) is the outside in-
vestor’s participation constraint: he must get at least his expected outside
return in order to be willing to participate. Equations (1.5) and (1.6) are the
intermediary’s participation and incentive constraints, respectively. It must
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get at least its market-determined required minimum return b to be willing to
participate; and it must also be compensated for the monitoring costs in order
to be willing to monitor the firm. Finally, equation (1.7) is the firm’s incentive
constraint: it must be compensated for the loss of the private benefit in order
to be willing to choose the good project.
All equations of this optimisation programme can be divided through by
the initial assets A0. Define the scaled variables R˜ f =
R f
A0
, R˜m = RmA0 , and
R˜u = RuA0 . Holmström and Tirole (1997) show that in equilibrium, all con-
straints bind. All firm assets are invested into the project, the intermediary
will monitor the firm, and the good project will be chosen in equilibrium. The
investor and the intermediary will invest up to the point where they get, in
expectation, exactly their required minimum returns (g and b, respectively).
The solution to this problem is then:
R˜ f =
b
Dp
I
A0
R˜m =
c
Dp
I
A0
=
b
pH
Im
A0
R˜u =

R  b+ c
Dp

I
A0
=
g
pH
Iu
A0
An important property of this solution is that all firms will choose the
same optimal investment policy per unit of their initial assets A0. In other
words, all firms choose the same capital ratio IA0 that maximise their expected
return, and scale up the investment project in proportion to their initial assets.
This property makes it easy to aggregate across a set of firms of different
sizes in terms of their initial assets, and thus makes this formulation of the
individual firm’s moral hazard problem easy to incorporate into a general
equilibrium model. I make use of this property in the model in Chapter 2.
The framework also makes a clear distinction between the balance sheets of
the borrower, the bank, and the outside investor; a second desirable property,
which is lacking in simpler models of moral hazard.
In their article, Holmström and Tirole (1997) show that in this model, a
contraction in aggregate intermediary capital will lead to a contraction in ag-
gregate uninformed capital as well, as less resources are available for monitor-
ing. As a consequence of such a credit crunch, total investment I will contract
by more than the initial crunch in the intermediary capital, as firms’ solvency
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ratio, i.e. the ratio of total firm assets to the total amount of assets invested,
must increase.
Holmström and Tirole (1997) also point out that the model provides a
rationale for countercyclical capital ratios for intermediaries. This is because
in a credit crunch, as bank capital is scarcer, the return per unit of capital will
be higher and thus a lower capital ratio will be enough to provide the right
incentives for the intermediary.
This result has a direct connection to the contemporary discussion on the
countercyclical regulation of bank’s capital ratios proposed after the financial
crisis of 2007–2009 in the international Basel III regulatory framework.3 How-
ever, although this model implies a countercyclicality of capital ratios, it does
not, by itself, provide a rationale for the regulation of these ratios through gov-
ernment intervention, as the market itself provides enough discipline for the
contractual parties through the optimal compensation scheme.
In addition to my research, this double moral hazard approach has also
been used in macroeconomics by Chen (2001), Meh and Moran (2010), Faia
(2010), Christensen, Meh, and Moran (2011), and Haavio, Ripatti, and Takalo
(2016). All of the aforementioned studies deal with the availability of bank
capital and its implications for financial stability from a macroeconomic per-
spective.
1.4 Asymmetric information in corporate finance
Besides moral hazard, another agency problem — adverse selection induced
by asymmetric information — can lead to loanable funds in the economy
being sub-optimally distributed, as compared to a situation of complete infor-
mation. Whereas moral hazard causes lending to depend on the availability
of internal funds of either the borrower or the informed investor, or both as
in the model discussed above, asymmetric information between lenders and
borrowers can lead to either over-investment or to credit rationing through an
inefficient pricing of risk. In these models, borrowers may typically default in
equilibrium, and the default probability is sensitive to the borrower’s internal
funds.
Two seminal models of asymmetric information are of particular interest.
The first one is the credit rationing model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and the
second one is the over-investment model of De Meza and Webb (1987).4
3See the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010).
4See House (2006) for a comparison of the properties of these two models.
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Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) formulate a model of private types with two sets
of agents, banks and firms. All agents are risk neutral. Banks have funds that
they can use to finance investment projects. Each firm is endowed with an
investment project of identical size I that yields an expected gross return $.
Furthermore, each firm is endowed with own funds w < I, such that it needs
external financing to undertake the project. It is assumed that all projects
have the same expected return $, but have different success probabilities p,
and hence a different variance of the project return. It is further assumed that
banks can observe the expected return, but not the success probability of an
individual project. Finally, firms can default on their loans. In order to acquire
external financing for the project, a firm therefore also needs to invest its own
funds in the project. Denote by r the gross interest paid by the firm on the
loan.
It is assumed that banks act competitively and maximise their profits over
their pool of loans. Under the assumption of unobserved borrower types,
however, they are not price-takers. Instead, banks set the interest rates charged
on loans strategically, taking into account the impact that the interest rate has
on the composition of the borrower pool.
These particular assumptions lead to a situation where credit rationing can
arise in equilibrium. The expected pay-off for a firm on a project is given by
$  pr(I   w), which is decreasing in the success probability p. The authors
show that the equilibrium is characterised by pooling in the credit market,
where all firms can get a loan at the same interest rate r, and a cut-off strategy
for the firms, where only firms with a low enough p apply for loans. From
the banks’ perspective, these are the riskiest and most undesirable borrowers.
This is because the expected return to the bank from an individual loan is
pr(I   w), which is increasing in the success probability p. This results from
the assumed use of standard debt contracts: the lender bears the downside
risk if the project fails, while borrowers are protected by limited liability. In
this case, as the interest rate increases, the safest borrowers opt out of the
credit market first. It is then possible that at the equilibrium interest rate, the
demand for loans exceeds the supply of loans. Increasing the interest rate —
which would reduce the demand for loans — would result in a lower expected
return for the bank, as the least risky firms would be driven out of the market
first.
This model describes a situation where asymmetric information leads to
too little financing, too high interest rates, and consequently a sub-optimally
low level of investment from society’s point of view. But this result hinges
on the specific assumptions of the model; in particular, on the assumption of
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identical expected returns on each project. At the other extreme, asymmetric
information may lead to an equilibrium characterised by too much financing,
too low interest rates, and thus a sub-optimally high level of investment.
This is the case described by De Meza and Webb (1987) in their seminal
contribution. Their set-up also features two sets of risk neutral agents, firms
and banks. Firms are again endowed with investment projects of equal size I
that yield a risky ex-post gross return R 2 fRs,R f g, common to all projects.
In case of success, with probability p > 0, the project yields R = Rs > 0, and
in case of failure, with probability 1  p, it yields R = R f = 0. The firms
also have identical initial assets w < I. Banks are endowed with funds that
they can use to finance these projects. It is assumed that they offer standard
debt contracts to the firms, and firms are consequently protected by limited
liability. Now, while each firm’s distribution of returns has the same support,
firms differ in terms of their expected return $ = pRs.
It is assumed that banks observe the distribution of projects in the popu-
lation of firms, but cannot observe the characteristics of an individual firm.
Again, as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), it is assumed that banks behave com-
petitively and set the interest rates charged on loans strategically to take into
account the impact of the interest rate on the loan applicant pool.
These assumptions give rise to a pooling equilibrium in the credit mar-
ket, again characterised by a cut-off strategy for the borrowers: all firms that
enter the credit market receive a loan at an equal interest rate. But now, the
equilibrium is characterised by over-investment rather than credit rationing
when compared to a situation of complete information. Competition among
banks will drive the interest rate down to a zero-profit level so that the mar-
ket clears. The expected pay-off to a firm that enters the credit market is
p (Rs   r(I   w)). The cut-off type is now the riskiest type, i.e. the one with
the lowest probability of success p among all loan applicants. This is due to the
fact that, contrary to the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model, the firm’s expected
pay-off on a project is now increasing in p as long as Rs   r(I   w)  0.
De Meza and Webb (1987) show that under complete information, each
type would be charged an interest rate that reflects their individual probability
of default, and the rate charged from the cut-off type would be higher than the
one charged in the competitive equilibrium under asymmetric information.
The marginal type thus acquires financing that is too cheap from the society’s
point of view, and selection is towards riskier borrowers. As interest rates rise,
the riskiest borrowers first opt out of the credit market.
I apply this model of asymmetric information in the essay in Chapter 3 to
explore incentive mechanisms behind the housing boom and the subprime cri-
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sis of the 2000’s in the United States. The framework allows for a discussion of
a market failure that leads to equilibrium over-borrowing by households and
to the presence of “subprime” households in the market for housing loans.
The De Meza and Webb (1987) framework of asymmetric information has
been used by House (2006) in an over-lapping generations model similar to
mine, and more recently by Takalo and Toivanen (2012) and Jokivuolle, Kiema,
and Vesala (2014). All of these studies focus on over-investment externalities
in the financing of physical investment, not housing.
1.5 Partial information and signal extraction
A simple yet powerful departure from the assumption of complete informa-
tion concerns a situation where agents do not observe the true data generating
process of an exogenous process that drives some economic fundamental. I
present here a simple univariate example. A more general multivariate pre-
sentation is found, for example, in Hamilton (1994, Ch. 13).
Let zt be a noisy signal about the unobservable data generating process xt:
zt = xt + #t (1.8)
xt = rxt 1 + ut. (1.9)
Here, #t  N(0, s2# ) and ut  N(0, s2u) are both assumed to be independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise. r 2 [0, 1) is a parameter. In each
period t, agents observe the signal zt, but not the components xt and #t.
Suppose that economic agents are interested in forming an estimate of xt
conditional on the history of observations zt = (z0, . . . , zt). This problem is
a signal extraction problem, and Equations (1.8) and (1.9) form a univariate
state-space system. Assuming that the agents form their beliefs rationally, the
solution to this problem is found by Bayesian updating. Given some prior be-
lief about the initial value x0, the agents update their beliefs on (x0, x1, . . . , xt)
in each period as new observations zt become available by taking advantage of
Bayes’ rule. This procedure yields a linear estimator of the latent state xt that
is optimal in the sense of minimising the mean square error of the estimator.
The Kalman filter methodology provides a powerful framework for forming
such estimators in multivariate and non-Gaussian state-space models, as well.
The implications of such signal extraction problems in general equilibrium
were first considered by Robert E. Lucas in a series of papers describing his
“island model”, starting with Lucas (1972). In the Lucas island model, pro-
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ducers of goods only observe local prices, but not the general price level in the
whole economy in a given time period. The general price level only becomes
known with a lag. In order to make supply decisions, producers must figure
out the relative contributions of changes in the general price level and changes
in relative prices to the price of their own good — the local price —, which
they take as given. Production decisions are optimally determined by changes
in relative prices. With the notation above, zt denotes the local price, xt the
general price level, and #t a shock to relative prices. Decisions are thus made
under partial information, and producers in this model confound nominal
and relative price changes. As a consequence, output becomes sub-optimally
volatile, as the only source of uncertainty in the model concerns the relative
contributions of xt and #t to changes in observed prices.
This idea of partial information about economic fundamentals has re-
cently received growing attention both in macroeconomics and in financial
economics. In macroeconomics, the asset pricing implications of model uncer-
tainty have been studied by Johannes, Lochstoer, and Mou (2016) and Collin-
Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2016), among others. In the context of
housing markets, Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007) explore asset pricing
implications of low-frequency risk in house price fundamentals, and Gelain
and Lansing (2014) study the implications of learning on house price dynam-
ics. In finance, Lewellen and Shanken (2002), Adrian and Franzoni (2009), and
Trecroci (2014) among others, formulate conditional capital asset pricing mod-
els with learning in order to explain cross-sectional variation in asset returns.
In Chapter 4, I apply the conditional capital asset pricing model with
Bayesian learning, following Adrian and Franzoni (2009) and Trecroci (2014),
to study how the beliefs of investors about returns to housing investment
evolved in the run-up and during the subprime crisis. I assume that the true
systematic risk of these investments is unobserved, and realised returns pro-
vide noisy signals about this risk. Investors may thus confound aggregate and
idiosyncratic risk, and are faced with a signal extraction problem of the type
described here.
1.6 Summary of the essays
This section describes the main modelling assumptions and summarises the
key results in the three essays that constitute the main body of this thesis.
Each essay is self-contained.
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1.6.1 Chapter 2: The interaction of monetary and macropru-
dential policies
In the first essay, I set up and analyse a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model where the financing of capital investment
is affected by a double moral hazard problem of the Holmström and Tirole
(1997) type. This friction affects both the demand and supply of credit in
the model economy, and thus distorts both investment decisions of firms and
saving decisions of households. Besides the friction on credit intermediation,
the model is standard to the New Keynesian research literature; in particular,
the general price level adjusts sluggishly to shocks due to a Calvo (1983) price-
setting friction.5
In the model equilibrium, the availability of loans for capital produc-
tion depends on the balance sheet conditions of both banks and the capital-
producing entrepreneurs because of agency costs imposed by the moral haz-
ard problem. The aggregate economy is thus vulnerable to shocks that affect
the balance sheets of banks and capital producers.
As the main contribution of the essay, I solve for jointly optimal mone-
tary and macroprudential policies. The monetary policy aims at removing
the distortion created by nominal rigidities, and the macroprudential policy
is in charge of mitigating the distortion on the level of aggregate investments
caused by the financial friction. Specifically, monetary policy targets the in-
flation rate, and macroprudential policy targets the aggregate leverage of the
banking sector, which determines aggregate investment in the economy. This
optimal policy problem is set up as a problem of a benevolent social planner
who chooses the values of these policy targets so as to maximise social wel-
fare, while respecting the private agents’ incentives and optimising behaviour.
I further assume that the planner can commit to the chosen policies. This type
of optimal policy problem is called a Ramsey problem after Ramsey (1927).
I find that the optimal policy can achieve an efficient outcome — in the
sense of replicating the equilibrium allocation of resources in an economy
without financial and nominal frictions — if the social planner can conduct
both monetary and macroprudential policy. Using monetary policy alone is
not enough: in this case a policy trade-off between stabilising the inflation
rate and the output gap arises. The results provide a justification for a sepa-
rate macroprudential policy that is conducted in coordination with monetary
policy.
5See e.g. Galí (2008) and Woodford (2003) for thorough presentations of the New Keynesian
model of business cycles.
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This trade-off results from the opposing effects that the nominal and fi-
nancial frictions have on the price of physical capital. An inflationary shock,
for example, requires a deflationary response in order to remove the distor-
tion on relative prices, but this will depress the real price of capital. However,
depression of the capital price worsens the incentive problems in the financial
market, which distorts the level of investments and creates an output gap.
Correcting for this latter distortion would then warrant positive inflation in
order to push up the real capital price.
As the second contribution, I systematically compare the performance of
simply policy rules to the optimal policy. When policy follows simple rules —
in the spirit of the Taylor rule for monetary policy, proposed by Taylor (1993)
— the source of fluctuations in the economy is relevant for the choice of the
appropriate policy mix. I find that there may be welfare gains from following
a monetary policy rule that reacts to assets prices, and in particular, to the real
price of capital.
A separate macroprudential policy rule, in the form of countercyclical bank
capital regulation, is only useful in counteracting shocks that arise from the
financial sector itself; however, it can be counterproductive in mitigating the
impacts of shocks that arise from the real sector but affect the financial sector,
because it can prevent or slow down the proper adjustment of investments
to their efficient level. This suggests that countercyclical capital buffers for
banks should rather be used as a discretionary policy tool to make them less
vulnerable to financial shocks.
1.6.2 Chapter 3: House prices, lending standards, and the
macroeconomy
In the second essay, I study the link between house prices, lending standards,
and aggregate over-investment in housing. I develop an overlapping gen-
erations model of the housing market following House (2006), who studies
over-investment in productive capital.
In the model, the market for housing loans is affected by asymmetric in-
formation as in the De Meza and Webb (1987) model: borrowers have private
types that define their idiosyncratic income risk. Another source of risk are
house values, observed by both borrowers and lenders.
The private income risk together with the public house valuation risk de-
termines the borrowers’ private equilibrium default probability on housing
loans. Selection in equilibrium is towards riskier borrower types: the marginal
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borrower is the riskiest one in the borrower pool. He would thus not find it
profitable to participate in the credit market under symmetric information,
because the cost at which he would be able to borrow would reflect his true
private risk, instead of the average risk in the whole borrower pool.
In this context, tight or loose lending standards are defined in relation to the
first-best allocation of credit that would prevail under symmetric information.
In a similar vein, a subprime borrower is defined in the model as a household
that finds it profitable to apply for a loan and buy a home under asymmetric
information, but would not do so under symmetric information as the cost of
borrowing would reflect its true private default risk.
In the main contribution of the essay, through a comparative statics exer-
cise, I show that lending standards are loose and the incentives for households
to apply for a loan are particularly strong, first, when future house values are
expected to be high, which leads to high leverage of borrowers.
However, there are strong non-linearities in the relationship between bor-
rowing incentives and expected house values. When expected future house
values are at a very low level, even high-risk households find it worthwhile
to borrow in order to finance a house purchase, as housing is cheap. When
the expected house values increase, these high-risk borrowers opt out of the
market first, as housing becomes more expensive. But as the expected values
increase even more, the expected capital gains on housing become so attractive
despite risks inherent in high leverage that the high-risk, or subprime, types
start to opt back into the market. Correspondingly, household default rates
first also decrease, but subsequently increase, as households become more
levered.
Second, incentives for borrowing are strong when safe interest rates are
low, which implies low costs of borrowing. This result implies that loose mon-
etary policy can have a direct impact on the stability of the housing market
through the cost of borrowing and the opportunity cost of housing invest-
ment.
These results shed light on incentive mechanisms that can help explain the
developments in the U.S. housing market in the early 2000’s. The environ-
ment was characterised by low interest rates and an expectation of continued
increases in house prices. At the same time, households became highly in-
debted.
Finally, I extend the model to include a strategic complementarity in home-
ownership and deadweight costs of default on house prices. The first feature
captures, in a simple form, the hype of owning a home that characterises a
housing boom. The second feature captures a fire sale externality that char-
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acterises a housing bust: as foreclosures increase, the value that debtors can
recover by seizing homes and selling them decreases. I demonstrate that these
two features can create endogenous cycles in house prices.
1.6.3 Chapter 4: Learning about systematic risk in the housing
market
In the third essay of this thesis, I explore the perceptions of investors about the
systematic risk in the residential housing market in the United States in 1987–
2016. The subprime crisis erupted in 2007 after a period of strong increases in
residential housing prices in many regions of the United States.
A prominent narrative of the crisis asserts that financiers and policymak-
ers alike believed economic fundamentals to be strong and house prices to
keep increasing, which justified a boom in mortgage lending. Because house
prices were expected to increase further, it was argued, the systematic — or
undiversifiable — risk in investment into the housing market was thought to
be negligible.
To systematically study the beliefs of financiers over the years that led to
the crisis, I estimate a conditional capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) with
Bayesian learning on returns in the residential housing market. I use monthly
data on house prices in 17 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) from 1987 to
2016 provided by Case & Shiller.
In the model, risk-averse financiers choose portfolio holdings of housing
investment to maximise their expected returns. The financiers only care about
their wealth, or in other words, about the risk-return trade-off of their invest-
ment. I assume that the financiers are unable to disentangle the idiosyncratic
and the systematic risk in the portfolio, and there is thus incomplete informa-
tion about the true risk-return trade-off. I further assume that an individual
portfolio is composed of a pool of regional housing investments, and the sys-
tematic risk is related to the extent to which the regional market co-moves
with the national housing market. The problem of an individual financier
in the model, who seeks to price the housing portfolio, is thus a signal ex-
traction problem where the observed returns are noisy signals about the true
aggregate state of the housing market.
I show evidence in the data that financiers’ perceptions about systematic
risk in the housing market were relatively low in the 1990’s and the early
2000’s, in the period where house prices were booming. At the onset of the
subprime crisis, these beliefs were most swiftly updated upward in regions
18
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that had experienced the strongest house price appreciation.
These results lend support to the view that the crisis was fuelled by a
loosening of lending standards and a credit boom, as financiers believed house
prices to keep rising and investment in the housing market to be safe. In other
words, the risk in housing investment was thought to be mostly idiosyncratic
and not systematic in nature. Hence it could be diversified away. In hindsight,
developments in regional housing markets were correlated, and the United
States experienced a dramatic nation-wide fall in house prices — something
that was widely thought to be very unlikely as late as in 2005.
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2 The interaction of
monetary and
macroprudential policies1
2.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis that erupted in 2007 in the United States has high-
lighted the role of aggregate balance sheet conditions of banks for economic
cycles. As a response to the crisis, policymakers have emphasised the impor-
tance of macroprudential regulation, as opposed to and in addition of reforms
to the regulation and supervision of individual institutions.2
Macroprudential policy in general refers to policy measures that aim at
mitigating the risks and imbalances of the financial system as a whole, while
conventional microprudential banking regulation has focused on single insti-
tutions. The mitigation of credit cycles, which can be much more volatile than
real output cycles, has been seen as a key policy goal for the new macro-
prudential framework. This regulatory response stems from the widespread
view that a build-up of system-wide risks and imbalances was at the heart
of the collapse of the financial system in 2007. In this view, mitigating credit
cycles and supporting financial stability are important policy goals in them-
selves, but they are also essential for the stability of the economy as a whole,
as banking crises tend to have long-lasting consequences for real economic
1An article based on this essay is forthcoming in the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. See
Silvo (2018).
2See, for example, the policy reports by the Bank of England (2009) and the Bank of Interna-
tional Settlements (2011).
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activity.
After the crisis, a new policy framework was internationally adopted in
the Basel III agreement in 2010 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
2010). The new macroprudential policy tools include, among others, counter-
cyclical and risk-weighted capital buffers for banks that depend not only on
the banks’ own balance sheet conditions, but also on aggregate economic and
credit conditions.
This essay contributes to the academic and policy discussions on how to set
up mandates for monetary and macroprudential regulators, and on the gains
of policy coordination between monetary and financial stability mandates.
The main contribution of this essay is to solve for the jointly optimal mix of
monetary and macroprudential policies in response to various economic and
financial disturbances. Very few previous pieces of research on joint monetary
and macroprudential policies have solved for the full jointly optimal policy
programme, and none have done it in a similar setup as this essay. As a
second contribution, this essay also provides a systematic welfare comparison
of the optimal policies to simple policy rules.
To do so, I formulate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model where banks’ balance sheets play a key role in financial intermediation,
which in turn has an important effect on economic cycles. These dynamics
arise because of informational frictions in credit intermediation caused by an
agency problem formulated by Holmström and Tirole (1997).
The key transmission channel from the financial sector to the real economy
in this model is the real capital price, which on the one side affects investment
decisions in the financial market, and on the other side households’ saving
behaviour. The fluctuations of this price summarise the effects that the agency
cost has on the availability of capital and investment in the economy. It can
also be interpreted as Tobin’s q.
To solve for the optimal policies, I set up a Ramsey policy problem in
which a social planner can directly set either one policy variable (the inflation
rate), or two policy variables (the inflation rate and the aggregate leverage of
the banking sector). I assume that the problem of the planner is constrained
in the sense that he cannot remove the agency problem in the economy.
As the main result, I find that the first-best optimal outcome, which cor-
responds to the frictionless real business cycle (RBC) equilibrium, can be
replicated when the social planner can jointly use both a monetary and a
macroprudential instrument. On the contrary, using only monetary policy
— namely, controlling only inflation — leads to a short-run policy trade-off
between stabilising inflation and the output gap. This result is linked to a sem-
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inal contribution by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), who discuss a situation
where nominal cost-push shocks lead to a similar short-run trade-off in sta-
bilising inflation. The findings in this essay thus broaden our understanding
on the sources of potential monetary policy trade-offs.
I also systematically compare the performance of simple rule-based poli-
cies to the optimal policies in terms of household welfare. When simple policy
rules are used instead of the Ramsey-optimal policies, contrary to the findings
in many earlier studies, I find that it may be beneficial for the monetary au-
thority to also react to financial conditions when financial frictions are present
in the economy.3 In particular, a Basel III-type countercyclical capital ratio
regulation works well in stabilising the credit cycle. By controlling the aggre-
gate leverage of the banking sector and smoothing out the credit cycle, it can
effectively prevent financial shocks from propagating to the real economy.
In contrast, when the disturbances arise from real supply or demand side
shocks, and not from the financial sector, the form of macroprudential policy
matters, as it can hinder proper economic adjustment by creating an addi-
tional friction on the adjustment of investment. In this case, a unified mandate
for the monetary authority, where besides price developments the central bank
also pays attention to financial conditions — in particular to the real price of
capital — seems to be sufficient.
It is not evident how monetary policy should react to financial imbalances
– if at all – and how new macroprudential policy measures should be co-
ordinated with monetary policy over the business cycle. According to the
Tinbergen principle, a policymaker should have as many policy instruments
as there are policy objectives, and each instrument should be assigned to one
objective. In light of this view, then, a separate macroprudential tool should
be useful when frictions in credit intermediation are present. The Ramsey-
optimal policy analysis in this essay supports this view.
It has to be noted, however, that the policies studied in this essay are ones
that aim at stabilising the credit cycle — as measured by deviations of the
loans-to-output ratio of the economy from its steady state — by responding
to various shocks that affect banks’ capital positions. The model is solved
through log-linearisation around its efficient steady state, in the sense that it
coincides with the steady state of the frictionless (first-best) economy. The so-
lution thus abstracts away from potential asymmetric macro-financial linkages
and large financial shocks, as well as from steady-state distortions. There is no
3See for example Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Iacoviello (2005) and Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2007).
26
2.2 Related literature
externality in financing that would require correction ex-ante, but the banks
in the model are vulnerable to macroeconomic and financial conditions, be-
cause their ability to fund investment projects depends on their balance sheet
conditions. This causes undesirable distortions away from the first-best allo-
cation.4 The results in this essay thus reflect a view of macroprudential policy
as a tool for managing business cycles that arise from dynamic distortions in
the economy, analogously to the traditional view of monetary policy in the
New Keynesian tradition.5 A similar rationale is given for optimal policies for
example in De Paoli and Paustian (2017).
The remainder of the essay is organised as follows. First, Section 2.2 re-
views earlier research related to my results. Section 2.3 then outlines the the-
oretical framework. Next, Section 2.4 presents the calibration and discusses
the empirical fit of the theoretical model. The main contribution of this essay
is presented in Section 2.5, which discusses the implications of the financial
friction to the aggregate economy, and the Ramsey-optimal policy plans that
can offset the effects of this friction to restore the first-best. Next, Section 2.6
analyses the aggregate dynamics of the model economy under various sim-
ple policy rules and compares these policy regimes to the Ramsey policies.
Section 2.7 discusses the welfare implications of the different policy regimes.
Finally, Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
The literature on financial frictions in macroeconomic theory is vast and grow-
ing. Most early studies on financial frictions in a general equilibrium setting
do not model financial intermediation explicitly, abstracting from banks’ cap-
ital position altogether. Examples include Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carl-
strom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Iacoviello
(2005), Monacelli (2008), Faia and Monacelli (2007), and Adrian and Shin
(2010).
More recent research does consider the role of credit intermediation in
business cycles. Cúrdia and Woodford (2010b, 2016) formulate a model with
costly intermediation and time varying credit spreads that arise from bor-
4Holmström and Tirole (1997) discuss more extensively the countercyclical bank leverage im-
plied by the agency problem that is also applied in this essay.
5The policy analysed in this essay could perhaps more accurately be termed as “financial sta-
bility policy”; to keep in line with previous literature, however, I use the term “macroprudential
policy”.
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rower default risk, and find that monetary policy should respond to current
and future credit spreads. Further building on Cúrdia and Woodford (2010b),
Cúrdia and Woodford (2010a, 2011) model balance sheets of both the central
bank and private banks. Their results suggest that in a deep enough financial
crisis, such unconventional monetary policy measures can be efficient.
Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas, and Diba (2016) suggest, building on Cúrdia
and Woodford (2010b, 2016), that financial market frictions can be strongly
countercyclical and have amplification effects on business cycles and fiscal
multipliers. This finding supports the view that mitigating credit cycles has
important consequences for general economic conditions.
Gertler and Karadi (2011) formulate an influential model of financial fric-
tions where a moral hazard problem exists between a bank and its depositors,
affecting the supply side of credit. However, in this framework, the balance
sheets of the bank and the borrower, on the demand side, are effectively in-
distinguishable. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010, 2015) extend the model of Gertler
and Karadi (2011) to include interbank credit markets; both Gertler and Kiy-
otaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) find that direct lending by the
central bank is an efficient monetary policy tool in mitigating financial tur-
moil.
Another strand of literature, including this essay, uses the Holmström–
Tirole (1997) double moral hazard framework to explicitly model frictions on
both the demand and the supply side of credit intermediation. As a conse-
quence, both the lenders’ and the borrowers’ balance sheets matter for the
financing conditions. This approach to modelling agency costs has previously
been used by Chen (2001), Meh and Moran (2010), Faia (2010), Christensen,
Meh, and Moran (2011), and most recently by Haavio, Ripatti, and Takalo
(2016). The latter find a role for public equity injections into banks in order to
prevent and mitigate effects financial shocks on credit intermediation.
In a different approach, Gerali, Neri, Nessa, and Signoretti (2010) extend
the model of Iacoviello (2005) to include a monopolistically competitive bank-
ing sector. In the model, borrowers are constrained by collateral constraints,
and banks are constrained by a cost of deviating from an exogenously given
capital ratio target. Hence, in this framework both banks’ and borrowers’ bal-
ance sheets also matter, but unlike in the Holmström and Tirole (1997) frame-
work, not as an equilibrium outcome from an optimal contracting problem.
The literature on jointly optimising monetary and macroprudential poli-
cies is still scarce. Most authors only focus on rule-based policies. Angelini,
Neri, and Panetta (2014) analyse an economy with collateral constraints where
a policymaker sets the parameters of simple monetary and macroprudential
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policy rules to maximise a quadratic policy objective. Angeloni and Faia
(2013) study jointly optimal rule-based monetary policies and capital regu-
lation using a model of bank runs. Christensen et al. (2011) build on Meh and
Moran (2010) to investigate optimal rule-based capital ratio regulation and
monetary policy.
With regard to jointly optimal Ramsey policies, Collard, Dellas, Diba, and
Loisel (2017) study jointly optimal monetary and macroprudential policies in
a model where limited liability and deposit insurance cause excess risk-taking
in the financial sector. De Paoli and Paustian (2017) analyse both cooper-
ative and non-cooperative optimal monetary and macroprudential policies,
both under commitment and discretion, in a New Keynesian economy with
always-binding borrowing constraints as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In line
with the results in this essay, Collard et al. (2017) and De Paoli and Paustian
(2017) also find it desirable to separate the two objectives of financial and price
stability to be dealt with two distinct policies.
This essay is closest, in terms of model structure, to Christensen et al.
(2011). The findings in this essay are mostly in line with theirs and those
of Angelini et al. (2014), who also find modest gains from macroprudential
regulation when shocks arise from the supply side, and larger benefits when
shocks arise from the financial sector itself. Angeloni and Faia (2013), on
the other hand, find that a countercyclical response to financial conditions,
either by reacting to bank leverage or asset prices, unambiguously increases
welfare. A similar result is obtained by De Paoli and Paustian (2017), who find
that a macroprudential policy, in the form of a tax on borrowing, is welfare-
improving, no matter the source of fluctuations.
2.3 The model
The model presented in this section builds and expands on the recent work
by Haavio et al. (2016). It incorporates into an otherwise fairly standard New
Keynesian setup a financial sector affected by double moral hazard of the
Holmström and Tirole (1997) type, whereby a moral hazard problem exists
both between the bank and its depositors, and the bank and its borrowers.
This allows for a friction to exist both on the supply and the demand side
of credit. This, in turn, creates a distinction between banks’ and productive
firms’ capital as they earn different returns in equilibrium.
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2.3.1 Structure of the economy
The economy consists of atomistic households, a production sector, a finan-
cial sector, and a government. The total mass of households is one. Each
household has three types of members with distinct roles: an entrepreneur,
a banker, and a worker-consumer6. Each banker manages a bank, each en-
trepreneur undertakes risky projects to produce new capital goods, and each
worker supplies labour to firms, consumes final goods, and saves. There is
perfect insurance between the family members within a household, so that
the model can be described with a representative household.
The production sector is standard to New Keynesian models, except for
capital production. Intermediate good firms employ capital and labour to pro-
duce goods, which are then bundled into final goods by final good firms. Cap-
ital is produced by risk neutral entrepreneurs, who undertake risky projects
to do so. Risk neutral banks collect deposits from households and issue loans
to entrepreneurs, who need funding for their projects. The banks also monitor
the entrepreneurs’ projects to guarantee efficient use of the funds.
Finally, the government conducts monetary and macroprudential policy.
2.3.2 Households
In each period, part of the economy’s entrepreneurs and bankers exit. An
entrepreneur survives into the next period with a constant and exogenous
probability le 2 (0, 1), and exits with probability 1   le. A banker’s sur-
vival probability is, similarly, lb 2 (0, 1). New entrepreneurs and bankers
are born in every period to replace the exiting ones, such that the shares of
entrepreneurs and bankers in the economy remain constant over time. Conse-
quently, the fraction of worker-consumers in the economy also stays constant.
While a banker or an entrepreneur is active, they do not consume; they
merely engage in banking or entrepreneurial activities and accumulate net
worth. Because they are assumed to be risk-neutral and financially con-
strained, they have an incentive to delay consumption until they are no longer
constrained. The assumption of finite horizons for bankers and entrepreneurs
follows Bernanke et al. (1999), and ensures that these agents cannot accumu-
late enough wealth to become financially unconstrained. When they exit, their
net worth is transferred to their household, to be consumed or saved.
6The terms “worker-consumer”, “worker” and “depositor” will be used interchangeably to
denote the family member who is not an entrepreneur or a banker, depending on the specific
context.
30
2.3 The model
The working member of the household consumes, makes saving decisions
and portfolio choices, and supplies labour in each period in a standard man-
ner. The household can save into one-period deposits at a bank or into phys-
ical capital; the deposits are discussed in detail in Section 2.3.5, where the
financial sector is introduced.
The representative household maximises its utility:
max
fCt ,Dt+1,Kt+1,Ltg¥t=0
E0
¥
å
t=0
btU(Ct, Lt), 0 < b < 1, (2.1)
subject to a budget constraint:
PtCt + PtqtKt+1 + Dt+1 = WtLt + Pt

rKt + (1  d)qt

Kt + (1+ rt)Dt + PtTt,
(2.2)
where Ct is real consumption, and Dt is the aggregate amount of nominal
deposits, yielding a gross nominal interest rate 1+ rt.7 Lt is labour supply, Kt
is the real capital stock, and Tt are real lump sum transfers received by the
household, which include profits from the monopolistically competitive firms
owned by the household and net returns from banking and entrepreneurial
activities.
The final good acts as numeraire, and Pt is its price index. Then, qt is the
real price of capital in terms of the final good. It may differ from unity because
of the distortion created by the financial friction, described below; it can also
be interpreted as Tobin’s q. Finally, Wt is the nominal wage rate, and rKt is the
real rental rate of capital. The parameter b 2 (0, 1) denotes the discount factor
of the household, and d 2 (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of capital.
I specify a standard CES utility function for the household:
U(Ct, Lt) = Zct
C1 st
1  s  
cL1+qt
1+ q
.
7Individual deposits are subject to project-level idiosyncratic risk. I assume that the repre-
sentative household invests into a fully diversified portfolio of deposits, or equivalently into a
mutual fund, the return on which is not subject to aggregate risk, following e.g. Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997). I further assume that the deposits are subject to a “cash-in-advance”-like constraint:
households choose the aggregate amount of funds to allocate in bank deposits in period t, in real
terms DtPt , already at the end of period t   1, although the individual deposits are made in t.
For this reason, the opportunity cost of funds is rt > 0, even though the financing contract is an
inter-period contract. This treatment of deposits follows Faia (2010).
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Here s > 0 is the risk aversion parameter, q > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labour substitution, and c > 0 is the labour disutility coefficient.
Zct is an exogenous preference shock, which captures real demand-side dis-
turbances.
This household problem leads to the following standard optimality condi-
tions for labour supply and for deposit and capital holdings:
wt =  UL(Ct, Lt)UC(Ct, Lt) (2.3)
1 = bEt

lt,t+1 (1+ rt)
Pt
Pt+1

(2.4)
qt = bEt
h
lt,t+1 (rKt+1 + (1  d)qt+1)
i
, (2.5)
where lt,t+1 =
UC(Ct+1,Lt+1)
UC(Ct ,Lt)
is the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution,
and wt = WtPt is the real wage.
2.3.3 Final good production
Final good producers bundle intermediate goods Yt(i) into final goods Yt us-
ing a standard aggregation technology
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt(i)
# 1
# di
 #
# 1
, # > 0. (2.6)
There is free entry and exit in the final good sector, and the firms are perfectly
competitive.
The maximisation problem of the final good producers, combined with the
zero-profit condition, yields the standard expressions for the demand sched-
ules of each intermediate good Yt(i) and the aggregate price level Pt:
Yt(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 #
Yt (2.7)
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt(i)1 #di
 1
1 #
. (2.8)
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2.3.4 Intermediate good production
There is a continuum of intermediate good producers of mass one, indexed by
i. At the beginning of each period, the intermediate firm i rents capital Kt(i)
from the household at price rKt , and employs labour Lt(i) at a nominal wage
rate Wt.
Each intermediate firm uses a Cobb-Douglas production technology:
Yt(i) = ZtKt(i)a(Lt(i))1 a, (2.9)
where Zt is an exogenous total factor productivity shock.
Cost minimisation by the intermediate firm yields the standard optimality
conditions for the capital and labour demand, given the relative factor prices,
and a condition for the real marginal cost yt:
rKt
wt
=
aLt(i)
(1  a)Kt(i) , (2.10)
yt =

rKt
a
a  wt
1  a
(1 a)
Z 1t . (2.11)
Each firm is able to set its price in a staggered manner as in Calvo (1983).
In any given period, the constant probability of being able to reset the price is
1  w, with 0 < w < 1. The profit maximisation problem of the intermediate
firm i who is able to reset the price in period t is:
max
Pt(i)
Et
"
¥
å
k=0
wkQt,t+k

Pt(i)
Pt+k
 Yt+kjt

Yt+kjt(i)
#
, (2.12)
subject to the demand condition:
Yt+kjt(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt+k
 #
Yt+k.
Qt,t+k = bklt,t+k
Pt
Pt+k
denotes the stochastic discount factor that is obtained
from the household’s optimality conditions. Yt denotes the nominal marginal
cost.
In equilibrium, all intermediate firms symmetrically choose the price Pt(i)
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= Pt . This yields the expression for the optimal price:
Pt =
#
#  1
Et å¥k=0 w
k Qt,t+k yt+kjt Yt+kjt P#+1t+k
Et å¥k=0 wk Qt,t+k Yt+kjt P#t+k
. (2.13)
In this equilibrium, the aggregate price index (2.8) can then be written as:
Pt =
h
wP1 et 1 + (1 w)(Pt )1 e
i 1
1 e , (2.14)
and the gross inflation rate between periods t and t  1 as:
pt =
"
w+ (1 w)

Pt
Pt 1
1 e# 11 e
. (2.15)
2.3.5 Capital good production
Capital needed in the production of intermediate goods is produced by en-
trepreneurs. They can acquire external funding for risky investment projects
from banks. The banks, on the other hand, invest both their own funds and
the deposits of workers into the projects. The details of this three-party fi-
nancing contract are given in the next section. The financial sector is affected
by agency costs created by a double moral hazard problem as formulated by
Holmström and Tirole (1997).
2.3.5.1 The financing contract
This section describes the partial equilibrium in the financial market. In what
follows, small letters denote individual-level variables, whereas capital letters
denote aggregate variables.
The financial sector consists of banks, each managed by a banker, that
channel funds from the workers to the entrepreneurs. Workers can choose
to deposit their savings at a bank.8 I assume that the banking system has
an aggregate amount of real deposits DtPt available in period t, which it can
8To make the financial sector non-trivial, I assume that a worker cannot deposit his savings in
the bank managed by the banker in the same household; nor can the banker lend funds to the
entrepreneur in his own household.
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intermediate to entrepreneurs within that period. To attract deposits, the re-
turn on the risky investment has to be high enough for the depositor. In this
sense, an individual deposit is not riskless, but rather has to be understood as
a short-term investment subject to idiosyncratic risk. At the end of the period,
after the returns from the investment project are realised, the banker returns
the proceeds from the project to the depositor. Anticipating the equilibrium
of the financial sector, the aggregate amount of these proceeds, in real terms,
will turn out to be equal to (1+ rt)DtPt , reflected in the household’s budget
constraint.
An entrepreneur’s objective is to maximise her expected profit from the
investment project. She can borrow money from the bank in order to lever
the return to the project. However, she can choose to neglect the investment
project to obtain a private benefit. The depositor nor the banker cannot ob-
serve whether the project was neglected or not. If the entrepreneur chooses to
neglect the project in favour of her private benefit, the productive investment
project is less likely to succeed. This presents the first form of moral hazard in
the financial sector and creates a friction to the demand side of funds, restricting
the ability of the entrepreneur to acquire external funding.
In order to mitigate this moral hazard problem, the banker needs to mon-
itor the entrepreneur. But this has a non-verifiable cost to the banker; because
of this, he might want to forgo the monitoring. The worker observes whether
the project succeeds or not but cannot verify whether the banker properly
monitored the entrepreneur. This is the second form of moral hazard in the
financial sector, which creates a friction to the supply side of funds. To mitigate
this second moral hazard problem, and to be able to attract deposits from
the worker, the banker needs to invest some of his own funds to be properly
incentivised to monitor the project, i.e., he must have some “skin in the game”.
Formally, if it is the size of an individual investment project, nt is the net
worth of the entrepreneur, at is the net worth of the banker, kt is the unit cost
of monitoring the investment project, and dt is the deposit of the worker in
period t, then:
it   nt  at + dt   ktit (2.16)
gives the maximum amount of external funding an entrepreneur can get for
her project, given her own net worth.
A successful project turns it final goods into Rit capital goods with R > 1.
A failed project yields R = 0. The one-period contract specifies how the
returns of the project are divided between the worker (Rwt ), the banker (R
b
t )
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and the entrepreneur (Ret ):
R  Rwt + Rbt + Ret . (2.17)
There are two types of projects: “good” and “bad” ones (or non-neglected
and neglected ones). The project succeeds with probability p 2 fpH , pLg, with
Dp = pH   pL > 0 and 1 > pH > pL > 0. If the entrepreneur chooses the
good project, the success probability is pH , but there is no private benefit to
her. There is also a continuum of bad projects, each with the same success
probability pL, but with an associated positive non-verifiable private benefit b
with 0 < b  b¯, proportional to the size of the project.
By choosing a monitoring intensity kt  0, the banker can prevent the
entrepreneur from choosing any of the bad projects with b  b(kt). I assume
b0(k)  0, b00(k)  0 and limk!¥ b0(k) = 0. Because monitoring is costly, it is
never possible for the banker to monitor at a level that completely eliminates
all bad projects.
In order for the three parties to be willing to participate in the contract, the
following incentive and participation constraints must be met:
qtpHRwt it  (1+ rt)dt (2.18)
qtpHRbt it  (1+ rat )at (2.19)
qtpHRbt it   ktit  qtpLRbt it (2.20)
qtpHRet it  qtpLRet it + b(kt)it (2.21)
Equations (2.16)–(2.21) define the financial contract. Equation (2.18) is the
participation constraint of the depositor, which tells that the depositor must
obtain a gross return at least as high from participating in the project, as she
would get on the deposit otherwise; rt is the net outside return on the deposit,
which is equal to the short-term market interest rate. Similarly, equation (2.19)
is the participation constraint of the banker, where rat is the market-determined
required minimum return on bank capital. The equilibrium rate of return will
be described below.
Equations (2.20) and (2.21) are the incentive constraints of the banker and
the entrepreneur, respectively. In order for the banker to be willing to mon-
itor the entrepreneur, the return from the good project, net of monitoring
cost, must be at least as much than the return from the bad project. The en-
trepreneur, in turn, must get at least as much from the good project as she
would get from the bad project together with the private benefit.
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In equilibrium, all constraints bind.9 It is easy to see why: first, the two re-
source constraints (2.16) and (2.17) are trivially binding at optimum. Second,
the compensations Ret and R
b
t must be high enough to properly incentivise the
entrepreneur and banker to behave; but by the pie-sharing constraint (2.17),
the more is allocated to them, the less is left for the depositor, who is the resid-
ual claimant of the project return. Thus, the depositor will not participate un-
less the minimum possible shares that satisfy the incentive and participation
constraints are allocated to the entrepreneur and the banker.
As a consequence, in each period, the entrepreneur and the banker in-
vest their whole net worth, as well as the whole deposit of the worker, into
the investment project, the banker always monitors the entrepreneur, and the
entrepreneur always undertakes the good project.
In order to guarantee that the good investment project is desirable com-
pared to the bad projects from the household’s point of view, I further assume
that qtpHR > maxf1+ rt, qtpLR+ b¯g. This assumption also guarantees that
the project has a positive rate of return and positive pledgeable income.
2.3.5.2 Optimal investment and leverage
In this section, I solve for the optimal leverage ratio of the entrepreneur, and
the corresponding optimal size it of an investment project. From the incentive
constraints (2.20) and (2.21), the banker and the entrepreneur must get at least:
Rbt =
kt
qtDp
(2.22)
Ret =
b(kt)
qtDp
(2.23)
to be properly incentivised in equilibrium. In other words, the more severe the
moral hazard of the entrepreneur at any given monitoring level, the more she
must be compensated for undertaking the good project instead of the bad one;
and the costlier monitoring is, the more the banker has to be compensated.
The depositor is the residual claimant of the return, who can then get at
most:
Rwt = R  Rbt   Ret = R 
b(kt) + kt
qtDp
. (2.24)
Therefore it is in the best interest of the depositor that the project is prop-
9See Holmström and Tirole (1997) for a detailed proof and discussion.
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erly monitored to guarantee that the good project is chosen. In equilibrium,
the entrepreneur and the banker get the minimum return that satisfies their
incentive constraints, and the depositor gets the maximum residual return.
From the participation constraints (2.18) and (2.19) it follows:
Rwt =
(1+ rt)dt
qtpH it
(2.25)
Rbt =
(1+ rat )at
qtpH it
. (2.26)
Combining equation (2.22) with (2.26) yields:
at
it
=
pH
Dp
kt
1+ rat
. (2.27)
Further, combining equation (2.24) with (2.25) yields:
dt
it
=
qtpHR
1+ rt
  pH
Dp
kt + b(kt)
1+ rt
. (2.28)
Equations (2.27) and (2.28) indicate that the greater is the cost of monitoring,
kt, the less deposits can be attracted from the worker, as the worker cannot
be convinced as easily that the project is properly monitored. The amount of
deposits is also decreasing in the severity of the moral hazard, b(kt). On the
other hand, it is increasing in the total expected return of the project, qtpHR.
Substituting equations (2.27) and (2.28) into the resource constraint (2.16)
gives, after some manipulation, the optimal investment as a function of the
inverse leverage gt:
it =
nt
gt
, (2.29)
where the inverse leverage gt  g(rt, rat , qt, kt) is given by:
gt = 1  qtpHR1+ rt +
pH
Dp
b(kt)
1+ rt
+

1+
pH
Dp

1
1+ rt
  1
1+ rat

kt. (2.30)
Here, qtpHR1+rt   1  rt is the net pledgeable income of the project, i.e. max-
imum net excess return that the entrepreneur can promise to the investors.
Equation (2.30) shows that the worse the moral hazard of the entrepreneur,
the costlier monitoring, the smaller the net pledgeable income, or the lower
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the real value of capital qt is, the less the entrepreneur can attract external
funding, or lever the investment size.
Now, the problem of the entrepreneur is to choose it to maximise her ex-
pected profit, given her net worth nt and the inverse leverage gt. As the return
is proportional to the investment size, expected profit is maximised when it is
maximised, or in other words, when the leverage ratio 1gt is maximised. Given
prices, gt is fully determined by the monitoring intensity kt.
Let kt denote the monitoring intensity that maximises the expected profit
of the entrepreneur. Using equations (2.21) and (2.29), and taking as given the
prices qt, rt and rat , the entrepreneur’s expected profit in terms of k

t can be
expressed as:
qtpHRet it =
pH
Dp
b(kt )nt
g(kt )
. (2.31)
Thus, the monitoring intensity that maximises the entrepreneur’s expected
profit is found by solving:
kt = argmax
kt
b(kt)
g(kt)
. (2.32)
In order to solve this problem, I assume the following functional relation-
ship between the monitoring intensity and the size of the private benefit:10
b(kt) =
8<:Gk
  h1 h
t if kt > k
b¯ if kt  k,
(2.33)
where 0 < h < 1, G > 0, b¯ > 0. In other words, there is a lower bound k
for the efficiency of monitoring under which the maximum private benefit is
always feasible. When kt > k, the amount of private benefit is a strictly convex
function of the monitoring intensity, increasing in G, and decreasing in h.
This specification of the monitoring technology yields the following inte-
rior solution to the problem (2.32):
kt =
hrt
1+ pHDp

1
1+rt   11+rat
 , (2.34)
10This form is chosen to capture the assumption that the private benefit is decreasing in the
intensity of monitoring, while also yielding tractable analytical results.
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which, when substituted into equation (2.30), yields the following equilibrium
degree of inverse leverage:
g(kt ) =
pH
Dp
b(kt )
1+ rt
  (1  h)rt, (2.35)
which in turn determines the equilibrium investment size.
In this model, the endogenous monitoring intensity kt plays a key role in
the dynamics of the financial sector. If kt were constant, the private benefit,
and thus the incentives of the entrepreneur, would also be time-invariant.
As a result, the response of bank lending to any shock that would lead to a
reduction in the banker’s own capital would be dampened.
In contrast, when kt is endogenous, it reacts to developments in the finan-
cial markets. If the banker’s own capital deteriorates, it is optimal to reduce
the monitoring intensity, and the moral hazard problem is exacerbated. As a
consequence, less deposits can be attracted, and less loanable funds are avail-
able. Endogenous monitoring therefore amplifies fluctuations in bank lend-
ing. This is the key driver behind the financial dynamics of this model, and
it is what makes bank capital fundamentally different from entrepreneurial
net worth or deposits. The aggregate implications of this mechanism are dis-
cussed in more detail in Section 2.6.
Finally, using equations (2.27) and (2.28), the resulting equilibrium lever-
age of an individual banker is:
gt  dt + atat = 1+
1+ rat
1+ rt

Dp
pH
qtpHR
kt
  b(k

t )
kt
  1

> 1. (2.36)
Similarly to the findings in Angeloni and Faia (2013) and Christensen et al.
(2011), the banker’s leverage depends positively on the return on bank capital
(1+ rat ) and on the uncertainty of the project returns (
Dp
pH
), and negatively on
the return on deposits (1+ rt), on the monitoring cost (kt ) and on the private
benefit (b(kt )).
2.3.6 Aggregation
I focus on the symmetric equilibrium where all projects are monitored at the
same intensity kt given by equation (2.34), and consequently the capital struc-
ture, given by the ratios of own and external funds to total investment ( ntit ,
at
it
40
2.3 The model
and dtit ), is equal across entrepreneurs, bankers and depositors, respectively.
The size of the project it may, however, vary across entrepreneurs.
The corresponding aggregate ratios are then simply given by:
Nt
It
=
nt
it
,
At
It
=
at
it
,
Dt/Pt
It
=
dt
it
, (2.37)
where capital letters denote aggregate amounts.
The equilibrium aggregate investment in the economy is determined by:
Nt
It
= g(kt ), (2.38)
where g(kt ) is given by equation (2.35).
Using the relation (2.27), the equilibrium rate of return to bank capital is
given by:
1+ rat =
1+ hrt ItAt
(1+ rt) 1 + DppH
. (2.39)
In other words, because of the binding participation and incentive constraints,
all bank capital yields its minimum required return in equilibrium. Because
monitoring is costly, it must be that 1+ rat > 1+ rt in equilibrium.11
Next, the laws of motion of the three types of capital are described by the
following equations. In equilibrium, the capital stock in the economy evolves
according to:
Kt+1 = (1  d)Kt + pHRIt, (2.40)
where pHRIt is the expected amount of new capital produced by the en-
trepreneurs.
Entrepreneurial and bank net worth are defined to evolve according to:
Nt+1 = le(1+ ret )
rKt+1 + (1  d)qt+1
qt
Nt (2.41)
11Investing the funds at in the open market would yield the market rate 1+ rt. Equating the
banker’s expected profit from the project with the outside return for the funds yields qtpHRbt it  
ktit = (1+ rt)at. Substituting in the equilibrium conditions (2.22) and (2.27) yields, after some
manipulation, the condition 1+ rat =
pH
pL
(1+ rt). As
pH
pL
> 1 by assumption, this condition is
always satisfied, and 1 + rat > 1 + rt in equilibrium. C.f. the proof in Holmström and Tirole
(1997).
41
2.3 The model
At+1 = Zbt+1l
b(1+ rat )
rKt+1 + (1  d)qt+1
qt
At, (2.42)
where rKt+1 + (1  d)qt+1 is the marginal value of a unit of capital in period
t+ 1, which is composed of two parts: the rental income at the beginning of
the period rKt+1, and the value of undepreciated capital (1  d)qt+1 remain-
ing at the end of the period. le and lb are the fractions of entrepreneurs
and bankers, respectively, surviving from period t to t+ 1. The return to en-
trepreneurial capital is simply defined as 1+ ret  qtpHR
e
t It
Nt , which is the ratio
of expected profit to net worth.
To introduce a shock arising in the financial market into the model, I let the
accumulation of bank capital be affected by an exogenous aggregate shock, Zbt .
I assume Zbt is an AR(1) process with a normally distributed i.i.d. innovation
term. A negative shock to Zbt corresponds to an exogenous and unanticipated
decrease in the accumulation of bank capital, or in other words, a sudden
erosion of bank capital At available at the start of a period t, common to the
whole banking sector. The shock affects the banks’ ability to extend funding to
entrepreneurs. It can be interpreted as a shock to the quality of bank capital,
similar to the shock analysed for example in Gertler and Karadi (2011).
Finally, by using the demand schedule (2.7) and the production technology
(2.9), the aggregate production is:
Yt = ZtKat L
1 a
t . (2.43)
The aggregate consistency constraint of the economy is:
Yt = (Ct + It)st, (2.44)
where Ct denotes aggregate private consumption and It aggregate invest-
ment.12 Finally, st  (1 w)

Pt
Pt
 #
+wp#t st+1  1 is the resource cost caused
12I assume that the monitoring of investment projects does not consume real resources. If it did,
the resource constraint would be Yt = (Ct + (1+ kt )It)st. This assumption is not quantitatively
restrictive, as the total monitoring cost kt It is very small in equilibrium: in the baseline calibration
of the model, kt It is approximately 0.027% of total resources. Omitting it, however, greatly
facilitates the solution of the analytical steady state of the model, as the steady state of the real
part of the economy then only depends on the financial sector indirectly through the asset price
qt. This assumption also renders the calibration of the model simpler and allows to nest the
standard New Keynesian models without a financial friction within the model; see the discussion
in Section 2.4 for details.
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The production phase
– The aggregate shocks Zt, Zct and Z
b
t are realised.
– Households rent capital Kt and supply labour Lt to intermediate
firms.
– Intermediate and final production take place.
The investment and consumption phase
– Entrepreneurs acquire funding for new investment projects. The fi-
nancing contract is agreed upon, given Nt, At and Dt/Pt.
– Monitoring and realisation of the investment projects take place.
– The outcome of the projects are observed. Returns to investment are
distributed according to the contract.
– Entrepreneurs and bankers accumulate net worth Nt+1 and At+1. Ex-
iting bankers and entrepreneurs transfer their accumulated wealth to
their household.
– Consumption and saving decisions of the household (Ct,Dt+1,Kt+1)
take place.
Table 2.1: Timing of events
by the price dispersion.
To close the model, a monetary policy for setting the nominal interest rate
rt needs to be specified. I start by analysing the constrained optimal policies
under a social planner’s solution in Section 2.5. Then, I look at simple policy
rules that can be used to approximate the constrained optimum, detailed in
Section 2.6.
2.3.7 Timing of events
The timing of the events is described in Table 2.1. Each time period is divided
into two phases, detailed in the upper and lower panels of the table. All aggre-
gate uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of the period. In the first phase,
production decisions take place. In the second phase, then, consumption and
investment decisions — including the financing contract — are made.
2.3.8 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium of the economy is a time path:
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n
Ct, Lt,Kt+1, At+1,Nt+1,Dt+1, qt, rKt , rt, r
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
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e
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w
t , k

t
o¥
t=0
(2.45)
that satisfies the households’ problem, the final and intermediate firms’ prob-
lems, the optimal financing contract, and the aggregate consistency condition.
The equilibrium dynamics as well as the deterministic steady state equilib-
rium of the model economy are summarised in Appendix 2.A.
2.4 Calibration and business cycle properties
This section first presents the calibration of the model, and then discusses
its business cycle properties by comparing standard business cycle statistics
computed from empirical data to key model moments.
2.4.1 Calibration
The model nests the standard real business cycle (RBC) and New Keynesian
(NK) models when steady state subsidies for employment and investment,
which correct for the steady state distortions caused by the nominal and fi-
nancial frictions, respectively, are assumed to be in place. The steady state
of the model is then efficient.13 By shutting down the financial friction, the
standard NK model is obtained, and by shutting down both the financial and
nominal frictions, the model corresponds to the standard RBC model.
The calibration of the model largely follows the calibration strategy dis-
cussed in Haavio et al. (2016). Assuming that a steady state investment sub-
sidy is in place, the steady state of the New Keynesian macro block is not
affected by the parameters of the financial sector. Thus the macro block and
the financial block of the model can be calibrated independently, and when the
financial friction is shut down, the model nests the standard New Keynesian
model.
The macro block is calibrated in a standard fashion to the New Keynesian
literature to match a quarterly frequency in U.S. data.The parameter values
are summarised in the upper panel of Table 2.2.
13The investment subsidy is derived in Appendix 2.A.2.
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Panel 1: New Keynesian block
Discount factor b 0.9951
Risk aversion s 2
Capital depreciation rate d 0.025
Elasticity of substitution (mark-up: 10 %) e 11
Capital share a 0.33
Frisch elasticity of labour supply q 0.5
Disutility of labour supply x 2
Calvo parameter w 0.8
Persistence of productivity shock r 0.95
Persistence of preference shock rc 0.7
Std. dev. of productivity shock se 0.006
Std. dev. of preference shock sc 0.005
Panel 2: Financial block
Elasticity of monitoring h 0.2992
Monitoring intensity G 0.0017
Survival rate of entrepreneurs le 0.9842
Survival rate of bankers lb 0.9507
Success probability of good project pH 0.95
Gross return of investment project: R = 1pH R 1.0526
Probability differential Dp = pH   pL Dp 0.0454
Persistence of bank capital depreciation shock rb 0
Std. dev. of bank capital depreciation shock sb 0.006
Table 2.2: Calibration of the model
The financial block is calibrated to match some steady state characteristics
of the model. The entrepreneur and banker survival rates, le and lb respec-
tively, are calibrated to match a steady state excess return on entrepreneurial
capital of 4.5% and an excess return on (core) private bank capital of 20% per
annum, compared to the short-term market interest rate. These values are
consistent with the estimates in Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009).
The calibration of the monitoring parameters h and G pin down the mon-
itoring cost in the steady state, and consequently the steady state leverage
of the entrepreneur, because leverage is fully determined by the monitoring
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intensity. On the other hand, bank leverage also depends on the monitor-
ing intensity, as it determines its ability to attract deposits. Hence, these two
parameters are the key parameters governing the financial sector dynamics.
The exact cost of monitoring activities in banks is hard to pin down em-
pirically. Banks’ overhead costs as a fraction of total assets in the U.S. are esti-
mated to be around 3% by the World Bank (2013). Albertazzi and Gambacorta
(2009) document operating expenses between 1.2% to 3.6% of total bank assets
in developed countries. However, overhead costs and operating expenses also
include costs not directly related to core banking activities. Philippon (2015)
estimates that the unit cost of financial intermediation has been stable at 1.5%
to 2% of intermediated assets in the U.S. over the past decades. However, be-
sides monitoring costs, these figures also include costs for asset management
and liquidity services. To take this into account, the calibration of h and G
matches a per annum monitoring cost of 1.2% of total bank assets in steady
state, which is slightly below the lower bound of the estimates reported by
Philippon (2015).
The leverage of non-financial US firms is estimated to be around 2.3–2.5
by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012). They also find that leverage ratios of financial
firms are very heterogeneous in the U.S. and depend on the type of the bank.
Large investment banks have leverage ratios in the order of 20, while commer-
cial banks typically have leverage ratios ranging from 10 to 12. The elasticity
of monitoring and monitoring intensity are calibrated in such a way as to pro-
duce a leverage ratio of around 1.5 for non-financial firms — entrepreneurs,
in this model —, and a leverage ratio of 16.5 for banks.
The success probability of the good project and the gross return from the
project, pH and R, are normalised such that pHR = 1, which makes the evo-
lution of the aggregate capital accumulation comparable to the standard New
Keynesian case. I set pH = 0.95, which implies a net return R   1 on the
investment project equal to approximately 5%.
Finally, the financial shock is calibrated to be purely transitory at fb = 0.
The standard deviance of the shock is calibrated to be the same than that of
the productivity shock. The parameters of such a financial shock is hard to
pin down empirically, but the calibration is intended to represent the finan-
cial shock as a strong but brief event on the financial markets. Given that it
takes time for banks hit by the shock to rebuild their capital stock, the purely
transitory shock has persistent effects.
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2.4.2 Business cycle properties
Table 2.3 displays business cycle statistics for both real and financial variables
in the data and two versions of the model: one where the financial friction is
active, but prices are flexible (“RBC”); and one with both the financial and the
nominal friction present (“NK”).
The data for the real variables are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis (BEA) and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The data for the
financial and banking variables are collected from the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Financial Institutions Examina-
tion Council (FFIEC) data publications. All data series are in logs, except the
real interest rate and the real return on bank capital. The model variable cor-
responding to each data series is also shown in the first column of the table.
In the data, output Y is the real GDP; consumption C are real personal con-
sumption expenditures; investment I is real non-residential fixed investment;
labour supply L are total non-farm hours; and the real wage w is compen-
sation per hour in the non-farm sector.14 The variables are quarterly and
deflated with the GDP deflator. The real interest rate rr is the one-year Trea-
sury bill rate less the one-year-ahead expected inflation, expressed in quarterly
terms. Expected inflation is measured as the median expected price change
over twelve months in the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers.
The selection of financial variables poses some challenges due to data avail-
ability and an imperfect mapping between the available data and the corre-
sponding variables in the theoretical model. In the data, bank capital and bank
assets are measured as the total net worth and total assets of all U.S. banks,
and entrepreneurial net worth and assets as the total non-financial corpora-
tions’ net worth and assets in the U.S. Bank leverage g and entrepreneurial
leverage 1/g are computed as the ratio of total assets to total net worth of
all U.S. banks and non-financial corporations, respectively. The return ra is
measured as the return on average equity of all U.S. banks, expressed in quar-
terly terms. Loans are the total loans issued by all U.S. banks. All financial
variables are deflated with the GDP deflator, or in the case of ra, with the
one-year-ahead expected inflation.
In the real sector, the model exhibits behaviour similar to other typical
business cycle models. This can be seen from the moments shown in the
upper panel of Table 2.3. The model broadly matches the relative standard
deviations of consumption, investment, the real wage and the real interest
rate, as well as the persistence of most series in the data. The degree of
14The choice of data for the real variables follows Smets and Wouters (2007).
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2.4 Calibration and business cycle properties
procyclicality of consumption and, to a somewhat lesser extent, of investment
and labour supply are also matched. However, in the model, unlike in the
data, the real wage is strongly procyclical. This is due to fully flexible wage
setting in the model.
The cyclical properties of the financial sector is displayed in the lower panel
of Table 2.3. First, entrepreneurial net worth is persistent and procyclical both
in the data and in the model. However, entrepreneur leverage is more pro-
cyclical and volatile in the model than in the data. Second, bank assets and
capital are persistent and procyclical, both in the model and in the data. Ag-
gregate bank leverage is more volatile than output both in the data and the
model, but more so in the model. However, it is countercyclical in the model,
but virtually acyclical in the data.15 Third, the return on bank capital is more
volatile in the model than in the data. However, its persistence and correla-
tion with output are approximately matched. Finally, loans and the loans-to-
output ratio are procyclical and more volatile than output both in the data
and the model. The persistence of these series is well matched.
The main caveats of the model are the absence of equity finance and the
accumulation of bank and entrepreneurial net worth only through retained
earnings. This makes the balance sheet items of both banks and entrepreneurs
strongly procyclical and autocorrelated. It also renders bank leverage coun-
tercyclical, as bank capital is reduced in recessions. At the same time, lending
and the loans-to-output ratio are procyclical, because bank capital is relatively
less scarce in expansionary periods. As a consequence, banks are able to at-
tract more deposits and expand lending. This feature of the model matches
the observed data.
Second, short-term debt is the only source of external funding for the en-
trepreneurs. This also implies that there is no portfolio problem in the financ-
ing of investment, and consequently no choice over risk. In contrast, the data
include a much richer variety of financial activity. Finally, the model includes
only three structural shocks. Richer sources of uncertainty could help to match
more closely the volatilities of the model variables to the ones observed in the
data.
With these caveats in mind, the main contribution of this paper is in the
theoretical analysis of optimal policy in the presence of a particular kind of
financial friction. The calibration of the model aims at matching the micro-
structure of the specific financing problem to data as closely as possible; the
15The cyclicality of bank leverage is sensitive to the choice of data and the exact definition of
leverage; e.g. Meh and Moran (2010) identify countercyclical bank leverage in their dataset.
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model succeeds in replicating steady state leverage ratios, returns on equity,
and various spreads, as described in the previous section.
2.5 The constrained optimum
This section discusses the implications of the agency problem in financial in-
termediation, and analyses the constrained optimal solution under both flexi-
ble and sticky prices, when the moral hazard problem is nonetheless present.
Optimal policy responses of the Ramsey planner are numerically computed
and presented through impulse response analysis. The efficient first-best op-
timum, to which the constrained optimal solutions are compared, is the equi-
librium of the standard flexible price real business cycle (RBC) model without
any friction in financial intermediation. Subsequently, I compare the results
to dynamics under non-optimised simple policy rules.
2.5.1 Implications of the financial friction
I first focus on a flexible price economy where the Calvo parameter is set
to w = 0. If b(kt) = 0, i.e., there are no private benefits available to the
entrepreneur, and consequently, no need for monitoring (kt = 0), the incentive
constraints (2.20) and (2.21) trivially hold; there is no incentive problem.
Then, the entrepreneur and the banker are indifferent between undertak-
ing the good project and not when Ret = R
b
t = 0. The depositor-worker
receives the whole gross return, Rwt = R. In this case, the financial intermedi-
ation becomes invisible in the sense that it is as if the worker himself would
directly undertake the project, i.e., the representative household becomes a
capital producer. This is observationally equal to the standard frictionless RBC
model, where the household’s savings are directly channelled into productive
investment. As a consequence, aggregate investment equals household sav-
ings in equilibrium: It = Dt/Pt. The RBC model is thus nested within the
model presented in this essay.
Frictions in the financial market cause aggregate investment to be at a sub-
optimal level: too low or high compared to the frictionless case. When these
frictions are present, aggregate investment It depends on the total amount of
entrepreneurial and bank capital, Nt and At, and – through their effect on
leverage – on the size of private benefits b(kt) and the monitoring intensity
kt. The more severe the agency problem, the less funds can be channelled
50
2.5 The constrained optimum
into investment projects. The inefficiency of credit intermediation is exac-
erbated by the monitoring cost: because of it, less resources are available
for productive investment. Both the entrepreneurs and the bankers are thus
capital-constrained. Moreover, Haavio et al. (2016) and Silvo (2018) show that,
as a consequence of the costly monitoring, bank capital is scarce relative to en-
trepreneurial capital. Increasing the relative availability of bank capital would
increase aggregate investment.
2.5.2 Constrained optimum in a flexible price economy
This and the following sections present the model dynamics under Ramsey
optimal policy plans. The Ramsey policy problem consists of maximising the
representative household’s lifetime welfare, given by equation (2.1), condi-
tional on the non-linear equilibrium conditions of the private sector. I then
approximate the optimality conditions of the Ramsey problem by a first-order
Taylor approximation in logs around the deterministic steady state of the
model. The full steady state of the model is given in Appendix 2.A.2. The
setup and the numerical solution of the Ramsey policy problem are described
in technical detail in Appendix 2.B.
I assume that the planner cannot remove the moral hazard problem — i.e
cannot make b(kt) = 0 feasible for any value of kt —, but can set aggregate
bank leverage directly to the value that maximises household welfare.16 The
planner’s solution is defined as being efficient when it replicates the flexible
price perfect competition allocation, which is the first-best outcome.
In the flexible price economy where the financial friction is present, the
fluctuation of the real price of capital (qt) away from unity creates a wedge
between the first-best and the actual outcome. The value of Tobin’s q fixed
at unity is a key feature of the frictionless RBC model, which follows from
the frictionless adjustment of capital. In order to replicate the first-best, the
Ramsey planner thus needs to offset this wedge.
Figure 2.1 shows the response of the economy to a one percent negative
productivity shock. The figure illustrates that the constrained optimal solution
of the social planner is efficient: the allocation replicates the first-best alloca-
tion up to a second-order approximation, denoted by the solid black line in the
figure. The solid grey line denotes the response in the economy with financial
16This policy can be thought of as a set of transfers in each period between the entrepreneurs,
the bankers and the depositors that reallocates wealth so as to alter the relative scarcity of bank
and entrepreneur capital and thus to achieve the optimal level of investment.
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Figure 2.1: Effects of a one percent negative total factor productivity shock in
the flexible price model
Note: Impulse responses are reported as percentage (%) or percentage-point (%-pts) deviations from steady
state. “Frictionless RBC”: model with fully flexible prices and no financial friction. “Constrained-optimal
RBC”: model with fully flexible prices but with the financial friction; the planner sets aggregate bank leverage.
“Laissez-faire”: model with fully flexible prices but with the financial friction; no policy intervention.
frictions when a social planner intervenes by implementing the Ramsey pol-
icy, and the dashed line indicates the response of the economy with financial
frictions and no policy intervention. The output gap Xt is defined as the gap
between actual output Yt and the efficient output Yet : Xt =
Yt
Yet
.17
The shock increases marginal costs of firms. Capital demand by interme-
diate firms then decreases, but because of the financial friction, less than in
the frictionless RBC economy. Entrepreneurs attempt to continue undertaking
investment projects to keep accumulating wealth. Without any policy inter-
17The efficient level of output is a benchmark computed as the output achievable with the
resources of the economy in the absence of monopolistic competition, the pricing friction, and the
financial friction.
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Figure 2.2: Effects of a one percent negative bank capital shock in the flexible
price model
Note: Impulse responses are reported as percentage (%) or percentage-point (%-pts) deviations from steady
state. “Frictionless RBC”: model with fully flexible prices and no financial friction. “Constrained-optimal
RBC”: model with fully flexible prices, but with the financial friction; the planner sets aggregate bank leverage.
“Laissez-faire”: model with fully flexible prices, but with the financial friction; no policy intervention.
vention, this results in a positive output gap as investment does not adjust
enough, and in a fall of the real capital price qt as a result of the weakened
demand for capital.
Instead, with policy intervention, the social planner sets aggregate bank
leverage to the level that maximises household welfare, given the friction in
the financial sector. This corresponds to a re-allocation of resources between
the three parties of the financial contract in such a way as to keep the real
price of capital, qt, fixed at unity. First, the planner transfers resources from
the entrepreneur to the banker. This allows the banker to increase the moni-
toring intensity and attract more deposits. The entrepreneur, however, has less
net worth and can undertake only smaller projects. The demand for loanable
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funds thus falls, which then decreases the supply of new capital in the econ-
omy, driving up the capital price qt. The stabilisation of Tobin’s q allows to
replicate the first-best outcome in the real sector, and in particular, the efficient
level of investment.
An exactly similar logic applies to stabilising the economy after a negative
bank capital shock, shown in Figure 2.2. The first-best outcome can again
be replicated. In this case, the destruction of bank capital interferes with the
bankers’ ability to extend loans for new projects, such that the supply of new
capital decreases and the capital price qt increases if there is no policy inter-
vention, as shown by the dashed lines. The social planner transfers resources
from the depositor and the banker to the entrepreneur, who can then invest in
more capital-producing projects with less external funding from the market.
This pushes down the capital price, as the demand for loans is reduced.
Appendix 2.D reports the corresponding results of a shock to the stochastic
discount factor. Here, the same conclusion holds: the planner can replicate the
efficient allocation by appropriately controlling aggregate bank leverage.
2.5.3 Constrained optimum in a sticky price economy
Next, I re-introduce the nominal rigidity into the model. Now, besides the
financial friction, the standard New Keynesian frictions – price stickiness and
monopolistic competition in intermediate production – also affect the econ-
omy.
With all of these frictions at work, the planner has to offset fluctuations
caused not only by the agency problem, but also those caused by the nominal
rigidity to achieve efficiency of the constrained optimum. I look at two differ-
ent policy set-ups: first, a situation in which the planner only controls the rate
of inflation; and second, a situation in which the planner can jointly set both
the inflation rate and the aggregate bank leverage. Results for the preference
shock are relegated to Appendix 2.D.
The dashed lines in Figure 2.3 show the response of the economy to a neg-
ative productivity shock when the social planner optimally sets the inflation
rate. With only one policy variable, the planner cannot fully offset the shock.
Following the shock, intermediate good firms’ marginal costs increase, which
leads to a positive output gap, and now also creates inflationary pressure. At
the same time, capital demand decreases. Consequently, qt drops, as capital
supply does not adjust enough due to the financial friction. The planner is
not able to stabilise both the output gap and qt, as the two move in opposite
directions. On the one hand, offsetting the price distortions would warrant
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Figure 2.3: Effects of a one percent negative total factor productivity shock in
the sticky price model
Note: Impulse responses are reported as percentage (%) or percentage-point (%-pts) deviations from steady
state. “Inflation choice”: model with sticky prices and the financial friction; social planner sets the inflation
rate. “Inflation and leverage choice”: model with sticky prices and the financial friction; social planner sets
the inflation rate and aggregate bank leverage. “Frictionless RBC”: the frictionless flexible price (first-best)
benchmark.
setting inflation to zero. On the other hand, in order to offset the financial
friction, the planner would need to generate an increase in inflation in order
to push up the capital price. As a consequence, the planner finds it optimal to
partly accommodate the shock.
It is useful to contrast this result with the standard New Keynesian model,
where no financial friction exists: faced with technology shocks, a Ramsey
planner can replicate the first-best by fully stabilising inflation, assuming that
there is a steady-state employment subsidy in place that offsets the steady
state mark-up of the intermediate producers.
In contrast, the solid grey lines in Figures 2.3 show the constrained op-
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Figure 2.4: Effects of a one percent negative bank capital shock in the New
Keynesian model
Note: Impulse responses are reported as percentage (%) or percentage-point (%-pts) deviations from steady
state. “Inflation choice”: model with sticky prices and the financial friction; social planner sets the inflation
rate. “Inflation and leverage choice”: model with sticky prices and the financial friction; social planner sets
the inflation rate and aggregate bank leverage. “Frictionless RBC”: the frictionless flexible price (first-best)
benchmark.
timal response when the planner controls two policy variables: the inflation
rate and the aggregate bank leverage. Now the first best allocation, shown in
solid black lines, can be replicated, and the constrained optimum is efficient.
One policy variable can be used to offset the distortion caused by price stick-
iness by stabilising inflation, and the other to offset the distortion in financial
intermediation by stabilising Tobin’s q, so that the policy trade-off is resolved.
The same applies when the economy is hit by a bank capital shock, as
depicted in Figure 2.4. With only one policy variable, the planner cannot fully
offset the shock. In both cases, Tobin’s q and the output gap move in opposite
directions, causing a policy trade-off. This trade-off can only be resolved by
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adding a second policy variable that can deal with the wedge in real capital
price.
In particular, after a bank capital shock, when the planner only controls
the inflation rate, the deterioration of bank capital causes a drop in investment
and leads to a negative output gap. At the same time, the decrease in capital
stock leads to an increase in the real price of capital and causes households
to substitute savings for current consumption, which reinforces the drop in
investment. In contrast, when the planner can also control bank leverage, the
planner can reallocate resources from the depositors and the banks to the en-
trepreneurs to stabilise Tobin’s q, as the ability of banks to finance investment
is reduced.
2.6 Simple policy rules
The Ramsey policy plans described above represent a constrained optimal
solution to setting the monetary and macroprudential policies. The Ramsey
policy is, however, a rather abstract policy plan that serves as a benchmark
for simpler policies and as a tool to help understand how the frictions in
the model economy should be dealt with. In particular, the kind of transfers
needed in each period to replicate the first-best allocation are likely very hard
to implement in a more realistic setting.
The optimal policy analysis suggests that the policymaker needs two sep-
arate policy instruments in order to stabilise the economic fluctuations: one to
deal with inflation, and one to deal with the financial friction. A need for sep-
arate macroprudential regulation then naturally arises in this context. In this
section, I analyse the dynamics of the model economy under various simple
policy rules.
2.6.1 Policy mandates
As seen in the previous section, the stabilisation of the economy requires in
general two distinct policy tools to deal with the two separate frictions.The
Ramsey policies assume that the policymaker acts under commitment, ob-
serves all variables in the economy, and can set the instrument values to max-
imise the household’s lifetime welfare. The planner, by jointly setting both
inflation and bank leverage, can replicate the first best. The responses to both
inflation and financial imbalances are perfectly coordinated in the sense that
they are jointly optimal and set to maximise the same objective, the household
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Policies Instruments
(i) MP Taylor rule
(ii) MP + MR Augmented Taylor rule
(iii) MP + MR Taylor rule + capital ratio regulation
Table 2.4: Policy regimes under simple rules
Note: MP: monetary policy; MR: macroprudential policy. Instruments: policy instruments at use.
welfare. However, in the absence of such a Ramsey planner, it is not imme-
diately clear what the policy targets should be and how the policy mandates
should be divided. In a more realistic model, the policymaker uses simple
policy rules that react to a few key variables.
The simple policy rule set-ups correspond to three distinct policy regimes:
(i) a regime where only conventional monetary policy that aims at price stabil-
ity is conducted; (ii) a regime where the monetary authority deals with both
price stability and financial stability; and (iii) a regime where there are two in-
dependent policymakers, one for the monetary policy and one for the macro-
prudential policy, each with their own policy targets. The policy regimes are
summarised in Table 2.4. The first column specifies which policies are at use:
monetary policy, or both monetary and macroprudential policies. The second
column specifies the policy instruments.
The first regime, on the first row of Table 2.4, consists of a conventional
monetary policy rule, which reacts to inflation and output gap. Next, on
the second row of Table 2.4, the second regime consists of an augmented
monetary policy rule. In addition to inflation and output gap, the monetary
authority also reacts to the real price of capital, or Tobin’s q. This policy
regime corresponds to one where the central bank tries to explicitly deal with
financial imbalances as well as price stability, but only has one instrument at
use. It is a dual mandate, and can be thought of as an approximate counterpart
to the Ramsey policy with inflation choice only.
Finally, the third regime is one where the tasks of price and financial sta-
bility are divided to two different authorities with different policy targets.
Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor rule. In addition, there is a macro-
prudential policy that aims at stabilising the credit cycle, as measured by the
deviation of the loans-to-output ratio from its steady state value, or the “credit
gap”. This is the primary credit cycle indicator identified in the Basel III
framework. The macroprudential policy tool is a countercyclical regulatory
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Regime Taylor rule Capital regulation
[fp fx fq] fg
(i) [1.5 0.5 0] –
(ii) [1.5 0.5 1] –
(iii) [1.5 0.5 0] 5
Table 2.5: Calibration of policy parameters
Note: Regimes: (i) standard Taylor rule; (ii) augmented Taylor rule; (iii) standard Taylor rule and
capital ratio regulation. Policy coefficients: fp : weight on inflation; fx : weight on output gap; fq:
weight on real price of capital; fg weight on banks’ capital ratio.
requirement on bank capital as in Basel III.
2.6.2 Monetary and macroprudential policy rules
2.6.2.1 Monetary policy
First, the central bank sets the nominal short-term interest rate rt using a
Taylor rule of the form:
1+ rt =
1
b
p
fp
t X
fx
t q
fq
t , (2.46)
where pt is the period-to-period gross inflation rate, Xt = YtYet is the output
gap, and qt is the real price of capital. The calibration of the policy parameters
is given in Table 2.5. The “standard‘” Taylor rule refers to a rule which only
reacts to inflation and output gap and sets fq to zero. The “augmented” Taylor
rule refers to a rule which sets fq away from zero. The weights on inflation
and output gap are set to 1.5 and 0.5, respectively, which are standard values
in the New Keynesian literature.
2.6.2.2 Capital regulation
In policy regime (iii), I assume that a financial regulator sets a minimum re-
quirement for the bank capital in order to stabilise the loans-to-output ratio.
In particular, now, the financing contract (2.16)–(2.21) in Section 2.3.5.1 is
augmented with the regulatory requirement:
gtat  at + dt, (2.47)
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where gt is the minimum capital ratio requirement, which sets a maximum
allowed leverage ratio for the banker. In this case, the banker is not able to
optimally choose the monitoring intensity kt in an unconstrained way. Instead,
he must set it to comply with the regulatory requirement gt, which he takes as
given. This also creates a constraint on the entrepreneur’s leverage. I assume
that equation 2.47 binds in steady state and in the vicinity of the steady state.
Analogously to the Taylor rule, I assume that the countercyclical capital
ratio regulation follows a policy rule of the form:
gt = g (Xt)
 fg , (2.48)
where Xt  (It Nt)/Yt(I N)/Y is the deviation of the loans-to-output ratio from its
steady state value. This ratio is the “credit gap”. g is the steady state value
of the capital ratio requirement. I set it such that it coincides with the un-
constrained bank leverage in steady state, given by equation (2.36), such that
the steady state of the model is not affected by the regulation.18 Finally, I set
the policy coefficient to fg = 5, which corresponds to an aggressive policy of
stabilising the credit cycle.
2.6.3 Dynamics under simple policy rules
Figure 2.5 shows the policy responses to a negative productivity shock. The
shock is inflationary and produces a positive output gap, so that monetary
policy responds by raising the nominal interest rate.
The adverse shock also affects financial intermediation. There is down-
ward pressure on investment, which decreases lending. The weakened de-
mand for capital pushes down the real price of capital. When a macropruden-
tial policy tool is active, it attempts to address this issue.
The augmented Taylor rule, shown in solid grey lines, attempts to offset
the fall in real capital price, qt, by raising the interest rate less than when
monetary policy does not react to qt, but in doing so it allows for a greater
output gap, as the two move in opposite directions. The fall in real capital
price, however, decreases inflationary pressure.
When the capital ratio regulation is active instead, it seeks to stabilise the
loans-to-output ratio by initially allowing for a higher bank leverage in order
18This implies that I do not take a stance on what would be an optimal steady state or permanent
level of capital ratio regulation. In the Basel III framework, the recommended ratio of Tier 1 capital
to total assets is 10.5%. In the model, the steady state ratio is 6.0%.
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Figure 2.5: Policy response to a one percent adverse productivity shock
Note: Impulse responses are reported as percentage (%) or percentage-point (%-pts) deviations from steady
state.
to sustain investment. The over-supply of financing depresses qt even further
and induces an even greater output gap. This is also inflationary. Conse-
quently, the monetary authority must counteract this by raising the interest
rate even more. In this case, the two policies work against each other.
In contrast, when the shock arises in the financial sector, the capital ratio
regulation can be helpful. Figure 2.6 shows the policy responses to a neg-
ative shock to bank capital. The deterioration of bank capital hinders the
banks’ ability to monitor investment projects. This in turn worsens the moral
hazard problem, discourages depositors, and leads to higher requirements
of entrepreneurial capital. The decrease in lending translates into decreased
investment and output.
However, the shock is also inflationary, because the drop in investment
implies an increase in the real price of capital, which in turn encourages
households to substitute savings for consumption. The shock also leads to
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Figure 2.6: Policy response to a one percent adverse bank capital shock
Note: Impulse responses are reported as percentage (%) or percentage-point (%-pts) deviations from steady
state.
a persistently lower level of bank capital and lending, because it takes time
for banks to re-accumulate capital.
When the capital ratio regulation is active, it allows bank leverage to in-
crease aggressively, which immediately offsets the impact of the bank capital
shock and sustains investment. The propagation of the financial shock into
the real sector is then mitigated, and the monetary authority needs to respond
only mildly. The augmented Taylor rule works in the same way, but is not able
to respond as aggressively, such that the shock is partially transmitted to the
real economy. The economy nonetheless returns to the steady state faster than
under the conventional Taylor rule.
This shows that when there are shocks arising from the financial sector it-
self, there are benefits to a separate macroprudential tool. However, restricting
bank leverage can be counterproductive in stabilising fluctuations caused by
shocks arising from outside, but affecting the financial sector. Here, in particu-
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lar, I have considered total factor productivity shocks. In this case, the policies
— which are not coordinated but instead follow independent mandates —
work against each other. The augmented Taylor rule offers a compromise that
tries to counterbalance the two policy objectives and that works reasonably
well when faced both with real and financial shocks.
In the next section, I quantify the welfare effects of the different policy
regimes. While the quantitative differences in welfare under the different
policy regimes are small, the exercise provides an ordering of the regimes in
terms of household welfare, compared to the first-best outcome.
2.7 Welfare analysis
In this section, I provide a welfare comparison of the different policy regimes.
I compute the welfare cost associated with each policy as consumption equiv-
alent amounts relative to a benchmark policy. The welfare evaluation follows
the strategy described in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006). The consumption
equivalent welfare cost is defined as the fixed fraction of consumption that the
household must give up under the benchmark policy regime, in each period,
to be indifferent between the benchmark policy and the policy it is being com-
pared to. A positive cost indicates that the household is better off under the
benchmark policy. The benchmark model to which the others are compared
here is the frictionless RBC model, which yields the first-best allocation. The
details of the computation of the consumption-equivalent welfare measure is
given in Appendix 2.C.
Table 2.6 shows the welfare properties of the economies relative to the
first-best. The second column of Table 2.6 reports the welfare costs of the
different policy regimes. In addition, the third, fourth and fifth columns of
Table 2.6 display the standard deviations of inflation, output gap and the
loans-to-output ratio in percentages, respectively, under the different policy
regimes.19
First, the welfare costs compared to the first-best allocation are small in
absolute terms under any policy regime. For example, the worst-performing
policy — the standard Taylor rule —results in a welfare cost of approximately
0.05% of consumption in each period compared to the first-best. This magni-
tude is in line with many earlier studies comparing welfare effects of different
19The results are not sensitive to the volatility of the bank capital shock. In particular, the wel-
fare ranking remains unchanged even under bank capital shocks that are an order of magnitude
more volatile.
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Policy Welfare cost (%) sp sx sX
Ramsey 2 var. 0.000 0.00 0.00 9.2
Ramsey 1 var. 0.001 0.01 0.13 15
Aug. Taylor rule 0.004 0.04 0.42 13
Capital regulation 0.038 0.14 0.58 0.08
Taylor rule 0.048 0.11 0.21 16
Table 2.6: Consumption equivalent welfare costs under different policies rela-
tive to the frictionless RBC model
Note: The models are in logs and solved with a second-order Taylor approximation around the steady state. A
positive welfare cost indicates a welfare loss relative to the first-best allocation. “Ramsey 2 var.”: Ramsey policy,
inflation rate and banking sector leverage. “Ramsey 1 var.”: Ramsey policy, inflation rate only. “Taylor rule”:
Standard Taylor rule reacting to inflation and output gap. “Aug. Taylor rule”: Taylor rule reacting to inflation,
output gap and real capital price. “Capital regulation”: Standard Taylor rule and capital ratio regulation. sp :
Standard deviation of inflation (%). sx : Standard deviation of the output gap (%). sX : Standard deviation of
the loans-to-output ratio (%).
monetary policy regimes.20
The first row shows the welfare properties of the Ramsey policy with both
monetary and macroprudential policy. It is optimal to fully stabilise both
inflation and the output gap, but not the credit gap. As the efficient allocation
is replicated, there is no welfare loss. The second row shows the Ramsey
policy under monetary policy only. Now, it is optimal to focus on stabilising
inflation, but not the output gap. Thus some deviation from the efficient level
of output is traded off for price stability. This is also seen when comparing the
third and fifth rows, which display the performance of the augmented Taylor
rule and the standard Taylor rule, respectively. The augmented rule results
in higher welfare by trading off some output stability in favour of inflation
stability.
The rule-based policies do not fall far behind in welfare levels compared to
the two Ramsey policies. The best regime is the augmented Taylor rule, shown
on the third row of the table, and second comes the policy mix that combines
a standard Taylor rule for monetary policy with the capital ratio regulation.
The standard Taylor rule alone fares worst. This suggests that when financial
frictions are present, some form of macroprudential regulation is desirable.
The welfare evaluation is somewhat in contradiction with earlier results on
the conduct of monetary policy in the presence of financial frictions. The con-
20The seminal discussion by Lucas (2003) finds consumption-equivalent welfare gains from
eliminating business cycle fluctuations, in general, to be roughly in the order of magnitude of
0.05%.
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ventional view in the literature is that the central bank need not concern itself
with asset price fluctuations, except insofar as they reflect changes expected
inflation.21 In this model, even when prices are fully flexible, the fluctuations
of real asset prices reflect the sub-optimal levels of investment caused by the
agency cost, and it is beneficial for the policymaker to react to them. However,
it is not optimal to attempt to fully stabilise the credit gap Xt.
Finally, it should be noted that this analysis compares different economies,
corresponding to each different policy rule, around a common steady state.
The assumption of an investment subsidy plays an important role here. With-
out it, the steady state allocation of the economy would not be efficient, and
a steady state capital ratio requirement to correct for this could create sizable
welfare gains. An augmented Taylor rule that reacts to asset price movements
cannot affect such a steady state distortion. Moreover, when the countercycli-
cal capital ratio requirement is only occasionally binding, the significance of
steady state regulation becomes even greater. These issues are left for future
research.
2.8 Conclusions
This essay investigates the policy implications of jointly setting monetary and
macroprudential policies when there are financial frictions in the economy.
The framework is otherwise a standard New Keynesian one, with an addi-
tional real friction arising from agency costs in financial intermediation. The
model nests the standard New Keynesian model when this frictions is shut
down.
The main contribution of this essay is to solve for the jointly Ramsey-
optimal monetary and macroprudential policies. The key finding is that with
both a nominal and a financial friction, a social planner needs to control both
the inflation rate and the aggregate bank leverage in order to replicate the
first-best allocation. The constrained optimum is then efficient. When the
Ramsey planner can only set the inflation rate, he cannot fully stabilise the
economy, and a short-run policy trade-off between stabilising inflation and
output gap emerges.
This trade-off results from the opposite effects that the nominal and the
financial frictions have on the real price of physical capital: an inflationary
shock requires a deflationary policy response in order to offset the relative
21See for example Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Iacoviello (2005) and Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2007).
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price distortions, but this will depress the real price of capital. However, a
depression of the capital price worsens the incentive problems in the financial
market, which distorts the level of investment and worsens the output gap.
Correcting for this latter distortion and closing the output gap would warrant
an inflationary policy response to push up the real capital price.
I also analyse simple rule-based policies and compare them to the bench-
mark provided by the Ramsey-optimal policies. In particular, I analyse Taylor-
type monetary policy rules and a Basel III-type countercyclical capital ratio
regulation that reacts to the deviation of the credit-to-output ratio from its
steady state. I find that if there are important fluctuations arising from fi-
nancial shocks, the availability of the countercyclical capital ratio regulation
enhances the effectiveness of policy in stabilising the economy. The macropru-
dential policy supports credit intermediation, and leaves the monetary policy
to deal with inflation.
However, when shocks other than financial ones – such as technology
or demand shocks – are the main drivers of business cycles, conventional
interest-rate-based monetary policy is enough to deal with cyclical fluctua-
tions, in particular if the monetary authority also reacts to financial market
conditions, i.e. to the real price of capital.
A separate tool for regulating the credit cycle is thus beneficial in mitigat-
ing financial shocks and their propagation to the real economy, but it may be
more desirable to use it in a discretionary manner to counter financial shocks
specifically, rather than as an active business cycle policy. In this sense, an
active Basel III-type countercyclical capital ratio regulation that reacts to all
fluctuations in the credit cycle, no matter their source, may be counterproduc-
tive. This suggests that there are gains from properly coordinating the use of
macroprudential policy with conventional monetary policy.
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2.A Summary of the model
2.A.1 Dynamic equilibrium conditions
This section summarises the dynamic model equations.
2.A.1.1 The macro block
The household’s optimality conditions are:
wt =
cLqt
UC(Ct, Lt)
(Labour supply)
1 = bEt

UC(Ct+1, Lt+1)
UC(Ct, Lt)
1+ rt
pt+1

(Bond Euler eq.)
qt = bEt

UC(Ct+1, Lt+1)
UC(Ct, Lt)
(rKt+1 + (1  d)qt+1)

(Capital Euler eq.)
where UC(Ct, Lt) = Zct
h
1
1 b (Ct   bCt 1)
i s
and logZct = fc logZ
c
t 1 + e
c
t ,
ect  N(0, s2c ), i.i.d.
The symmetric equilibrium conditions of the intermediate production sec-
tor are:
rKt
wt
=
aLt(j)
(1  a)Kt(j) (Relative factor price)
yt =

rKt
a
a  wt
1  a
(1 a)
Z 1t (Real marginal cost)
Pt
Pt
=
#
#  1
Et å¥k=0 w
k Qt,t+k yt+kjt Yt+kjt p#+1t+k
Et å¥k=0 wk Qt,t+k Yt+kjt p#t+k
(Optimal pricing)
where Qt,t+k  bk UC(Ct+1,Lt+1)UC(Ct ,Lt)
Pt
Pt+k
and logZt = f logZt 1 + et, et  N(0, s2),
i.i.d.
Furthermore, the numerator of the optimal pricing decision can be refor-
mulated recursively as:
Numt = ytYt +w(1+ rt) 1Et p#+1t+1 Numt+1,
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and the denominator as:
Denomt = Yt +w(1+ rt) 1Et p#t+1Denomt+1,
which allows expressing the optimal price relative to the aggregate price level
recursively (for computational convenience) as:
Pt
Pt
=
#
#  1
Numt
Denomt
.
The aggregate dynamic equilibrium conditions are:
Yt = ZtKat (Lt)
1 a (Aggregate production)
Yt = (Ct + It)st (Aggregate consistency constraint)
st = (1 w)

Pt
Pt
 #
+wp#t st 1 (Correction for price dispersion)
Kt+1 = pHRIt + (1  d)Kt (Capital accumulation)
Pt =
h
wP1 #t 1 + (1 w)(Pt )1 #
i 1
1 # (Aggregate price level)
1 = wp# 1t + (1 w)

Pt
Pt
1 #
(Price dispersion)
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2.A.1.2 The financial block
The aggregate equilibrium in the financial sector is described by the following
equations.
kt =
hrt
1+ pHDp

1
1+rt   11+rat
 (Optimal monitoring)
b(kt ) = G(kt )
  h1 h (Private benefit)
rt =
qtpHR
1+ rt
  1 (Net pledgeable income)
gt =
pH
Dp
b(kt )
1+ rt
  (1  h)rt (Entrepreneur’s inverse leverage ratio)
Ret =
b(kt )
qtDp
(Entrepreneur’s return share)
Rbt =
kt
qtDp
(Banker’s return share)
Rwt = R  Ret   Rbt (Worker’s return share)
1+ rat =
pH
Dp
kt
It
At
(Return on bank capital)
1+ ret =
pH
Dp
b(kt )
It
Nt
(Return on entrepreneurial capital)
It =
Nt
gt
(Investment size)
gt = 1+
1+ rat
1+ rt

Dp
pH
qtpHR
kt
  b(k

t )
kt
  1

(Banker’s leverage ratio)
Dt
Pt
= (1+ kt )It   Nt   At (Aggregate deposits)
Nt+1 = le(1+ ret )
rKt+1 + (1  d)qt+1
qt
Nt
(Accumulation of entrepreneur’s net worth)
At+1 = Zbt+1l
b(1+ rat )
rKt+1 + (1  dt)qt+1
qt
At
(Accumulation of banker’s net worth)
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where logZbt = fb logZ
b
t 1 + e
b
t , e
b
t  N(0, s2b ), i.i.d.
2.A.1.3 Government policy
Finally, the model is closed by the Taylor rule for the nominal interest rate,
and the rule for the macroprudential policy.
1+ rt =
1
b
p
fp
t X
fx
t q
fq
t (Taylor rule)
gt = g (Xt)
 fg (Capital ratio regulation)
Here, Xt  YtYet is the output gap and Xt 
(It Nt)/Yt
(I N)/Y is the deviation of the
loans-to-output ratio from its steady state value, or the “credit gap”. g is the
steady state banker leverage ratio.
2.A.2 Deterministic steady state
The deterministic steady state of the model is as follows. It is assumed that
a steady state employment subsidy is in place such that m = 1, so that the
steady state is not distorted by the monopolistic competition.
2.A.2.1 The macro block
The steady state of the macro block of the model is:
1+ r =
1
b
P = P = 1
p = 1
s = 1
y = 1
q =
1+ r
bpHR
rK = q(r+ d)
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w = (1  a)

rK
a
 a
a 1
K =
24 rK
a
 q+a
a 1 1  a
c

rK
a
  d
pHR
 s35 1q+s
L = K

rK
a
 1
1 a
Y =
rKK
a
I =
dK
pHR
C = Y  I
Z = Zc = Zb = 1
The steady state is non-distorted and identical to the efficient steady state
— where prices are assumed flexible and there is no financial friction in in-
vestment — when q = 1. The efficient steady state can thus be replicated by
imposing a steady state investment subsidy on the gross return of the invest-
ment project, R. Denote this subsidy by 1+ V. Then, the subsidy needed to
replicate the efficient steady state is:
q =
1+ r
bpHR(1+ V)
= 1 , V = 1
b
  1+ r
b
= r+
r
1+ r
,
where R(1+ V)  R is the subsidised return on investment. I assume that
such a subsidy is in place.
2.A.2.2 The financial block
The steady state of the financial block of the model is:
1+ ra =
b
lb
1+ re =
b
le
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Rb =
k
qDp
Re =
b(k)
qDp
Rw = R  Re   Rb
k =
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G
h
1  h
1 h 0@ b  leb
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1A1 h
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
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b
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Dp
k I
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b
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2.B The Ramsey problem
The problem of the Ramsey planner can be formulated as follows. Let yt
be a vector containing the n endogenous variables of the economy, including
the planner’s choice variables, and ut the vector of exogenous variables. The
agents in the economy optimise taking the planner’s choice variables (the pol-
icy variables) as given. The equilibrium of the private economy is described
by the m first-order conditions and transition equations:
Et[ f (yt 1, yt, yt+1, ut)] = 0.
This leaves n m choice variables for the planner.
The Ramsey planner chooses the values of these policy variables in each
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period to maximise household welfare, subject to the private economy’s equi-
librium conditions:
max
fytg¥t=t
Et
¥
å
t=t
bt tU(Ct , Lt)
s.t. Et [ f (yt 1, yt , yt+1, ut)] = 0 8 t 2 f. . . , t  1, t, t+ 1, . . . g.
In Section 2.5.3, the Ramsey policy problem is solved and analysed nu-
merically using the Dynare 4.5 software package, which is run in MATLAB.
The Dynare routine first numerically computes the first order conditions of
the planner problem above, subject to the true nonlinear equilibrium condi-
tions of the private economy. The latter consist of the first order conditions
of the private sector, the laws of motion for stock variables, and the aggregate
resource constraint. The Ramsey optimality conditions will thus correctly in-
clude welfare-relevant second order terms of the private sector equilibrium
conditions. The routine then linearises these planner’s first order conditions
around the steady state of the model by using a first-order Taylor approxima-
tion. The solution is computed under the assumption of timeless perspective,
following Woodford (2003), to avoid the time inconsistency problem associ-
ated with Ramsey policies under commitment.
2.C The welfare cost
The welfare cost of the different policy measures are computed as consump-
tion equivalent costs relative to a benchmark policy as described in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2006).
Define the welfare of the household under the benchmark allocation (de-
noted by R), conditional on the state of the economy at time zero, as:
VR0 = E0
¥
å
t=0
btU(CRt , L
R
t ),
where CRt and L
r
t denote the plans for consumption and hours worked under
the benchmark policy regime.
Similarly, define the conditional welfare under an alternative policy plan
(denoted by A) as:
VA0 = E0
¥
å
t=0
btU(CAt , L
A
t ).
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Assume that at time zero, all variables are equal to their steady-state val-
ues. Since the steady state of the model is undistorted and unaffected by the
different policy regimes, the initial state of the economy is the same for the
benchmark and the alternative policies.
Next, denote by x the consumption-equivalent conditional welfare cost of
the alternative policy regime, relative to the benchmark regime. Formally, the
cost x is implicitly defined by:
VA0 = E0
¥
å
t=0
btU((1  x)CRt , LRt ).
Using the CES functional form for periodic utility and solving for x yields:
VA0 = E0
¥
å
t=0
bt
"
Zct
((1  x)CRt )1 s
1  s  
c(LRt )
1+q
1+ q
#
= E0
¥
å
t=0
bt
"
((1  x)1 s   1)Zct
(CRt )
1 s
1  s
#
+VR0
, x = 1 
241+ VA0  VR0
E0å¥t=0 btZ
c
t
(CRt )1 s
1 s
35 11 s .
Note that when VA0 = V
R
0 , the measure equals zero.
Simulating the allocations — solved by taking a second-order Taylor ap-
proximation around the steady state to ensure a correct welfare ranking of
the alternative policies — for a long enough time horizon T and repeating the
simulation N times, for N large enough, yields an estimate of the conditional
expectations VR0 and V
A
0 . This allows to numerically estimate the cost x.
78
2.D Impulse responses to the preference shock
2.D Impulse responses to the preference shock
10 20 30
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
10 20 30
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
10 20 30
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
10 20 30
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
10 20 30
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
10 20 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
10 20 30
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
10 20 30
-1
0
1
2
3
10 20 30
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
10 20 30
-1
0
1
2
10 20 30
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
Figure 2.7: Effects of a one percent negative preference shock under Ramsey
policy in the flexible price model
Note: Impulse responses are reported as percentage (%) or percentage-point (%-pts) deviations from steady
state. “Frictionless RBC”: model with fully flexible prices and no financial friction. “Constrained-optimal
RBC”: model with fully flexible prices but with the financial friction; the planner sets aggregate bank leverage.
“Laissez-faire”: model with fully flexible prices but with the financial friction; no policy intervention.
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Figure 2.8: Effects of a one percent negative preference shock under Ramsey
policy in the sticky price model
Note: Impulse responses are reported as percentage (%) or percentage-point (%-pts) deviations from steady
state. “Inflation choice”: model with sticky prices and the financial friction; social planner sets the inflation
rate. “Inflation and leverage choice”: model with sticky prices and the financial friction; social planner sets
the inflation rate and aggregate bank leverage. “Frictionless RBC”: the frictionless flexible price (first-best)
benchmark.
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Figure 2.9: Policy response to a one percent negative preference shock under
simple policy rules
Note: Impulse responses are reported as percentage (%) or percentage-point (%-pts) deviations from steady
state.
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3 House prices, lending
standards, and the
macroeconomy
3.1 Introduction
The housing boom of the early 2000’s in the U.S. culminated in the subprime
crisis of 2007–2009. The episode demonstrated the need to understand the
dynamics of house prices, housing debt, and their links to the aggregate econ-
omy.
This essay offers a demand-side explanation of the housing boom and
bust by concentrating on loan demand and changes in the composition of
the borrower pool over the house price cycle. It presents a theoretical model
of the housing market with over-investment in equilibrium, and explores the
incentives of households to take on debt over the house price cycle. I show
that asymmetric information coupled with deadweight costs of default can
create endogenous cycles in house prices. I also show that lending standards
are loose and the incentives for less-than-creditworthy borrowers to apply for
a loan are particularly strong, first, when future house values are expected to
be high, which leads to high leverage of borrowers; and second, when safe
interest rates are low, which implies low costs of borrowing. However, there
are strong non-linearities in the relationship between borrowing incentives
and economic fundamentals. This analysis helps to explain the behaviour
of households during the housing boom of the early 2000s in the U.S. in an
environment characterised by low interest rates and increasing house prices.
The data on housing markets in the U.S. have a few salient features. Fig-
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Figure 3.1: Mortgage lending, delinquencies, and the house price cycle
Note: House prices: %-deviation from a linear trend; source: S&P Case-Shiller U.S. National
Home Price index. Subprime mortgages: % share of total mortgage originations; source: Inside
Mortgage Finance, collected from the Financial crisis inquiry report (2011) for years 1996–2008
and Zibel and Andriotis (2015) for years 2009–2014. Delinquency rate: % share of all single-
family residential mortgages; source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. New
mortgage originations: total volume of new single-family residential mortgage originations, 1990–
2010, %-deviation from sample mean; source: U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency.
ure 3.1 shows the co-movement of new residential mortgage originations, the
mortgage delinquency rate, and subprime mortgage lending over the house
price cycle in the United States in 1990–2015. Starting from 1998, house price
appreciation picked up and peaked in 2006 at 30% above trend before falling
dramatically. This dramatic boom-bust episode in house prices was, however,
accompanied and even overshadowed by a surge in mortgage originations.
They grew from almost 70% below the sample mean in 1990 to 120% above
the mean in 2003. The most impressive growth in originations coincides with
the period from 2000 to 2003, at the onset of the housing boom.
At the same time, the share of subprime mortgage origination was rela-
tively stable at around 10% of all mortgage originations until 2004, after which
it rapidly expanded, peaked at 24% in 2006 together with house prices. It then
collapsed virtually to zero from 2009 onward. Meanwhile, the delinquency
rate was stable at slightly above 2% until 2006. As house prices started to
fall, delinquencies on mortgages started increasing and reached 11% in 2009.
They have remained elevated since then. The expansion of subprime lending
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is related to a loosening of lending standards that followed the increased se-
curitisation of subprime loans, as argued e.g. by the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (2011).
In this essay, I analyse the incentives of potential borrowers to enter the
loan market and subsequently to potentially default on the loan by using a
model of asymmetric information in the credit market. I model the hous-
ing market in a setting where the intermediation of loans is inefficient be-
cause of an adverse selection problem, modelled after the classic framework
of De Meza and Webb (1987, 1990). I assume fundamental house values are
exogenous and heterogeneous, but endogenise the sales price of housing. In
the model, all households are subject to two shocks: a shock to house value,
and an income shock. The former is observable by all agents, whereas the
latter is private information to the borrower. The households also face two
fundamental choices. First, they must decide whether to buy or rent a home;
they may need to borrow to finance housing purchases, but their future in-
come is uncertain at the time of purchase. Second, after income uncertainty
is resolved, they can choose to default on their existing debt. In this model,
default acts as a form of insurance against adverse house value and income
shocks by allowing partial consumption smoothing, but carries a deadweight
cost to the household.
In order to talk about over-borrowing, there has to be a market failure
that allows households to take on too much debt from a social perspective.
Similarly, a loosening or tightening of lending standards can be modelled as
a deviation from the first-best in lenders’ optimal decisions in terms of to
whom, and at what price, loans should be granted.1 In the model presented
in this essay, borrowers differ in their default risk in a way that is unobservable
to lenders. This particular information structure leads to over-borrowing in
equilibrium, and subprime borrowers are defined as the set of borrowers who
do get a loan under asymmetric information, but would not if their types were
publicly observable.
The main contributions of this essay are two-fold. The first set of results
comes from a theoretical comparative statics exercise that explores participa-
tion and default incentives in the cross-section of households. The second set
focuses on incentives over time to explain a boom-bust cycle in the housing
market.
1The term “lending standards” is used here to describe the behaviour of lenders under asym-
metric information, relative to their actions under symmetric information. The term is used in a
similar way in a host of literature concerning informational asymmetries in the credit market; see
e.g. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) and the references therein.
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First, I show that there is a non-linear relationship between expected house
values and participation in the credit market in the static model. This non-
linearity is created by a trade-off between the cost of borrowing and expected
capital gains. When future house values, and thus prices, are expected to be
low, participation is high. As expected house values rise, the types with the
lowest expected income first opt out of the market because housing becomes
more expensive. Eventually however, the expected capital gains become so
attractive that the risky types enter the market again. Because the borrowers
in this environment are more levered, default becomes optimal if they are hit
by an adverse combination of income and house value shocks.
On the other hand, the relationship between safe interest rates and credit
market participation is monotone: lower interest rates attract more borrowers
as outside returns and borrowing costs are both low. An environment of low
interest rates and high expected house values thus render the economy vulner-
able to adverse house value and income shocks as household become highly
levered. I also demonstrate that tightening default legislation that treats all
borrowers equally is not an effective way to curb over-borrowing and reduce
household leverage. An effective policy must target incentives of different
types directly in order to improve the robustness of household balance sheets.
Second, I show that the model is capable of accommodating a deterministic
cycle in house prices, and that these dynamic patterns match those observed
in the U.S. data in terms of relative magnitudes and the timing of the cycles.
The endogenous cycle is created by a strategic complementarity in the house-
holds’ preference for housing consumption together with a deadweight cost
of defaults. These elements capture, first, the ‘hype’ surrounding homeown-
ership during the boom phase, and subsequently, the foreclosure wave that
induces the bust phase.
The remainder of the essay is organised as follows. First, Section 3.2 re-
views related research contributions. Section 3.3 then describes the model
economy. Next, Section 3.4 solves for the credit market equilibrium under
symmetric and asymmetric information, and Section 3.5 describes the timing
of events and characterises the equilibrium of the aggregate economy. The
main results are discussed in Section 3.6, which explores the link between
house prices, interest rates, and the selection into the housing market through
a comparative statics exercise, and Section 3.7, which extends the baseline
model to accommodate an endogenous boom-bust cycle in house prices. Fi-
nally, Section 3.8 concludes.
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The results in this essay complement the evidence in a series of influential
empirical studies by Mian and Sufi (2009, 2011) and Mian et al. (2013). The au-
thors find evidence for a credit supply driven mortgage lending boom, where
lenders expanded their supply of mortgage lending and relaxed their lending
standards in the run-up to the subprime crisis of 2007–2009. The shift in sup-
ply was tightly connected to the expansion of mortgage securitisation since
the early 2000’s.
In a theoretical setup, Justiniano et al. (2015) find that the housing boom
and bust in the United States was more likely driven by shocks to house prices,
not an exogenous loosening of credit conditions. On the other hand, Favilukis
et al. (2017) and Gelain et al. (2018), among others, show that a relaxation of
financial constraints — namely collateral requirements — can lead to a large
house price boom.
I focus on an analysis of credit demand and borrower behaviour as a po-
tential driver for housing booms that is complementary to the supply-side
explanations, such as house price and credit supply shocks. Using loan-level
data, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that the relaxation
of lending standards prior to the subprime crisis was partly explained by an
increase in credit demand, when controlling for supply-side factors such as
house prices and securitisation. The theoretical results in this essay are con-
sistent with this evidence.
This essay is also linked to a growing body of literature on the interactions
between house prices prices and aggregate consumption, including Iacoviello
(2005), Kiyotaki et al. (2011), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Iacoviello and Pavan
(2013), Kaplan and Violante (2014), Gorea and Midrigan (2017), and Guerri-
eri and Iacoviello (2017). However, these studies do not explain or motivate
why some borrowers are credit-constrained. In contrast to them, my focus
is on formulating explicitly the incentives for credit market participation and
default.
This research also connects to recent theoretical models of the housing
market where mortgage borrowers can strategically default, such as Corbae
and Quintin (2015), Guler (2015), Arslan et al. (2015), Elenev et al. (2016), and
Garriga et al. (2016). These studies are more quantitative in nature than this
essay, but their findings are in line with the ones presented here: households
have the strongest incentives to default when they both face an adverse in-
come shock and their home equity is negative. However, these studies do not
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consider private information, with the exception of Guler (2015).2
A recent strand of literature has attempted to explain inefficiencies in ag-
gregate investment by exploiting an adverse selection framework. Eisfeldt
(2004), Morris and Shin (2012), Bigio (2015), House (2006), Takalo and Toiva-
nen (2012), and Jokivuolle et al. (2014) analyse investment in entrepreneurial
projects, or the financing of capital production, in general equilibrium when
the allocation of finance is affected by asymmetric information on project qual-
ity. Similarly to this essay, the latter three studies also apply the De Meza and
Webb (1987, 1990) framework. On the credit supply side, Dell’Ariccia and
Marquez (2006) find that increasing asymmetric information across lenders
can lead to a tightening of lending standards, as lenders screen loan appli-
cants better.
The model presented in this essay builds upon the general equilibrium
framework of House (2006), who focuses on risk-neutral entrepreneurs who
invest in capital investment projects. To my knowledge, the De Meza and
Webb (1987) adverse selection framework has previously not been applied to
model inefficient credit intermediation in the mortgage market in a macroeco-
nomic setting, although the theory lends itself quite naturally to this context.
This essay also adds to the literature by considering two sources of uncertainty
jointly, instead of only one.
Finally, this essay connects to an old literature in macroeconomics and
macro-finance that focuses on deterministic and endogenous cycles in invest-
ment. Examples include Suarez and Sussman (1997), Azariadis and Smith
(1998), Matsuyama (2007), Favara (2012), Beaudry et al. (2015), Matsuyama
et al. (2016), and Azariadis et al. (2016). All rely on some combination of
strategic complementarities and costs of default to generate an endogenous
cycle. In a slightly different set-up, Gorton and He (2008) model a repeated
strategic game of borrower screening between banks, where changes in the
private information of lenders lead to an endogenous credit cycle.
2Contrary to this essay, however, the author argues that adverse selection has lead to credit
rationing rather than over-investment in the housing market, and that the run-up to the subprime
crisis can be explained with an increase in information symmetry and thus an increase in effi-
ciency of credit intermediation caused by technological advances, rather than an exacerbation of
a market failure. In contrast, I argue that information asymmetry can explain the run-up to the
crisis. For instance, new financial innovations that were thought to pool the risks in individual
subprime loans, such as mortgage backed securities, are an example of increasing opaqueness of
the credit market.
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In this section, I describe in detail the economic environment of the model.
First, I describe the stochastic structure of the economy and the information
sets of each agent. I then formulate the problems of each type of agent. The
subsequent sections solve for the equilibrium in the credit and housing mar-
kets.
3.3.1 Description of the economy
The economy consists of three types of agents: consumers, lenders, and real
estate agents. The consumers have a finite lifetime, and they consume hous-
ing services and other consumption goods and receive an endowment income.
The lenders extend loans to consumers in a perfectly competitive credit mar-
ket. The real estate agents buy housing from consumers exiting the economy
as well as from lenders in possession of foreclosed housing, refurbish them,
and sell them to newborn consumers.
There is a continuum of mass one of households that consist of risk averse
consumers. Each consumer only lives for two periods. In each period, a new
generation of consumers enters as the previous one exits, so that the total mass
of consumers stays constant. Each consumer receives an exogenous income
in both periods of her life. Income in the first period of life is certain and
identical across all consumers, but the income in the second period is subject
to idiosyncratic risk. In the first period, the consumer must make a tenure
choice of either buying or renting a unit of housing. In order to buy a house,
she may need a loan from a lender. In the second period, she consumes
housing services and other consumption goods. Similar to the income, the
value of housing in the second period is also subject to idiosyncratic risk.
I also assume that debt is not perfectly enforceable, so that a borrower can
default on a loan in the second period instead of repayment.
There is also a continuum of mass one of lenders, who are risk neutral.
They maximise the expected profit on their lending activity. They have access
to an infinitely elastic supply of funds.3 The lenders grant loans to borrow-
ers, collect loan repayments, and consume their profits. The credit market is
perfectly competitive and anonymous, and the loans are one-period loans.
Finally, there is a continuum of mass one of perfectly competitive real es-
tate agents, who are also risk neutral and who maximise their expected profit.
3For example, through the international financial market.
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They buy the housing stock from each exiting generation of households, as
well as used housing held by lenders, refurbish it at no cost, and sell or rent
it to the entering generation.
3.3.2 The credit market
There is a perfectly competitive credit market where households can apply
for a loan l0 from a continuum of atomistic lenders. A lender observes the
realisation of the house value q1 and the income y1 after the loan contract has
been agreed upon, but before the loan repayment is scheduled to be made. If
there is no default, the lender collects the loan repayment (1+ r0)l0, where r0
is the offered interest rate. In the event of default, the lender seizes the house,
worth q1h, and also has recourse to a fraction 0 < x < 1 of the borrower’s
income, y1.
The credit market equilibrium is described in Section 3.4.
3.3.3 The consumer problem
Consider a consumer who lives for two periods, t = 0, 1. A consumer who
wishes to become a home-owner buys housing h in t = 0 at a unit price q0.
At the time of the purchase, the value of the house in the next period, q1, is
uncertain. It can be q1 = qH with probability f, or q1 = qL with probability
1  f, with qH > q0 > qL  0. As a benchmark, I assume q0h > y0, so that
a prospective home buyer will need a loan to finance the purchase.4 If the
individual chooses to rent instead, she can earn the safe market rate 1+ r¯ on
a safe deposit a0, while paying a rent s1 per unit of housing in the second
period.
Similarly to the house value, the endowment of the consumer in period
t = 1 is uncertain, and can take on the values y1 2 fyH , yLg with yH > y0 >
yL > 0. The probability of receiving yH or yL are p and 1  p, respectively.
The combination of these two sources of uncertainty may trigger a default by
homeowners who have debt. The joint distribution of y1 and q1 is shown in
Table 3.1.
I assume that there is a fixed aggregate stock of housing h¯. Each individual
must occupy a housing unit of equal size h, which provides a flow of hous-
ing services; each unit is ex-ante identical. Since income y0 is equal across
4This need not be the case. A situation where buyers are able to self-finance the home purchase
is discussed in Section 3.6.2.
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q1 , y1 yH yL
qH pf (1  p)f
qL p(1  f) (1  p)(1  f)
Table 3.1: Joint distribution of endowment y1 and house value q1 in t = 1
households as well, the assumption of fixed h means that, importantly, the
ratio of housing to income hy0 — or equivalently leverage — is constant across
borrowers.5 I abstract from the choice over how much housing to acquire.
The consumers differ by their probability of realising a high endowment
yH : there is a continuum of types p 2 [0, 1]. This implies that different
consumers also face a different risk of default if they have debt. Otherwise,
they have the same preferences, the same support for the income distribution
y1 2 fyH , yLg, and the same stochastic process and support for the housing
value shock on q1.6
The type p is private information observed only by the consumer herself,
and not by other agents in the economy. Lenders and real estate agents know
the distribution of p, denoted by F(p), which is time-invariant.
I assume that consumers only value consumption in the second period of
their life. Then, anticipating the equilibrium, in the first period there is no
consumption; the endowment received in t = 0 is fully invested either into
housing h or a safe deposit a0. The budget constraints of a homeowner and a
tenant in the first period are then:
Home-owner: q0h = y0 + l0
Tenant: a0 = y0
5The strict assumptions of identical y0 and h are made for convenience, but it is the equal
leverage ratio that is crucial. This assumption is important in equilibrium, because it prevents
borrowers from signaling their types to lenders by choosing different house sizes and conse-
quently different leverage. The implications of this assumption are discussed in more detail in
Section 3.4.4.
6Note that the parameter p defines both the expected income and the income risk for each
type. This is a key assumption of the De Meza and Webb (1987) model. It stands in contrast
with the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model, where each type has the same expected income, but
faces a different income risk; i.e “riskier” types’ realised incomes are mean-preserving spreads
of “safer” types’ incomes. These distributional assumptions define whether the credit market
equilibrium exhibits under- or over-investment. See House (2006) for a thorough discussion on
the implications of these assumptions.
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At the beginning of the second period, the income y1 is observed, and
the home-owner with a home loan makes the decision of whether or not to
default. If there is no default, she pays back the loan principal and interest
and consumes the rest of her wealth. However, if she chooses to default on
the loan, the lender seizes the house and a fraction xy1 of the income, and the
borrower must convert into a tenant, paying rent s1 on housing. A defaulting
borrower also faces a deadweight cost of default k  0. It can be interpreted
as capturing various real costs associated with default, such as legal costs or
loss of access to credit markets. A tenant consumes her income endowment
and her savings. The price of the consumption good acts as numeraire and is
normalised to unity.
The ex-post budget constraints of the household in the second period of
their life, t = 1, are:
Home-owner:
No default c1 + (1+ r0)l0 = y1 + q1h
Default c1 + s1h = (1  x)y1   k
Tenant: c1 + s1h = y1 + (1+ r¯)a0
The consumer derives utility from consuming housing services and other
goods in the second period of her life, captured by the utility function u(c) +
civ(h), where i = H,R designates a home-owner (H) or tenant (R). The utility
function is separable in housing services and other goods, and I assume u()
increasing and concave: u0() > 0, u00() < 0. Utility from housing services
satisfies v() > 0 and v(0) = 0. In addition, home-owners enjoy a utility
premium on housing services: cH is normalised to 1 for home-owners, and
cR = c < 1 for tenants.7
I denote by p(p) is the individual ex-ante probability of not defaulting in
t = 1, given the home-owner’s type p. It is an equilibrium object, for which
the expression is derived in Section 3.4.1.
7Since the housing choice is a binary one (own/rent), the separability assumption is not crucial,
but it is analytically convenient. For the same reason, the shape of v is not important as long as
an owner enjoys a utility premium relative to a tenant. The assumption of a utility premium on
owning is a common one made in the literature on housing investment. It is made to compensate
for the riskiness of owning in order ensure at least some households want to own rather than
rent. See e.g. Iacoviello and Pavan (2013).
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The value function of a consumer of type p in t0 who becomes a home-
owner is:
VH(p) =p(p)E [u(cnd(y1, q1)) + v(h)jp] +
(1  p(p)) E [u(cd(y1)) + cv(h)jp] (3.1)
s.t. q0h = y0 + l0 (3.2)
cnd(y1, q1) = y1 + q1h  (1+ r0)l0 (3.3)
cd(y1) = (1  x)y1   k   s1h (3.4)
where cnd denotes period 1 consumption conditional on no default, and cd
period 1 consumption conditional on default.
Substituting the period 0 budget constraint (3.2) into the no-default budget
constraint (3.3) and rearranging yields the intertemporal budget constraint
cnd(y1, q1) = y1 + (1+ r0)y0 + Dqh  r0q0h (3.5)
where Dqh  (q1   q0)h equals the capital gain on the house. The term r0q0 is
the user cost of housing borne in the second period.
Similarly, the value function of a consumer who becomes a tenant is:
VR(p) = E [u(cr(y1)) + cv(h)jp] (3.6)
= pu(cr(yH)) + (1  p)u(cr(yL)) + cv(h)
s.t. cr(y1) = y1 + (1+ r¯)y0   s1h (3.7)
An individual chooses to buy a house and become a home-owner if and
only if VH(p)  VR(p). The trade-off that the individual faces is between the
risky capital gain on housing and the utility premium on housing services as
a home-owner, versus the less risky consumption granted by the safe return
on savings as a tenant.
The value function of a household of type p in the first period is thus:
V(p) = max fVH(p),VR(p)g . (3.8)
3.3.4 The real estate market
There is also a competitive real estate market, where a continuum of atomistic
real estate agents act. In each period, a representative real estate agent buys
housing both from non-defaulting exiting home-owners and from lenders
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who have seized the houses of defaulting home-owners. The real estate agents
refurbishes the housing stock at no cost, and sells it to the new, entering gen-
eration.
I assume that the whole housing stock, both owner-occupied and rental
housing, are subject to the same distribution of value shocks. Then, in any
given period, a fraction f ends up as high value (qH), and a fraction 1  f as
low value (qL).
Competition drives the profits of the real estate agents to zero, so that the
sales price of the refurbished housing to a generation entering in period t is:
qt = fqH + (1  f)qL. (3.9)
The real estate agents also rent part of the housing stock to the defaulting
homeowners whose houses have been foreclosed, and households who have
chosen to rent, in any given period t at a rental rate of st, and bear the user
cost rt 1qt 1 per unit of housing. Perfect competition then drives the rental
rate down to equal the user cost of housing:
st = rt 1qt 1. (3.10)
3.3.5 Timing
In every period t, a new generation enters. A generation indexed by its entry
period t = t. Each generation lives for two periods. The timing within the
two periods of a generation entering in t = 0 is outlined in Table 3.2.
3.4 Credit market equilibrium
The credit market intermediates funds to consumers who wish to become
homeowners but who cannot self-finance their housing investment. Under
the assumptions made in Section 3.3, all consumers receive an identical en-
dowment in the first period of their life, so that all (or none) of those who
wish to buy a house must borrow.
In this section, I characterise the credit market equilibrium by focusing
on a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I derive first the optimal default decision
of the borrower, given the loan amount and repayment, and next the terms
of the loan contract offered by the lender, given the ex-ante expectation of
default in the borrower pool. The equilibrium in the loan market in the first
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Period 0
– The generation t = 0 is born and receives the first-period endowment
y0.
– The preceding generation t =  1 sells their housing stock to the real
estate agents, consume, and exit.
– The new generation observes the house price q0 and the income y0,
and make its housing choice. The cutoff type pˆ0 is determined.
Period 1
– The house values q1 2 qH , qL as well as the income realisations y1 2
yH , yL are realised and observed by all agents.
– The homeowners make their optimal default choice.
– The successful homeowners sell their housing to the real estate agents
at the price q1 and consume cnd(y1, q1).
– The renters consume cr(y1) and the foreclosed homeowners consume
cd(y1).
– The generation t = 0 exits while a new one enters.
Table 3.2: Timing of events
period of a given generation is then characterised by the terms of the credit
contract and a set of borrowers who accept this contract, given the ex-ante
default probabilities. I analyse the equilibrium both under symmetric and
asymmetric information in order to highlight the externality that causes over-
investment.
3.4.1 Optimal default decision
In the second period, a home-owner will choose not to default if and only if:
u(cnd(y1, q1)) + v(h)  u(cd(y1)) + cv(h) (3.11)
for a given realisation (y1, q1). Then, the ex-ante probability of no default
conditional on the borrower type p, denoted by p(p), is:
p(p) = Pr fu(cnd(y1, q1)) + v(h)  u(cd(y1)) + cv(h) jpg (3.12)
= Pr f(1  c)v(h)  u(cd(y1))  u(cnd(y1, q1)) jpg . (3.13)
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In other words, the homeowner will not default if the utility premium from
owner occupied housing relative to tenant occupied housing is greater than
the utility in terms of consumption insurance acquired by defaulting.
Because u0(c) > 0 by assumption and ¶cnd(y1,q1)¶y1 = 1 >
¶cd(y1)
¶y1
= 1   x
for 0 < x < 1, the right-hand side of the inequality in expression (3.13) is
decreasing in y1. Thus the probability of no default, p(p), is increasing with
the probability of high income p. Correspondingly, the conditional default
probability is 1  p(p), which is decreasing in p.
3.4.2 Credit market equilibrium under symmetric informa-
tion
As a benchmark, assume first that borrower types p, and thus also individual
ex-ante default probabilities p(p), are publicly observable. Then, a lender
will offer a loan contract Cp characterised by an interest rate r(p) to each
type p. The symmetric information equilibrium thus provides the first-best
benchmark for the credit market, since each consumer faces individual loan
terms that reflect their true riskiness.
Because borrowers choose when to default strategically, the state (y1, q1)
under which default occurs, and thus the lender’s return in the default state,
are also endogenous and depend on the type. I define a default set D(p) as the
set of states of nature (y1, q1) in which a borrower of type p finds it ex-post
optimal to default:
D(p)  f(y1, q1) j u(cFBd (y1;p)) + cv(h) > u(cFBnd (y1, q1;p)) + v(h)g.
Next, I define a lender’s expected gross recovery rate, in case of default,
on a loan given to a p-type as:
d(p) = E

q1h+ xy1
l0
j (y1, q1) 2 D(p)

. (3.14)
In the first period, each potential borrower will demand a loan of equal
size, l0 = q0h   y0, because they do not value consumption in t = 0. The
expected return to a lender on such a loan is then:
EP(p)  [p(p) (1+ r(p)) + (1  p(p)) d(p)] l0. (3.15)
Perfect competition ensures that the expected return on each individual
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loan is equal to the opportunity cost of the funds, 1+ r¯. The equilibirum rate
offered to each p-type can then be solved from the zero-profit condition:
[p(p)(1+ r(p)) + (1  p(p))d(p)] l0 = (1+ r¯)l0
, 1+ r(p) = 1+ r¯
p(p)
  1  p(p)
p(p)
d(p). (3.16)
Given the offered rate r(p), a borrower accepts the loan and becomes a
homeowner if VH(p)  VR(p), as given by equations (3.1) and (3.6); other-
wise, she becomes a tenant. High-p borrowers enjoy lower interest rates on
their loans. At the limit, the borrower with p = 1 faces no income risk, but
only a risk of the house losing its value.
Denote by the superscript FB (for “first-best”) variables under the sym-
metric information equilibrium. Given the rate r(p) and using the budget
constraints (3.4) and (3.5), the first-best consumption of a type-p homeowner
in the no-default (nd) and default (d) states, respectively, are:
cFBnd (y1, q1;p) = (1+ r(p)) y0 + y1 + Dqh  r(p)q0h (3.17)
cFBd (y1;p) = (1  x)y1   k   sFB1 h, (3.18)
and the consumption of a tenant is:
cFBr (y1;p) = y1 + (1+ r¯)y0   sFB1 h. (3.19)
In the above, I assume that the rental rate under symmetric information is
sFBt = st = r

t 1qt 1, where r

t is the equilibrium pooling rate under asymmet-
ric information. This assumption ensures that the value of renting is equal
under symmetric and asymmetric information for all types. In other words,
the opportunity cost of owning is kept constant when comparing the two
economies.
Proposition 1 The credit market equilibrium under symmetric information is char-
acterised by a set of loan contracts Cp , characterised by an individual interest rate
r(p), and a cut-off type pˆFB 2 [0, 1] such that all individuals with p  pˆFB accept
Cp and become home-owners, and all individuals with p < pˆFB become tenants, and
the lenders break even in expectation for every type p individually.
Proof In Appendix 3.A.
The first-best, or efficient, cutoff type pˆFB is just indifferent between buy-
ing and renting, and is characterised by:
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VFBH (pˆ
FB) = VFBR (pˆ
FB)
, E
h
p(pˆFB)

u(cFBnd (pˆ
FB)) + v(h)

+
(1  p(pˆFB))

u(cFBd ) + cv(h)

j pˆFB
i
=
E
h
u(cr) + cv(h) j pˆFB
i
, p(pˆFB) = E

u(cFBr )  u(cFBd ) j pˆFB

E

u(cFBnd (pˆ
FB))  u(cFBd ) + (1  c)v(h) j pˆFB
 . (3.20)
The credit market equilibrium under symmetric information is efficient
and establishes a first-best benchmark. There is efficient risk-sharing because
the cost of borrowing of each type correctly reflects their true default risk. The
implications of this feature are further discussed in Section 3.6.
3.4.3 Credit market equilibrium under asymmetric informa-
tion
Next, I return to the assumption that a borrower’s type is unobservable to the
lender. I focus on a particular Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies
characterised by pooling of borrowers.
Again, all borrowers demand a loan of equal size, l0 = q0h  y0, because
consumption in t = 0 is not valued by any consumer and hence the whole
endowment is either saved into the safe asset or offered as down payment on
a house. However, now low-p borrowers have the incentive to mimic high-
p borrowers in order to get a loan with favourable terms. This is due to the
consumption insurance given by limited liability in case of default. Because all
consumers have an identical initial income y0 and all demand an equal sized
loan, the high types are not able to signal their type to the lenders. There
exists now an equilibrium in which the lender offers a common interest rate
r0 to all potential borrowers, such that he makes in expectation a non-negative
expected profit on the pool of loans.
In this case, because the loan interest rate is the same for all types, the ex-
post optimality of default does not depend on type. All consumers then find
it optimal to default in the same states, and their default sets do not depend
on type. I therefore assume that the lender’s expected recovery rate on a loan
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is the same across all individuals; I denote this expected recovery rate on the
whole loan pool by d¯.
The equilibrium interest rate is determined by the break-even condition of
the lenders. The expected return of a lender who charges an interest rate r0,
given the pool of loan applicants characterised by the cutoff pˆ, is given by:
EP   E [p(p) jp  pˆ] (1+ r0) + E [(1  p(p)) jp  pˆ] d¯ l0. (3.21)
In equilibrium, the competition in the credit market drives the return on the
loan down to equal the market rate, or the opportunity cost of the funds.
The equilibrium interest rate offered to all loan applicants, denoted by r, can
again be solved from the zero-profit condition:
EP = (1+ r¯)l0
, 1+ r0 = 1+ r¯E [p(p) jp  pˆ]  
E [(1  p(p)) jp  pˆ]
E [p(p) jp  pˆ] d¯
 1+ r. (3.22)
Given the offered rate r0 = r, an individual accepts the contract C if VH(p; r)
 VR(p). The cutoff type pˆ is implicitly determined by:
VH(pˆ; r) = VR(pˆ)
, p(pˆ) = E[u(cr(y1))  u(cd(y1))jpˆ]
E[u(cnd(y1, q1, r))  u(cd(y1)) + (1  c)v(h)jpˆ] , (3.23)
where cnd, cd and cr are given by equations (3.5), (3.4) and (3.7), respectively.
Proposition 2 The credit market equilibrium under asymmetric information is char-
acterised by a pooling contract C, characterised by a common interest rate r, and a
cut-off type pˆ 2 [0, 1] such that all individuals with p  pˆ accept C and become
home-owners, all individuals with p < pˆ become tenants, and the lenders break even
in expectation on the whole pool of loans given pˆ.
Proof In Appendix 3.A.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, pˆ  pˆFB 8 pˆ when the ratio of expected recovery
rates d(pˆ)d¯ is small enough.
Proof In Appendix 3.A. The exact condition for d(pˆ)d¯ is also given in the
Appendix.
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Proposition 3 implies that there is over-borrowing in equilibrium. This
result is discussed in more detail in Section 3.6.1. The intuition for the condi-
tion on d(pˆ)d¯ is the following. The greater the expected recovery rate in case
of default, the lower the interest rate charged on the loan is. The condition
then guarantees that r(pˆ)  r, i.e. that the marginal borrower would pay a
higher interest on the loan if her type were publicly observable. In this case,
she would no longer be indifferent on entering the credit market, and would
become a tenant instead. I assume that this is the case in all of the subsequent
analysis.
3.4.4 Robustness of the credit market equilibrium
The pooling equilibrium described in this section rests on very strict assump-
tions. Three assumptions, in particular, are crucial: first, the fixed size of
housing; second, the absence of consumption in the first period; and third,
perfect competition in the credit market. The first two assumptions prevent
any signaling of private types by borrowers in the first period. The third one
places a bound on the interest rates that a lender can offer. The assumption
of equal initial endowments, on the other hand, could be relaxed to also al-
low for idiosyncratic income in the first period, as long as this income is not
correlated with type (as in the second period). Because of these assumptions,
lenders cannot infer anything about the loan applicants’ types when offering
the loan contracts, and pooling arises in equilibrium.
The pooling equilibrium also crucially depends on the set of available loan
instruments and on market incompleteness. Here, I have assumed that only
standard debt contracts are available.8 Then, under the assumptions above,
no signaling by applying for loans for houses of different size or entailing
different down payments is possible. But other types of contracts could allow
for the separation of types in equilibrium.
The possibility of default offers partial consumption insurance if the indi-
vidual is faced with adverse shocks, i.e. some state contingency. The absence
of complete markets makes the loan contract lucrative for the low types. If
lenders were allowed to offer state-contingent debt contracts, with higher in-
terest rates but lower repayment ratios in case of adverse shocks, some types
8De Meza and Webb (1999) argue that the standard debt contract can be optimal under certain
conditions in a model of private types. In particular, assume that only the debt repayment is veri-
fiable, and not the wealth of the borrower, when the debt is redeemed. However, in case of default,
assume that the borrower’s wealth can be also verified at no cost. Under such circumstances the
standard debt contract is the optimal contract.
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with a high income risk would find it optimal to self-select into these contracts
instead.
Another possibility would be to allow for unsecured debt contracts. Then,
a lender could offer contracts with a higher interest rate but no collateral
alongside the collateralised debt contract. Again, this would offer better in-
surance for the lower types and could result in a separating equilibrium.
Finally, as noted for example by Tirole (2006, Ch. 6.5), it could be optimal
for a lender to merely pay a lump sum compensation for the worst types to
stay out of the credit market.
However, none of these features — state-contingent debt contracts, unse-
cured debt, or lenders offering to pay potential applicants in order for them
not to apply — are observed in actual markets for housing credit. I have
chosen to make very strict assumptions in order to sustain a pooling equilib-
rium, because it offers a convenient way to define subprime borrowing in a
theoretical context.
Although pooling is a very strong and not necessarily realistic equilib-
rium outcome, some pooling of applicants seems likely to have been present in
the U.S. housing market prior to the financial crisis. Indeed, Demyanyk and
Van Hemert (2011) provide empirical evidence from loan-level data that the
mortgage interest spread between prime and subprime borrowers narrowed
significantly over the boom years, even after controlling for borrower and
loan characteristics. At the same time, controlling for these same characteris-
tics, they show that the quality of loans deteriorated. This should have been
reflected in an increase of the spread, when in fact the opposite was observed.
Finally, the assumption of perfectly competitive credit markets is crucial in
sustaining the pooling equilibrium. Competition drives down the interest rate
in such a way that no lender is able to deviate from the equilibrium by offering
contracts with higher interest rates in an attempt to screen loan applicants. It
is in essence the combination of private types and perfect competition that
drives the selection of subprime types in the market and creates the over-
investment externality.9
9This result links to a debate on the relationship between bank competition and financial
stability. On the one hand, Ruckes (2004) and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) argue that an
increase in competition may induce lenders to lower their lending standards in order to gain
market shares. On the other hand, Gorton and He (2008) show that strategic bank competition
can cause endogenous fluctuations in lending standards when screening applicants is costly. More
competition then leads to tighter lending standards. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) find that lending
standards are tighter in the subprime loan market when there is more competition.
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3.5 Parametrisation and model solution
In this section, I first characterise the equilibrium of the overlapping genera-
tions model, and then outline the solution method of the model. The equi-
librium is a fixed-point problem, and I solve for it numerically; I discuss here
the particular assumptions on functional forms and parameter values made
in the computation.
3.5.1 Equilibrium and aggregation
The equilibrium is an allocation fctt+1, pˆt, ht, rt , qt, stg¥t=0 such that given the
interest rate rt , the cut-off pˆt satisfies the condition (3.23) and the household
consumption plan is given by ctt+1 = fcnd, cd, crg, defined by equations (3.5),
(3.4) and (3.7); the loan interest rate rt satisfies (3.22) given pˆt; the house
sales price qt satisfies (3.9); the rental rate st satisfies (3.10); and the following
conditions hold:
Yt = Ct + Ht (3.24)
h¯ =
Z 1
0
hdp, (3.25)
where equation (3.24) is the aggregate consistency condition, and (3.25) is the
housing market clearing condition; h¯ denotes the aggregate housing stock.
Ct is the aggregate consumption of goods, Ht is the aggregate consumption
of housing services, and Yt is the aggregate income of generation t, born in
period t = t. They are defined as:
Ct =
Z pˆt
0
crt+1 dp + (1  gt)
Z 1
pˆt
cdt+1 dp + gt
Z 1
pˆt
cndt+1 dp (3.26)
Ht =
Z pˆt
0
stt+1 dp + (1  gt)
Z 1
pˆt
stt+1 dp + gt
Z 1
pˆt
rt qt dp (3.27)
Yt =
Z pˆt
0
[(1+ r¯)yt + yt+1]dp + (1  gt)
Z 1
pˆt
(yt+1   k)dp
+ gt
Z 1
pˆt
[(1+ r)yt + yt+1 + Dqt+1]dp (3.28)
where pˆt denotes the cutoff type in generation t, and gt the ex-post frac-
tion of non-defaulting home-owners in generation t in the second period of
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their life. By the law of large numbers, gt ! E[p(p)jp  pˆ].
3.5.2 Functional forms
I assume log utility u() = v() = log() and a uniform distribution of types
with p  Uni f orm(0, 1). Under the latter assumption, f (p) = 1 and F(p) =
p denote the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of p, respectively. These simple functional
forms allow for an analytical solution of the equilibrium default probability
and the equilibrium interest rate as well as a simple characterisation of the
cut-off type.
In particular, the optimal default choice (3.11) is given by the condition:
u(cd(y1)) + cv(h) > u(cnd(y1, q1)) + v(h)
, log(cd(y1)) + c log(h) > log(cnd(y1, q1)) + log(h)
By substituting in the budget constraints (3.4) and (3.3), this condition can be
solved for:
y1 +Fq1h < F

(1+ r)l0   kh1 c

where F 

1  1 xh1 c
 1
> 0.
Therefore, the ex-ante optimal default probability of a type p is given by
Prf’default’ jpg = Pr
n
y1 +Fq1h < F

(1+ r)l0   kh1 c

jp
o
 1  p(p).
The borrower thus optimally defaults if and only if the weighted sum of y1 and
q1 realises a low enough value. In other words, default is optimal in the joint
event of both y1 and q1 realising a low enough value. In particular, I assume
that in the benchmark parametrisation, default is optimal when (y1, q1) =
(yL, qL).
The ex-ante default probability of a borrower from a lender’s point of view,
given the borrower cut-off type, is then:
E [(1  f)(1  p)jp  pˆ] = 1  f  (1  f)E [pjp  pˆ]
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Parameter Value
Safe interest rate R¯ 1.04
Utility from owner-occ. h vH(h) 0.2
Lender appropriation rate x 0.288
High house value prob. f 0.915
Default DWL cost k 2.08
q0/y0 2.94
qH/q0 1.07
qL/q0 0.24
yH/y0 1.43
yL/y0 0.71
Table 3.3: Baseline parameter calibration
= 1  f  (1  f)
R 1
pˆ p f (p)dp
1  F(pˆ)
=
1
2
(1  f)(1  pˆ),
and correspondingly the no-default probability is E[1  (1  f)(1  p)jp 
pˆ] = 12 (1+ f+ (1  f)pˆ). Finally, the equilibrium pooling interest rate (3.22)
in this case is:
1+ r = 1+ r¯1
2 (1+ f+ (1  f)pˆ)
  (1  f)(1  pˆ)
1+ f+ (1  f)pˆ
qLh+ xyL
l0
, (3.29)
3.5.3 Numerical calibration and solution
The equilibrium of the model is found as a solution to a fixed point problem in
p, given by equation (3.23), together with the zero-profit condition (3.22) that
determines the equilibrium interest rate r. In general, no analytic solution
for this problem exists. I therefore solve for the equilibrium allocation numer-
ically by using an iteration algorithm. The solution algorithm is described in
Appendix 3.B.
The parameter values used in the numerical model solution and simulation
are given in Table 3.3. They are chosen to mach some key long-run housing
market statistics from the U.S. data, shown in Table 3.4, alongside with the
corresponding statistics generated by the model under the calibration given
103
3.5 Parametrisation and model solution
Variable Data Model
Safe interest rate 1.04 1.04
Homeownership rate 0.66 0.66
Average recovery rate 0.5 0.48
Delinquency rate 0.023 0.028
Loan-to-value ratio 0.7 0.66
House prices peak-to-trend 1.29 1.07
House price trough-to-trend 0.72 0.24
Real personal inc. 1975-2015 1.33 1.43
Income loss at unempl. 0.76 0.71
Loan spread 162 bp 162 bp
Household indebtedness ratio 1.30 1.94
Rent-to-income ratio 0.38 0.20
Default only when (yL, qL) X X
Table 3.4: Data moments and model counterparts
in Table 3.3. The data are annual and include data series on house prices,
the homeownership rate, the mortgage delinquency rate and real personal
income.
In the data, the changes in house prices are computed as percentage devi-
ations of the Case-Shiller national home price index from its long-run trend
in 2006 (the peak-to-trend ratio) and in 2012 (the trough-to-trend ratio). The
trend is computed as a linear trend from the sample over 1975–2014. In 2006,
at the peak of the house price cycle, house prices were 29% above the long-run
trend, and in 2012, in the trough, they were 28% below trend.
The homeownership rate in the U.S. was 66% on average over the sample
period 1991–2015. The delinquency rate is the average delinquency rate on
all single-family residential mortgages over 1991–2007, before the foreclosure
crisis; it was on average 2.3% over this period. I have omitted the crisis period
from the sample period in order to capture the long-run average delinquency
rate without this rather unusual episode. Real income growth is measured as
the growth of the real median personal income growth over 1975–2015, which
was 33%.
The model matches all of these long-run averages quite well, with the ex-
ception of house prices. In the model, the relative prices qH/q0 and qL/q0 are
crucial for the default incentives and the homeownership decisions of house-
holds. With the parametrisation given here, a low house value realisation is
104
3.5 Parametrisation and model solution
relatively unlikely, but the low house value is much lower than in the data;
the high house value is also parametrised to be lower than the peak observed
in the data. These assumptions are needed in order to discourage enough low
types from entering the credit market and to match the homeownership and
delinquency rates.
According to Ospina and Uhlig (2016), the average loan-to-value ratio at
origination over 2006–2012 was 0.7. The model approximately matches this
value. Hayre and Saraf (2008) estimate that losses in the event of default
range from 35% to 60%. I choose parameter values that produce a recovery
rate of 0.48, which is well in the range of these estimates, and also consistent
with the value 0.5 used in Corbae and Quintin (2015).
In line with the results in Corbae and Quintin (2015), who also find that
borrowers defaulted on mortgage loans during the U.S. foreclosure crisis only
when they were sufficiently underwater on their home equity and suffered a
negative income shock, I choose parameters such that default occurs in equi-
librium only when y1 = yL and q1 = qL, i.e. when the home-owner suffers
both an adverse income and an adverse house value shock at the same time.
In other states of the world, the borrower has no incentive to default. In this
case, the default probability of a type p is 1  p(p) = (1  f)(1  p), which
is the joint probability of the event (y1, q1) = (yL, qL).
Finally, based on figures reported in Kawano and LaLumia (2017), annual
income loss at unemployment is at around 76% in the data. I choose the
income parameters such that the ratio yLy0 roughly replicates this figure.
Given the stylised structure and timing assumptions of the model, it is
hard to pin down realistic values for the interest rates and spreads. The safe
gross interest rate is set to 1.04. This is a rather low value, but ensures the
existence of a pooling equilibrium.10 The spread between 30-year fixed rate
mortgages and the 30-year Treasury bond, on a per annum basis, has been
on average 162bp over the sample 1977–2002, before the financial crisis and
the boom. The model is consistent with this figure. Household indebted-
ness, measured as the ratio of total household debt to disposable income, was
around 130% at the peak of the boom in 2006. The model produces a ratio
somewhat higher than this peak observed in the data. Finally, national ac-
10The debt is modelled as a one-period loan in the model, which is unrealistic for a mortgage.
On the other hand, in the model, each generation of households only lives for two periods. This
timing is hard to reconcile with typical mortgage maturities and interest rates in the data. This
horizon for the household can, however, be interpreted as a period over which the borrower holds
a given mortgage, or a time span over which the mortgage is not refinanced, rather than a whole
lifetime.
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count data on household consumption expenditures shows a share of around
40% going towards rents, whereas the model produces a somewhat lower fig-
ure.
Taken together, the figures in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show that the model, while
simple, can replicate some of the long-run averages in the U.S. housing market
data. In the next section, I look at some comparative statistics to gauge further
how the selection into homeownership depends especially on the safe interest
rate r¯, the housing value risk f, and the penalty on income at default x.
3.6 Equilibrium characteristics
In this section, I describe some equilibrium features of the model: over-
investment in housing, the source of this inefficiency, and the links between
default rates, house prices, and interest rates.
3.6.1 The over-investment externality and subprime
borrowing
The key feature of models of the credit market with a De Meza and Webb
(1987) type of information structure is that there is over-investment compared
to the first-best whenever there is a non-zero possibility of borrower default.
The marginal type pˆ is the riskiest type in the loan pool, meaning that
the loan pool is riskier than it would be under symmetric information. The
set of borrowers of borrowers that are able to get a loan under asymmetric
information, but would not do so under symmetric information can be called
subprime borrowers. They are borrowers whose loans are not socially optimal.
In particular, under the assumption of uniform distribution of types, this set
is equal to the share pˆFB   pˆ. Similarly, under uniformly distributed types,
the homeownership rate is defined as 1  pˆ.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.2, which shows the value functions of a ten-
ant, VR(p), and a home-owner, VH(p), as a function of type p, together with
the value function of a homeowner under symmetric information, VFBH (p).
The value function of a tenant is by assumption on the rental rate equal under
both symmetric and asymmetric information. All value functions are increas-
ing in the type: a high type has, on expectation, a higher consumption in the
second period because of the lower income risk.
Two notable features of the equilibrium are shown in the figure. First,
there is a discontinuity in the homeowner’s value function under symmetric
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Figure 3.2: Value functions and cut-offs under symmetric and asymmetric
information
information, VFBH (p). This is because the lowest types, left of the jump, default
whenever they face the low house value shock q1 = qL, regardless of their
income y1.11 This high default probability is reflected in a very high interest
rate offered to them, which makes borrowing very expensive.
This discontinuity is absent in the corresponding value function under
asymmetric information, VH(p). This reflects the externality associated with
entry into the credit market. If an agent of type p enters the market and takes
a loan, it yields her an expected marginal utility of consumption u0(cnd) with
probability of p(p), i.e. if she does not default. This expectation is the higher,
the higher the type. The cost of entry, however, does not depend on type: the
pooling interest rate 1+ r is the same for all entrants.
However, by entering the market, the marginal borrower makes the pool
marginally riskier, and thus increases the interest rate faced by all other agents
in the credit market as well. It is this change in the interest rate r induced by
entry, which affects the consumption available in the no-default state for every
borrower, that the marginal borrower does not internalise under asymmetric
information. In the symmetric information case, the interest rate 1 + r(p)
correctly reflects each type’s riskiness, such that the externality disappears.
11The jump corresponds to a switch from a larger default set D(p) to a smaller one.
107
3.6 Equilibrium characteristics
The second important feature is cross-subsidisation induced by credit mar-
ket pooling. The highest types are better off under symmetric information, as
their cost of borrowing is lower than the pooling rate. Conversely, there is a set
of types that would not enter the credit market under symmetric information,
but do so under asymmetric information. The low types are better off under
asymmetric information, and their borrowing is being subsidised by the high
types.
3.6.2 Comparative statics
To gauge how the the over-borrowing externality depends on the various pa-
rameters of the model, I perform a comparative statics exercise. I change three
key parameters of the model one by one while keeping all other parameters
fixed. The parameters of interest are the probability of a high house value
realisation f, the safe interest rate 1+ r¯, and the lender appropriation rate x.
The extent of the market failure is quantified in Figures 3.3, 3.4, and
3.5, respectively. They show how the marginal types pˆ and pˆFB, the ex-
ante default probability of default in the loan pool observed by the lender,
E[1  p(p)jp  pˆ], and the equilibrium pooling loan interest rate r change
as the three key model parameters change.
As Panel (a) of Figure 3.3 shows, the model exhibits a non-linear (inverse
U-shape) relationship between the probability of a high house value realisa-
tion f and the marginal type, all other parameter being fixed at their bench-
mark values. Strikingly, the homeownership rate is 100% (i.e. the marginal
type is pˆ = 0) both when a high house value is very unlikely and very likely.
At the limit, when the high house value yH will never occur, i.e. when
f = 0, the purchase price of the house is equal to the low value: q0 = qL.
Then, buying a house is very cheap, and there is no price risk involved. As
a consequence, owning is very attractive to all types, even those with low
expected income. Even as f becomes positive, for low values, q0 = fqH +
(1   f)qL remains low, and buyers are able to self finance (i.e. q0h  y0).
The threshold under which households are able to self-finance the purchase
is marked by a vertical dashed line.
As f increases, the purchase price q0 and loan amounts also increase. At
first, the worst types who have the lowest expected income start opting out
and renting instead. However, default remains non-optimal for all types in
the borrower pool, because the borrowers are not very levered and the cost of
default exceeds the cost of servicing the loan.
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium cut-off type, subprime borrowing, default probability
of the loan pool, and loan interest rate as a function of the house value risk f
Eventually, as q0 keeps rising, default becomes optimal for some types.
There is a discontinuous jump of the ex-ante default probability of the bor-
rower pool away from zero. At this point, as defaults become a non-zero
probability event, the over-investment externality kicks in, and the asymmet-
ric information equilibrium allocation no longer replicates the efficient one.
As the probability of the high house value and therefore the purchase price
q0 keep rising, the worst types keep opting out of the credit market, and thus
the borrower pool becomes safer. Although defaults still happen, the pool
becomes less risky.
However, as the high house value becomes likely enough, riskier types
with worse income expectations are drawn back to the credit market. Con-
sequently, the ex-ante default rate sharply increases. It is in this region of
increasing market participation that the over-investment externality is at its
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worst. For a given value of f, the vertical distance of the two curves measures
the amount of subprime borrowing. This difference between the two curves
in Panel (a) is plotted in Panel (b). It can also be interpreted to measure
the looseness of lending standards relative to first-best: it shows that lend-
ing standards are loose exactly when high future house values are relatively
likely. The loan interest rates, depicted in Panel (d), depend on the default
probabilities, shown in Panel (c).
For very high values of f, in the range 0.95–0.99, homeowners default
whenever they are hit by a low house value under asymmetric information as
well, regardless of their income realisation, because they are so highly levered.
Then the ex-ante default probability is no longer dependent on the composi-
tion of the borrower pool. In this region, the inefficiency thus disappears.
These results are consistent with empirical evidence presented by Mian
and Sufi (2011), who study the impact of exogenous house price increases
on household borrowing. They show that low credit quality households in-
creased their borrowing by much more than high credit quality households in
U.S. regions where housing supply was inelastic. These regions experienced
the most significant house price increases in 2002–2006. Prior to 2002, however,
borrowing by low credit quality households did not increase although house
prices were already increasing. The authors also show that in regions with
inelastic housing supply, although the increase in house prices started already
around 2000, the total indebtedness of all households (the total debt-to-income
ratio) actually decreased slightly from 2000 until 2002, and started increasing
only in 2003. This suggests that an exogenous increase in house prices first led
to a slight decrease of household indebtedness, and subsequently in a strong
increase, with low quality borrowers increasing their borrowing the most.
Figure 3.4 shows a similar exercise of comparative statics for the safe inter-
est rate 1+ r¯, all other parameter being fixed at their benchmark values. The
baseline value is 1+ r¯ = 1.044.
The marginal type is increasing in the safe interest rate, as depicted in
Panel (a) of the figure. When r¯ is low, the cost of lending as well as the
outside return for savings is low as well; therefore purchasing a house is
very attractive. As the safe interest rate increases, borrowing becomes more
expensive and the outside return better; this leads to the worst types opting
out of the credit market. The inefficiency is worst for relatively low values of
r¯, as shown in Panel (b). In the symmetric information economy, each agent’s
cost of funding reflects their true riskiness through a type-dependent margin
over the safe rate, which increases faster for low types than when they face
the pooling interest rate.
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Figure 3.4: Equilibrium cut-off type, subprime borrowing, default probability
of the loan pool, and loan interest rate as a function of the safe interest rate
1+ r¯
Finally, Figure 3.5 shows a comparative statics exercise with respect to
the lender appropriation rate x. When x = 0, the lender cannot seize any
of the second-period income of the borrower in case of default, and when
x = 1, he can seize all of it, in addition to the house. The baseline value is
x = 0.288. For values below x = 0.25, no equilibrium exists given the rest
of the parameter values in the benchmark calibration; thus only the range
x 2 [0.25, 1] is reported in the figure.
This exercise shows that stricter regulation in case of default – as x in-
creases – mitigates incentives for default, inPanel (c). At around x = 0.45,
no households wants to take out a loan and risk losing such a share of their
income in case of default. But this also means that the default regulation is so
strict that the homeownership rate goes down to zero, as shown in Panel (a)
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium cut-off type, subprime borrowing, default probability
of the loan pool, and loan interest rate as a function of the lender appropria-
tion rate x
of the figure. It also affects equally all borrowers, regardless of their default
risk.12
12De Meza and Webb (1990) suggest that a 100% tax on capital gains, with full offset of losses,
would restore an efficient allocation. This type of scheme would in essence eliminate the risk,
but also the gain, from the risky investment in housing. All types would then be indifferent
between housing and the safe asset, and there would be no incentive to default. With such a tax
scheme, the government would effectively pool together the idiosyncratic risks and provide full
consumption insurance for the households. However, this type of policy on housing gains and
losses does not seem feasible in practice.
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3.6.3 Implications for monetary policy and financial regula-
tion
The characteristics of the equilibrium described in this section have some
poignant policy implications. The comparative statics exercises highlight that
the over-investment externality is particularly severe first, when house values
are relatively high on expectation, which is reflected in high purchase prices;
and second, when interest rates are relatively low. These are exactly the type
of conditions that prevailed in the U.S. during the housing boom. Under
these conditions, households have strong incentives to become very highly
levered, making the economy vulnerable to adverse income or house price
shocks through an increased likelihood of default.
In terms of policy, first, there is a direct link between the over-investment
externality and the conduct of monetary policy. A low interest rate regime
directly fuels households’ incentives to take on debt, which is not surprising.
Notably, the effective Federal Funds rate was low, at around 1%, in 2002–2003
at the height of the housing boom.
Second, the cross-subsidisation of high-risk borrowers is at the heart of the
externality. In the U.S., as well as many other countries, promoting home-
ownership by supporting cheap and accessible mortgage borrowing has been
a political priority for decades. This policy has promoted lenient lending
standards and made borrowing persistently too cheap for many households
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011).
Finally, during the housing boom years of the early 2000s, it was not un-
common for lenders to offer low “teaser rates” on new adjustable-rate mort-
gage loans (ARMs), further increasing the attractiveness of these loans in the
eyes of many households. When the interest rates on the loans increased
after the teaser period, many borrowers found themselves unable to service
their debt. This suggests that they would not, or perhaps should not, have
borrowed on terms that truly reflected their credit risk.13
There is also scope for macroprudential policy that curbs households’ in-
centives to borrow. Removing favourable tax treatment of housing loans, im-
posing loan-to-value or loan-to-income constraints and making lenders re-
sponsible for properly testing the creditworthiness of potential borrowers are
examples of policies that directly affect the incentives to borrow, and thus
render the economy as a whole more robust to adverse shocks.
13Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) finds that so-called “option ARM” loans, which
even allowed for negative amortisation, accounted for nearly 10% of mortgage originations in
2005 and 2006.
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3.7 An endogenous boom-bust cycle
The housing market is an asset market that is prone to experiencing boom-
bust episodes. First, housing supply (new housing starts) typically adjusts
only slowly to demand shocks due to, for example, zoning and time-to-build
issues. Second, the market is rather opaque and illiquid compared to many
other asset markets, because of high transaction costs and the inability to sell
short. This can lead to persistent deviations from equilibrium prices and to
long-lasting cycles.
This point is made by Crowe et al. (2013), who document 51 real estate
boom-bust episodes in a sample of 40 countries over 2003–2009. Cerutti et al.
(2017) analyse a sample of 53 countries over the years 1970–2012, and find
that in most years, between 20 to 60% of the countries were experiencing a
house price boom; most countries in their sample experienced at least one
boom episode over this period. More than half of the housing boom episodes
in their sample coincided with a credit boom, and almost 85% of all housing
booms in the sample ended in recessions. In summary, house price boom-bust
episodes are globally a rather common phenomenon, and house price cycles
are tightly linked with credit cycles.
The model I have discussed so far is essentially static in nature. Because
there is no aggregate uncertainty, the expected value of housing is the same
for each entering generation, and there are no aggregate cycles. The problem
of each generation is identical to any other. In this section, I modify the model
to allow for an endogenous aggregate boom-bust cycle in credit and house
prices.
Two additional ingredients are needed. The first one is a positive demand
externality in housing: households derive more utility from owning a house
when many others own a house as well. As I show, the existence of such
an externality in housing consumption also leads to strategic demand com-
plementarity in homeownership. It is a reduced-form way to capture a hype
surrounding homeownership, reflecting a housing boom in a simple manner.
One potential source for such positive spillovers is a neighbourhood ex-
ternality stemming from owner-occupied (as opposed to rental) housing con-
sumption: owner-occupied houses tend to be better maintained and thus more
pleasant for neighbours. Second, there may be positive spillovers through so-
cial and political action. Unlike tenants, homeowners have a financial stake
in making their neighbourhood a more attractive place to live and are thus
more active in their communities, making it more attractive for others as well.
Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) find some empirical evidence for these positive
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spillovers from owner-occupied housing consumption and homeownership.
The second ingredient is a deadweight cost of default on the price of fore-
closed housing. So far, the only deadweight cost in the model (k) is incurred
on the income of the defaulting household. This is an idiosyncratic cost that
the defaulting household alone bears. It captures personal costs of default; for
example legal costs, costs of moving, loss of access to the credit market after
default, or loss of reputation after default. On top of this idiosyncratic dead-
weight cost, I now impose a cost of default on the aggregate housing stock,
which depends on the aggregate default rate in the economy.
Several reasons for such a cost exist. First, it can be thought of capturing
the fact that foreclosed housing often sells at a big discount relative to mar-
ket prices. Sellers of foreclosed housing often need to liquidate the property
quickly and have an incentive to accept a low price because of the illiquid
nature of the housing market. Mian et al. (2013) find a strong negative effect
of foreclosures on house prices in a zip code-level analysis. They estimate that
the increase in foreclosures accounted for 33% of the decline in house prices
in 2007–2009 in the U.S. They argue that this was due to a fire sale effect:
the market was flooded with foreclosed properties when the economy was
already weak, which forced sellers to accept low prices.
Finally, there may be negative spillovers to foreclosed housing similar to
the positive externalities from homeownership discussed above. Campbell
(2013) reviews empirical evidence on the existence of such physical foreclo-
sure externalities. He argues that foreclosures have a negative spillover effect
on prices of nearby housing, as the occupants of foreclosed housing may be-
come negligent, and a high rate of foreclosures may lead to social problems
in the neighbourhood. Campbell et al. (2011) estimate an average foreclosure
discount of 27% in a sample of individual house transactions in Massachusetts
over the period 1987–2009. Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009) summarise em-
pirical research on the overall size of the foreclosure discount, and find that it
has often been estimated to be 22–24% of average sales prices in the samples
studied, consistent with Campbell et al. (2011).
3.7.1 Strategic complementarity in homeownership
I modify the value function of a homeowner in equation (3.1) by adding a
demand externality that depends on the aggregate homeownership rate 1 
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pˆ.14 Specifically, the value function is now:
VH(p; pˆ) =p(p)E [u(cnd(y1, q1)) + v(h) + g(1  pˆ) j p] +
(1  p(p)) E [u(cd(y1)) + cv(h) j p] (3.30)
I assume that g : [0, 1] ! R is a strictly strictly increasing function of the
homeownership rate 1  pˆ with g(0) = 0 and 0 < g0(1  pˆ) < 1 8 pˆ 2 [0, 1].
The positive demand externality also implies strategic demand comple-
mentarity in homeownership. To see this, recall that the optimal action of a
given household is defined by the cut-off strategy, given by equation (3.23).
This action depends on the expected pay-offs of homeownership relative to
renting, and consequently now also depends on the actions of others through
the aggregate homeownership rate 1  pˆ.
The assumption of a slope of the function g below unity implies weak
strategic complementarity. Cooper and John (1988) and more recently Beaudry
et al. (2015) show that a slope above one implies strong complementarity,
which is a sufficient condition for equilibrium multiplicity. Beaudry et al.
(2015) also show that a slope of the demand complementarity function below
unity guarantees a unique equilibrium, but can accommodate a deterministic
cycle around this equilibrium.
A further assumption is that a tenant does not enjoy this demand external-
ity. A tenant’s value function is thus unchanged from the baseline formulation
(3.6), reproduced here for convenience:
VR(p) = E [u(cr(y1)) + cv(h) j p] . (3.31)
The household’s value function is then:
V(p; pˆ) = max fVH(p; pˆ),VR(p)g . (3.32)
The ex-post default choice and the ex-ante no-default probability p(p; pˆ) are
modified accordingly and now also depend on the aggregate homeownership
rate. A borrower of type p defaults in the second period if and only if:
u(cd(y1)) + cv(h) > u(cnd(y1, q1)) + v(h) + g(1  pˆ).
14This definition of the homeownership rate hinges on the continued assumption of uniformly
distributed types.
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3.7.2 Deadweight cost of default
The second extension to the baseline model is the inclusion of a deadweight
cost of default on the house price. I now assume that each housing unit
seized and sold by the lender after a default suffers a cost 1  y proportional
to the market price q1, with 0 < y < 1. That is, a house h that is foreclosed
only yields yq1h to the lender who sells it to a real estate agent, and the real
estate agent also receives yq1h. The share (1  y)q1h is lost. This represents
a discount on the value of the housing stock that is foreclosed. A homeowner
who does not default on his loan is not subject to this cost, and is able to sell
his house at the market price q1h.
I denote by S the set of possible states of the world (y1, q1) and by S the
number of different states inS. In particular,S = f(yH , qH), (yL, qH), (yH , qL),
(yL, qL)g and S = 4.
The value of the aggregate stock of housing of an exiting generation in
period t, denoted by q¯t, is then:
q¯t = f (p¯t, f) [(I  1d,t) q+ 1d,t yq] (3.33)
where 1d in a S S diagonal matrix with elements iss = 1 if there is default in
state s 2 S and iss = 0 if there is not.
Furthermore, f (p¯, f) = vec([p¯ 1   p¯]0[f 1   f])0 (1  S) is the joint
distribution vector of the average income type on the market p¯ and the house
value shock f, where p¯  E[p jp  pˆ]. Finally, q = [qH qL]0 is a S  1
vector of house values.
This expression picks up the states in which default happens and discounts
the house values by y in those states, while keeping them unaffected in the no-
default states. It then produces the expected value of the aggregate housing
stock.
3.7.3 Parametrisation of the extended model
The behaviour of the model and the dynamics of the house price cycle are
sensitive to the parameter values. The length, magnitude and frequency of
the deterministic cycle can vary significantly. I show below a specific example
that demonstrates that the model can, qualitatively, replicate a similar boom-
bust pattern in house prices, default rate, and new lending to the data in
Figure 3.1.
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Parameter Value Model moment Static Boom-bust
Demand complementarity a 0.7 - - -
DWL cost on housing y 0 - - -
Safe interest rate r¯ 1.04 Safe interest rate 1.04 1.04
Utility from owner-occ. h vH(h) 0.2 Homeownership rate 0.66 0.75
Lender appropriation rate x 0.288 Average lender recovery 0.5 0.1
High house value prob. f 0.915 Delinquency rate 0.03 0.032
Default DWL cost k 2.08 Default only when (yL , qL) X X
q0/y0 2.94 Loan-to-value ratio 0.66 0.66
qH/q0 1.07 House p. peak-to-trend 1.07 1.08
qL/q0 0.24 House p. trough-to-trend 0.24 0.25
yH/y0 1.43 Rel. income growth 1.43 1.43
yL/y0 0.71 Rel. income loss 0.71 0.71
Table 3.5: Boom-bust parameter calibration
Note: “Static” refers to the targeted equilibrium values under the baseline calibration,
replicated from Table 3.3. “Boom-bust” refers to the equilibrium steady-state values
under the boom-bust calibration, around which the system oscillates.
In the numerical computations, I use the functional form
g(1  pˆ) = a log(1+ (1  pˆ))
for the demand externality function. Here a > 0 is a parameter that governs
the strength of the complementarity. Setting 0 < a < 1 guarantees that 0 <
g0() < 1 everywhere in the domain [0, 1].
The parametrisation mostly follows the baseline presented in Table 3.3 in
Section 3.5.3. The demand complementarity parameter a and the haircut on
house values y govern the behaviour on the cycle, and are chosen to qualita-
tively match the cyclical patterns observed in Figure 3.1. The value of a is set
to 0.7, such that the externality is strong enough to generate a cycle but low
enough to rule out equilibrium multiplicity. The discount parameter y = 0 is
set to an extreme value; it is needed to generate a big enough bust in the house
price. The discounts observed empirically in general range from 22% to 27%
(Clauretie and Daneshvary 2009; Campbell et al. 2011). Finally, the demand
complementarity strengthens the incentives for buying a house. Because of
this, the resulting homeownership rate is higher than in the static model.
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Figure 3.6: Boom-bust model dynamics and the data
Note: Panel (a): Model dynamics, deviations from mean. Panel (b): Data, percentage
deviations from mean or trend.
3.7.4 Boom-bust dynamics
This section presents and discusses the dynamics of the model under the
parametrisation in Table 3.5, and compares these dynamics to the patterns
observed in data.
Panel (a) of Figure 3.6 plots the dynamics of the extended model. With the
given parametrisation, the model exhibits a deterministic cycle of two periods
around its equilibrium. All variables are expressed in deviations from their
mean values. Panel (b) replicates the data from Figure 3.1; here, for ease of
comparison with the model counterparts, all series are either de-meaned or
de-trended by removing a linear trend.
The model dynamics work as follows. Assume, first, a situation where
the price of housing q0 and the homeownership rate 1  pˆ are both high, as in
period 1 of Panel (a). Because there are a lot of risky households in the market,
the default rate increases in the next period, and homeownership decreases.
Consequently, the price q0 is depressed because of the deadweight loss caused
by the increase in defaults. But the fall in the house price attracts more new
buyers in the following period, and the cycle starts again.
119
3.7 An endogenous boom-bust cycle
Ratio of standard errors Data Model
Loan originations to house prices 4.1 4.7
Subprime loan originations to all loan originations 0.13 0.50
Default rate to loan originations 0.05 0.04
Default rate to house prices 0.23 0.20
Table 3.6: Relative volatilities of the series in Figure 3.6
Note: Relative volatility is measured as the ratio of standard errors. “Model”: series in
Panel (a), “Data”: series in Panel (b) of Figure 3.6, respectively.
Here, the first-best homeownership is more sensitive to the changes in the
house price, which makes the share of subprime borrowers move counter-
cyclically with respect to house prices. However, the homeownership rate is
always at a lower level under symmetric information than under asymmetric
information.
Panel (b) of Figure 3.6 shows the developments in the housing market in
the U.S. in 1990–2015. In the data, house prices peak in 2006. New mortgage
originations peak slightly earlier, in 2003, and remain elevated through 2006.
Subsequently, new originations fall together with house prices. Likewise, the
share of subprime borrowing remains stable until 2003, starts to rapidly in-
crease in 2004 and peaks with house prices in 2006, after which it collapses
together with house prices. The delinquency rate only picks up later, in 2009,
as house prices fall.
The model largely exhibits these same patterns. When house prices are
rising, homeownership increases; in the context of the model, this translates
directly into new loan originations. House prices peak as housing demand
peaks. Finally, as in the data, defaults peak after house prices, as the increase
in borrowing translates into increased defaults with a delay.
In terms of relative magnitudes, the model also performs well. The relative
volatilities of the series in Figure 3.6 are presented in Table 3.6. All ratios are
of the same order of magnitude both in the data and the model. Most notably,
new loan originations are more volatile than house prices. In the model, there
are only two assets available to the household — the safe deposit and the
risky investment in housing. Moreover, the diversification of endowments
into both assets is not optimal. Therefore small changes in the price of the
risky assets induce large fluctuations in the households’ investment incentives,
and consequently, the homeownership rate as well as the share of subprime
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borrowers. On the other hand, as only a small fraction of borrowers default
in any given period, only a small fraction of the housing stock is subject to a
haircut. There is no aggregate shock that would lead to large swings in house
prices.
In the data, the changes in the homeownership rate are small (not depicted
in Figure 3.6), but the volume of new residential mortgage loan originations
grows sevenfold in absolute terms, or from 70% below mean to 120% above
mean over the boom period. Beside loans for new purchases, this amount
also includes refinancing and home equity loans, which are strictly speaking
absent in the model. Nonetheless, mortgages for new purchases amount to a
substantial share of total mortgage originations.15
It has to be noted, however, that the fluctuations in the theoretical model
are very small in absolute terms. They are weak oscillations around the model
equilibrium. The model is not intended to be a quantitative model of business
cycles; in order to work as such, it would need more powerful mechanisms
that induce aggregate fluctuations. Here, all uncertainty is idiosyncratic, and
the fluctuations are created by externalities stemming from the demand com-
plementarity on the one hand, and the default discount on the other hand.
Finally, endogenising housing supply in the model would dampen the ef-
fects of the incentive mechanism. A perfectly inelastic housing supply coupled
with a perfectly elastic credit supply imply that credit demand by households
alone drives the boom–bust dynamics in the model. However, as long as hous-
ing supply is not very elastic, and credit on the other hand is easily accessible,
the incentive mechanisms described in this essay are at work. These condi-
tions are empirically plausible in many regions of the United States; Mian
and Sufi (2011) provide empirical evidence on strong house price growth and
a marked increase in household indebtedness in areas where housing supply
was inelastic in 2002–2006.
3.8 Conclusions
This essay outlines a model of the housing market where housing finance is
affected by an adverse selection problem. The selection is towards less credit-
worthy borrowers. The aim of the essay is to shed light on the specific incen-
tives that can cause equilibrium over-investment and endogenous fluctuations
15See e.g. the Mortgage Bankers Association (2016) for more detailed information on mortgage
origination by purpose.
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in lending standards, captured by the endogenous share of subprime borrow-
ers in the market. The market failure leads to households being too levered
compared to the first-best credit allocation, which renders the aggregate econ-
omy fragile. To my knowledge, this essay is the first to apply the De Meza
and Webb (1987) adverse selection framework to study housing investment.
The model succeeds in replicating some key long-run averages in the U.S.
housing market before the subprime crisis, such as the default rate, homeown-
ership rate, and loan-to-income ratio. The dynamic model can also replicate
the patterns empirically observed in the U.S. during the housing boom and
the foreclosure crisis, in 1990–2015, in terms of relative magnitudes and the
timing of the cycles. The demand-side mechanism discussed in this essay is
complementary to supply–side explanations of the subprime crisis, such as
credit or housing supply shocks.
Using comparative statics, I show that the over-borrowing externality is
the most severe, first, when future house values are expected to be high; and
second, when safe interest rates are relatively low, which implies low costs of
borrowing and a low opportunity cost on housing investment. Under these
circumstances, the incentives of subprime borrowers to enter the credit market
are the strongest. These are also exactly the circumstances which prevailed in
the U.S. prior to the subprime crisis in the early 2000s; the results are consis-
tent with a substantial market failure in housing finance in the years prior to
the crisis. They also demonstrate that there are strong and important links be-
tween the conduct of monetary policy and financial stability, as interest rates
directly affect incentives for credit market participation.
In terms of policy, I find that a tightening of foreclosure regulation, which
affects all defaulting borrowers equally, is not an effective way to curb this
problem. Removing the over-borrowing externality calls for measures that af-
fect incentives directly. Effective policies could include removing favourable
tax treatment of housing loans and owner-occupied housing, imposing loan-
to-value or loan-to-income constraints on lending, and regulatory action de-
signed to make lenders properly test the creditworthiness of potential borrow-
ers.
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Proof of Proposition 1
The homeowner consumption in the no-default state cFBnd is increasing in p:
¶cFBnd
¶p =   ¶r(p)¶p l  0, as:
¶r(p)
¶p
=

E [q1h+ xy1 jp]
l0
  (1+ r¯)

| {z }
<0
p0(p)
p(p)2| {z }
>0
< 0.
The value VFBR (p) = E

u(cFBr ) + cv(h)jp

continuous and differentiable by
the assumptions made on u(). It is linearly increasing in type p:
¶VFBR (p)
¶p
= u(cFBr (yH))  u(cFBr (yL)) > 0
¶2VFBR (p)
¶p2
= 0.
The value
VFBH (p) =E
h
p(pˆFB)

u(cFBnd (pˆ
FB)) + v(h)

+
(1  p(pˆFB))

u(cFBd ) + cv(h)

j pˆFB
i
is not necessarily continuous and differentiable everywhere: it can exhibit
discontinuous jumps. To see this, define default sets D(p) as the set of states of
nature s 2 S in which a borrower of type p ex-post finds it optimal to default:
D(p)  fs 2 S j u(cFBd (ys1;p)) + cv(h) > u(cFBnd (ys1, qs1;p)) + v(h)g,
where ys1 and q
s
1 denote the realisation of income y1 and house value q1 in
state s. The default probability p(p) is decreasing in p, which implies that
p > p0 =) D(p)  D(p0). In other words higher types cannot default
in strictly more states than lower types. Finally, when the set of states S
is a discrete set, either D(p) = D(p0) 8p,p0, or D(p)  D(p0) for some
p = p0 + e for an arbitrarily small e > 0. In the former case, all types default
in exactly the same states, and VFBH (p) is continuous and differentiable in p.
In the latter case, there are discontinuous jumps at types where the switch
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from a default set D(p0) to D(p)  D(p0) happens, because ex-ante welfare
V is always strictly higher the less likely a default is for a given type.
However, because utility u() is increasing in consumption by assumption,
consumption in the no-default state is increasing in p, consumption in the
default state is constant in the type p, and the no-default probability is in-
creasing in p, it follows that expected utility is increasing in p. This directly
implies that VFBH (p) is always increasing in p, also at any possible disconti-
nuity points.
Then, there exists a parametrisation (specific functional forms and a set of
parameter values) for which the value functions VFBR (p) and V
FB
H (p) intersect
at most once in the interval p 2 [0, 1]. If no intersection exists in this interval,
if VFBR (p) < V
FB
H (p) 8p, define pˆFB = 0, and if VFBR (p) > VFBH (p) 8p, define
pˆFB = 1. I assume that the parametrisation is such that I can rule out cases
where the value functions could intersect more than once. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Similarly to the symmetric information case, the value of a tenant VR(p) is
linearly increasing in p:
¶VH(p)
¶p
= u(cr(yH))  u(cr(yL)) > 0
The value of a home-owner VH(p) is increasing in p following the same ar-
gument as VFBH (p), presented in the proof of Proposition 1 above. Then, there
exists a parametrisation (specific functional forms and a set of parameter val-
ues) for VR(p) and VH(p) such that they intersect at most once in the interval
p 2 [0, 1]. If no intersection exists in this interval and VR(p) < VH(p) 8p,
define pˆ = 0, and if VR(p) > VH(p) 8p, define pˆ = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma 1 r(pˆ)  r, where r(pˆ) is the interest rate that the marginal type pˆ would
pay under symmetric information, and r is the equilibrium pooling rate under asym-
metric information.
Proof. I denote p¯  E[p(p) j p  pˆ] and d¯  E[d(p) j p  pˆ]. From the
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equilibrium conditions for r(p) and r, we have:
1+ r(pˆ)  1+ r
, 1+ r¯
p(pˆ)
  1  p(pˆ)
p(pˆ)
d(pˆ)  1+ r¯
p¯
  1  p¯
p¯
d¯. (3.34)
Case 1. d(p) = d¯.
Substituting d(p) = d¯ into equation (3.34):
1+ r¯
p(pˆ)
  1  p(pˆ)
p(pˆ)
d¯  1+ r¯
p¯
  1  p¯
p¯
d¯
, 1+ r¯
d¯| {z }
1

1 p(pˆ)
p(pˆ)  
1  p¯
p¯
1
p(pˆ)   1p¯| {z }
=1
) r(pˆ)  r 8 pˆ.
Case 2. d(p) > d¯.
Solving from equation (3.34), we have the condition:
d(pˆ)
d¯


1  p(pˆ)
p¯

(1  p(pˆ)) 1+ r¯
d¯
+
p(pˆ)
p¯
1  p¯
1  p(pˆ) . (3.35)
Case 3. d(p) < d¯.
When the condition (3.35) above holds, r(pˆ)  r also when d(p) < d¯.
Therefore the interest rate charged on the marginal type under symmetric
information r(pˆ) is greater than the pooling rate r whenever condition (3.35)
holds. 
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, pˆ  pˆFB 8 pˆ when condition (3.35) holds.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the marginal borrower pˆ would pay a (weakly) higher
interest rate if her type were publicly observable. The homeowner’s value
function is decreasing in r0:
¶u(cnd)
¶r0
= y0   q0h < 0|{z}
by assumption
) ¶VH
¶r0
= p(p)
¶u(cnd)
¶r0
< 0
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Therefore the marginal type would be worse off under symmetric information
and would not enter the credit market when r(pˆ) > r. When r(pˆ) = r, she
would be indifferent on entering the credit market, and would also be the
marginal type under symmetric information. This implies pˆ  pˆFB. 
3.B Numerical solution algorithm
The numerical method for finding the equilibrium is an iteration algorithm
based on guessing and iterating on an interest rate until convergence. The
algorithm searches for an equilibrium through backward induction, starting
from solving the second-period problem of the consumer given the guess for
the interest rate, and given this solution, solving the first-period problems of
the consumer and the lender. The algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. Guess for an equilibrium interest rate r.
2. Compute consumption profiles in all different states in t = 1 and the
utilities u(c) from these consumption profiles given the guess for r.
3. Compute the ex-post default decision in t = 1 of each type p for all
realisations (y1, q1).
4. Given the ex-post default choices, compute the ex-ante private default
probabilities, expected values VH and VR, and tenure choices in t = 0.
5. Find the cut-off type pˆ who is indifferent between the expected values
VH and VR given the guess r.
6. Given the guess r and the borrower pool defined by pˆ implied by the
guess, compute the lenders’ expected profit.
7. If the lenders’ expected excess profit is not equal to zero, adjust the guess
r and iterate until convergence.
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4 Learning about systematic
risk in the housing market
4.1 Introduction
[U]nquestionably, housing prices are up quite a bit; I think it’s
important to note that fundamentals are also very strong. We’ve got
a growing economy, jobs, incomes. We’ve got very low mortgage
rates. We’ve got demographics supporting housing growth. —
We’ve never had a decline in house prices on a nationwide basis.
Ben Bernanke, July 1st 2005, CNBC.
Did investors mis-estimate the amount on undiversifiable risk in the U.S.
real estate market during the run-up to the subprime crisis that erupted in
2007? This essay argues that uncertainty about the true undiversifiable risk
in residential investment contributed to the real estate boom. Investors in the
real estate market were confident during the housing boom years in the late
1990’s and early 2000’s, which was justified by the seemingly strong economic
fundamentals. As the subprime crisis unfolded, investors had to adjust their
beliefs on undiversifiable risk very strongly upward, in particular in regions
where the boom had been strong. I show evidence from the U.S. data that
supports this view.
I apply a conditional capital-asset pricing model (CAPM) with Bayesian
learning to estimate a time-varying measure of undiversifiable, or systematic,
risk in the U.S. residential housing market.1 I assume that the underlying sys-
1In the finance literature, the terms “undiversifiable” and “systematic” are often used inter-
changeably to refer to risk that cannot be diversified away. The term “aggregate risk” is also
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tematic risk of the real estate portfolio — its market beta — is unobservable
and time-varying. This means that investors cannot disentangle idiosyncratic
and systematic risk in a specific portfolio, and must instead attempt to esti-
mate them by using observable portfolio returns. I estimate the model to U.S.
data by using excess returns on investment in residential housing computed
from regional house price indices.
The results indicate that the market beta2 of the residential housing portfo-
lio was relatively low in most regions in the U.S. especially in the early 2000’s,
which coincides with the years of strongest house price appreciation. Starting
from 2006, when house prices peaked, these patterns were reversed: investors
swiftly revised their beliefs about systematic risk upward. Idiosyncratic un-
certainty about excess returns also increased at the onset of the crisis.
A prominent narrative of the housing boom and the subprime crisis in
the U.S. attributes the expansion in mortgage lending to a loosening of credit
standards, enabled by widespread securitisation of mortgages and a liberal-
isation of the financial market. This narrative is advocated, for example, in
the influential series of studies by Mian and Sufi (2009, 2011) and Mian et al.
(2013). Mortgage-backed securities offered good returns with seemingly low
risk. This expansion in credit supply fuelled demand for housing and con-
tributed, in hindsight, to a bubble in house prices in many geographical areas.
At the same time, increasing house prices coupled with the loosening of lend-
ing standards attracted worse and worse borrowers, resulting in a build-up of
risk in the borrower pool, and eventually, the subprime crisis.
What, then, can explain this deterioration of credit standards on the lender
side? Mortgage-backed securities were deemed safe and often held AAA rat-
ings, because they pooled together mortgages in a way that diversified away
credit risk that was believed to be inherently idiosyncratic. A widespread col-
lapse of house prices was believed to be unlikely.3 This essay argues that this
kind of belief in low systematic risk may have contributed to the observed
increase in credit supply, even if lenders understood that the quality of the
borrower pool was deteriorating.
In this essay, I gauge the beliefs of institutional investors in the housing
market, who invest in large portfolios of residential housing — or securities
whose returns depend on the development in residential house prices — in
sometimes used for undiversifiable risk.
2The market beta measures the extent of co-movement of a given asset’s expected return with
that of the expected return on the market portfolio; it defines the risk premium demanded by
investors on that asset. It is defined formally in Section 4.2.
3See the report by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011, Ch. 7).
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a given geographical area, and who care only about the risk/return trade-
off of their investment. Such a portfolio can also be regarded as relatively
liquid, unlike investment into housing by a single household, on the borrower
side.4 In other words, I am interested in the beliefs of the financier side of the
residential housing market, which guide the supply of funding for housing
investment.
I assume that investors are rational, but uncertain about the true riskiness
of the housing market portfolio. They form beliefs on the housing market beta,
which defines the risk premium demanded on the housing portfolio, through
Bayesian updating. Potential mis-pricing of risk is only evident ex-post. In
the model, the CAPM pricing equation emerges as an equilibrium condition.
It is the uncertainty induced by learning that leads to mis-pricing that is ex-
post observable to the econometrician. This point is also made explicitly by
Lewellen and Shanken (2002).
This essay is related to a large literature on the conditional CAPM in fi-
nance and financial economics. The original static CAPM, introduced by
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) and expanded on by Black et al. (1972), is
the workhorse model of asset pricing in finance. Its empirical shortcomings
are famously documented by Fama and French (1992, 1993, 2004).
A substantial share of research has focused on the conditional version of
the CAPM, which postulates that the pricing equation holds only conditional
on the information set of the investor in a given period. In this model, the
relationship between the expected return on the market portfolio and the ex-
pected return on an asset — the asset’s beta — is no longer constant, but
time-varying. The conditional CAPM has been developed, among others, by
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). It has had
more success in explaining cross-sectional variation in stock returns than the
static CAPM.
The conditional CAPM relates naturally to models of learning. This essay
is tightly linked to this branch of the CAPM literature. Pastor and Veronesi
(2009) provide an overview of models of learning in finance. Lewellen and
Shanken (2002), Adrian and Franzoni (2009), and Trecroci (2014) formulate
versions of the conditional CAPM with Bayesian learning where investors are
assumed to update their beliefs on the time-varying parameters of the CAPM
according to observations on asset returns. Huang and Hueng (2008) model
and estimate a conditional CAPM with adaptive learning. The focus in all of
4Households who purchase a house likely also have preferences over aspects of the house other
than the risk/return profile associated with its expected price development, such as location and
amenities.
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these studies is in comparing the performance of the CAPM with learning in
explaining cross-sectional variation in asset returns against other conditional
versions of the CAPM.
This essay is methodologically closest to those of Adrian and Franzoni
(2009) and Trecroci (2014). I adapt the model formulated by Trecroci (2014)
and apply it to the U.S. real estate market to explain the development of
investors’ beliefs during the housing boom and the subprime crisis. The setup
is similar to that of Adrian and Franzoni (2009), but unlike this essay and
Trecroci (2014), they assume the existence of conditioning variables on the
latent aggregate state and a mean-reverting process for it. I also generalise and
expand on the setup of both Adrian and Franzoni (2009) and Trecroci (2014)
by allowing heteroskedasticity in forecast errors through a flexible GARCH
specification for idiosyncratic uncertainty and by estimating the full set of
structural parameters.
This essay also connects to a growing literature on the implications of
model uncertainty and learning on macroeconomic outcomes.5 Since the fi-
nancial crisis of 2007–2009, in an effort to understand time-varying risk, much
work has been put into exploring the implications of model uncertainty and
the evolution of beliefs on the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates and as-
set prices. Recent contributions include Johannes et al. (2016), Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2016), and Luzzetti and Neumuller (2016).
In the context of housing markets, Piazzesi et al. (2007) explore asset-
pricing implications of low-frequency risk in house price fundamentals. Gelain
and Lansing (2014) as well as Granziera and Kozicki (2015) study the impli-
cations of rational and non-rational learning on house price dynamics and
in particular on generating bubbles. My focus is instead on the evolution of
investor beliefs, implied by learning, taking the house price developments as
given.
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows. Section 4.2 outlines
the theoretical model of asset pricing with learning and derives the laws of
motion for investor beliefs. Section 4.3 discusses the empirical strategy and
the data. Section 4.4 presents and discusses the estimation results. Finally,
Section 4.5 concludes.
5See Hansen (2014) and the references therein for a general discussion of model uncertainty
and asset pricing.
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4.2 The model and methodology
In this section, I outline the conditional CAPM and the underlying assump-
tions. The model with learning results in a Bayesian signal extraction prob-
lem for an individual financier who attempts to determine the appropriate
risk premium on a given asset. The optimal solution to this problem can be
found by applying the Kalman filter, which gives the equilibrium laws of mo-
tion for the beliefs of investors about the latent state of the economy, as new
observations become available. In addition, the Kalman smoother yields the
corresponding ex-post estimates of the latent state that use the full sample
of observations, against which the ex-ante beliefs can be evaluated. Finally,
I discuss how the structural parameters of the model can be estimated using
maximum likelihood methods.
4.2.1 The conditional CAPM with learning
The formulation of the conditional CAPM in this section is standard and fol-
lows, for example, that found in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). The learn-
ing process is modelled similarly to Adrian and Franzoni (2009) and Trecroci
(2014).
4.2.1.1 Derivation of the conditional CAPM
The conditional CAPM requires a rather small amount of theoretical structure.
I assume that investors in financial markets are risk-averse and rational, but
have incomplete information on the data-generating process of the economy.
The investors are assumed to have preferences over the riskiness of their port-
folios. I denote the common information set of all investors in period t by It.
The problem of an individual investor is then to choose the optimal portfolio
subject to the risk-return trade-off. The optimal portfolio is mean-variance
efficient, or in other words, yields the desired mean return with the smallest
possible variance.6
I assume the existence of a safe asset f whose gross return is r ft , and fur-
ther that investors can borrow and lend unconstrained at this risk-free rate.
Furthermore, there is a set of risky assets, indexed by i. In the context of hous-
ing markets, here, each risky asset corresponds to a specific regional portfolio
6This results is standard in the CAPM literature.
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of investment into residential housing.7 In each period t, investors observe the
risk-free gross return, r ft , gross returns on each risky asset i, r
i
t, and gross re-
turns on the value-weighted market portfolio, rMt , such that fr ft , rit, rMt g 2 It.
Next, I define the excess returns on asset i as Rit  rit   r ft , and on the
value-weighted market portfolio, correspondingly, as RMt  rMt   r ft . Finally,
I assume that the financial market is perfectly competitive and presents no
arbitrage opportunities.
The well-known result by Ross (1976) states that in the absence of arbitrage,
there exists a strictly positive pricing kernel Mt+1 such that the following
holds for excess returns on any asset i:
Et[Mt+1Rit+1] = 0, (4.1)
where Et[]  E[jIt] denotes the investors’ expectation conditional on infor-
mation at time t.
Under these assumptions, the market return is itself a pricing kernel. As
a consequence, equation (4.1) holds for Mt+1 = RMt+1 and R
i
t+1 = R
M
t+1, which
then implies:
Et[RMt+1] =  
covt(RMt+1,R
M
t+1)
Et[RMt+1]
=  vart(R
M
t+1)
Et[RMt+1]
, (4.2)
where Et()  E(jIt), vart()  var(jIt), and covt()  cov(jIt) denote the
conditional expectation, variance, and covariance, respectively.
Then, substituting Mt+1 = RMt+1 into equation (4.1), the following holds
for any asset i conditional on period t information:
Et[Rit+1] =  
covt(Rit+1,R
M
t+1)
Et[RMt+1]
=   covt(R
i
t+1,R
M
t+1)
vart(RMt+1)
vart(RMt+1)
Et[RMt+1]
 Et[bit+1]Et[ht+1], (4.3)
where Et[bit+1] 
covt(Rit+1,R
M
t+1)
vart(RMt+1)
is asset i’s risk loading on the market portfo-
7This is the Sharpe-Lintner formulation of the CAPM (see Sharpe (1964)).
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lio, or its market beta, and Et[ht+1]    vart(R
M
t+1)
Et [RMt+1]
is the expected market risk
premium. Equation (4.3) is the conditional CAPM equation.
Together with equation (4.2), (4.3) implies that:
Et[Rit+1] = Et[b
i
t+1]Et[R
M
t+1]. (4.4)
Equation (4.4) establishes an equilibrium relationship between expected excess
returns of an asset i and the market portfolio in the CAPM.
Following Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and Adrian and Franzoni (2009),
I make the standard assumption that the realised excess return Rit+1 depends
linearly on the pricing kernel. The linear factor model together with equation
(4.4) implies that the realised return Rit+1 depends linearly on R
M
t+1:
Rit+1 = a
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1R
M
t+1 + #
i
t+1, (4.5)
#it+1jIt  N(0, s2i,t+1), s2i,t+1 = ai0 + ai1(#it)2 + ai2s2i,t (4.6)
where #it+1 are i.i.d. innovations. I assume that the variance of this innovation,
s2i,t+1, is time-varying and follows a deterministic GARCH(1,1) process with
parameters ai0, a
i
1 and a
i
2, where a
i
1 + a
i
2 < 1.
This structure allows for a flexible specification of heteroskedasticity in the
innovations. It makes the model unconditionally non-Gaussian. Importantly,
however, given the information set It, the innovation #it+1 and thus the model
are also conditionally Gaussian.
Finally, I assume Et[ait+1] = 0 8t, or in other words, that the CAPM equa-
tion (4.4) holds in expectation.
4.2.1.2 Learning in the conditional CAPM
So far, the exposition of the model has been based on the workhorse condi-
tional CAPM. In this section, I discuss how to incorporate incomplete infor-
mation and learning into the model framework in a tractable fashion.
The crucial assumption is that investors do not observe either shocks to
the pricing kernel Mt+1 or to the individual assets’ returns. Aggregate shocks
to the pricing kernel could reflect, for example, shocks to future cash flows on
the market portfolio or shocks to the market discount rate that affect either
the variance of the market return or its covariance with the return on asset i
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in equation (4.2).8
Because investors cannot disentangle systematic from idiosyncratic risk,
they cannot perfectly deduce asset i’s risk loading on the market return (bit+1)
nor Jensen’s alpha (ait+1).
9 In particular, they only observe realised returns
and attempt to estimate the true risk loading of each asset i. I assume that
they update their beliefs on this risk loading by using Bayesian updating. The
information set of a given investors at time t investing in a given portfolio
i is then given by It = fRit,RMt g. They thus have only partial information
about the true state of the economy at time t. This uncertainty will never be
resolved.
Then, from the point of view of an investor, the time-varying coefficients
ait+1 and b
i
t+1 are modelled as random variables. Following Adrian and Fran-
zoni (2009) and Trecroci (2014), I assume that the time-varying risk loading
bit+1 and the time-varying intercept a
i
t+1 follow autoregressive processes char-
acterised by:
bit+1 = (1  f i)b¯i + f ibit + uit+1 (4.7)
ait+1 = (1  gi)a¯i + gibit + vit+1 (4.8)
where f i and gi are constant autoregressive coefficients, b¯i and a¯i are the long-
run stable means of bit+1 and a
i
t+1, respectively, and (u
i
t+1, v
i
t+1)  N(0,Sin)
are jointly normally distributed i.i.d. innovations, uncorrelated with #it+1 8t. I
assume that all innovations are serially uncorrelated.
Furthermore, I assume that the values of the time-varying coefficients ait+1,
bit+1, as well as a¯
i b¯i, the aggregate shocks vit+1 and u
i
t+1 and the idiosyncratic
shock #it+1 are all unobserved to the investors in all periods t. The autoregres-
sive structures of ait+1 and b
i
t+1, the conditional normality of the innovations
vit+1, u
i
t+1 and #
i
t+1, and the GARCH structure of #
i
t+1 are known to the in-
vestors. I also assume that the structural parameter values gi, f i, Sin, ai0, a
i
1, a
i
2
are all time-invariant and known.
The learning CAPM presented here assumes that all investors believe that
the asset returns follow the CAPM pricing equation (4.4). This condition is an
equilibrium pricing condition, but each investor takes it as given as a price-
taker. They also have identical information sets, such that their beliefs on the
8See Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) for a discussion.
9“Jensen’s alpha”, after Black et al. (1972), can be used as a measure of asset mispricing in the
CAPM framework.
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underlying aggregate state (ait+1 and b
i
t+1) are identical. Thus the equilibrium
condition given by equation (4.4) must continue to also hold under partial
information.
Of course, from the point of view of the econometrician, there might very
well be deviations from this equilibrium condition. It is well known from the
finance literature that the conditional CAPM does not explain the cross-section
of asset returns very well.10 However, this is not a concern here. I am inter-
ested in gauging the beliefs of investors, conditional on their information sets
at a given point in time, under the assumption that they believe the CAPM
pricing condition to hold. Lewellen and Shanken (2002) point out that, even
when investors are rational and follow the CAPM pricing condition, incom-
plete information and learning can give rise to predictability in asset returns
ex-post, and thus an apparent failure of the CAPM empirically.
Finally, I have assumed that the realisations of shocks are unobserved, but
that the investors do know the structural parameters of the model. Therefore,
there is no learning about the deep parameters or about the model itself, but
only about latent systematic risk. Incorporating parameter or model learning
would add another layer of learning into the model, increasing investors’ un-
certainty about the latent state. While this assumption has implications for the
results in quantitative terms, it would likely not affect the overall conclusions.
This issue is left for future research.
4.2.2 Optimal Bayesian updating
Based on the assumptions laid out in the previous section, the problem of an
individual financier is a signal extraction problem: realised returns are noisy
signals on the underlying state, which he must try to estimate in order to
be able to price the housing portfolio. The optimal linear solution to such
a signal extraction problem under Bayesian learning is found by applying
the Kalman filter. This gives the optimal solution to the investor’s signal
extraction problem in the form of equilibrium laws of motion for the latent
state.
Under the current assumptions — in particular under conditional normal-
ity of the model — the Kalman filter gives the best sequential linear projection
of the latent state Et[ait+1] and Et[b
i
t+1].
11 In addition, the Kalman smoother
10For a general discussion on the performance of the conditional CAPM, see for example Lettau
and Ludvigson (2001) and Fama and French (2004).
11This is a standard result that follows from the properties of normally distributed signals and
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provides an algorithm that can be used for an ex-post evaluation of these be-
liefs, given the full set of observations up to a final period T. This section
follows the assumptions and derivation of the Kalman filter and smoother
presented in Harvey (1989) and Hamilton (1994, Ch. 13).
4.2.2.1 State-space representation of the learning CAPM
The dynamic system to be estimated is given by equations (4.4), (4.7) and (4.8)
as well as equations for the unknown time-invariant state means:
Rit+1 = a
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1R
M
t+1 + #
i
t+1
a¯i = a¯i 8 t
b¯i = b¯i 8 t
ait+1 = (1  gi)a¯i + giait + vit+1
bit+1 = (1  f i)b¯i + f ibit + uit+1
This system can be written in state-space form as:
Rit = H
0
tz
i
t + #
i
t (4.9)
z it+1 = F
iz it + n
i
t+1, (4.10)
where (4.9) is the observation equation and (4.10) is the state equation. In
this notation, I define z it to be the unobserved state vector, Ht the vector of
time-varying coefficients on the state, nit+1 the vector of state innovations, and
Fi the autoregressive constant coefficient matrix on the state vector:
z it =

ai b¯i ait b
i
t
0
Ht =

0 0 1 RMt
0
nit+1 =

0 0 vit+1 u
i
t+1
0
Bayesian updating. Even under non-Gaussian signals, the Kalman filter provides the minimum
mean square linear estimator of the latent state conditional on the information set. See Hamilton
(1994, Ch. 13) for a formal proof.
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Fi =
2664
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1  gi 0 gi 0
0 1  f i 0 f i
3775
Starting from some prior values, the Kalman filter then produces sequen-
tially updated linear estimates of Et[z it+1]. The relevant information set in
period t is It = fRit,Htg.
I introduce the following standard notation for the Kalman filter estimates.
First, let z it+1jt = Eˆ[z
i
t+1jIt] denote the a priori linear projection of z it+1 on
It, or the best linear least-squares estimate of Et[z it+1]. Further, z it+1jt+1 =
Eˆ[z it+1jIt+1] denotes the corresponding a posteriori linear projection of z it+1 onIt+1.
Second, I define the a priori forecast error as z˜ it+1jt = z
i
t+1   z it+1jt, and the
a posteriori projection error as z˜ it+1jt+1 = z
i
t+1   z it+1jt+1. The corresponding
mean squared errors are defined as Pit+1jt = E[z˜
i
t+1jt z˜
i0
t+1jt] and P
i
t+1jt+1 =
E[z˜ it+1jt+1z˜
i0
t+1jt+1].
Finally, I denote the forecast of Rit+1, or the linear projection of R
i
t+1 on It,
by Rit+1jt, and the conditional forecast error of R
i
t+1 by R˜
i
t+1 = R
i
t+1   Rit+1jt.
Equipped with this notation, the recursive Kalman filter projections can be
written as:
Ritjt 1 = Htz
i
tjt 1 (4.11)
z itjt = z
i
tjt 1 + k
i
tR˜
i
t (4.12)
z it+1jt = F
iz itjt (4.13)
Pitjt = P
i
tjt 1   kit(H0tPitjt 1Ht + s2i,t)ki0t (4.14)
Pit+1jt = F
iPitjtF
i0 + Sin (4.15)
where
kit  Pitjt 1Ht(H0tPitjt 1Ht + s2i,t) 1
is the Kalman gain.12
12The derivation of these projections is straightforward but somewhat tedious; a standard pre-
sentation can be found e.g. in Hamilton (1994, Ch. 13.2).
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Starting from some priors z i0j0 and P
i
0j0, this recursion gives the updated
beliefs on the unobserved state, given the observations in It, in each period
t = 1, 2, ..., T. Of particular interest are the estimates of the time-varying
coefficients bit+1jt and a
i
t+1jt. They give the evolution of the investors’ beliefs
on the CAPM relationship (4.4) over time, as they observe new data on asset
returns.
Contrary to the investors in the model, the econometrician observes the
full sample of observations up to a final period T. This allows for an ex-
post evaluation of the ex-ante beliefs of the investors by applying the Kalman
smoother. The fixed interval smoothing algorithm gives the best sequential
linear least-squares estimate of E[z itjIT ], given the information set IT in the
final period T, denoted by z itjT :
z itjT = ztjt + P

t (z
i
t+1jT   Fiztjt)
PtjT = Ptjt + Pt (Pt+1jT   Pt+1jt)P
0
t
where Pt  PtjtFi
0
P 1t+1jt. The recursion now starts from the final period T and
runs backward.
4.2.2.2 Maximum likelihood estimation of the filter parameters
The GARCH structure in the innovation term #it+1 renders the model uncon-
ditionally non-Gaussian, but conditionally Gaussian, as discussed in Section
4.2. This conveniently allows for a standard derivation of the Kalman filter as
well as estimation of the filter parameters by maximum likelihood.
The likelihood function L, or the joint density of the observations Ri 
(Ri1, . . . ,R
i
T), can be written as:
L(Ri; qi) =
T
Õ
t=1
p(RitjIt 1; qi),
where p(RitjIt 1; q) denotes the density of Rit conditional on It 1 and the
structural parameters qi. The first two moments of this conditional density
are Et 1[Rit] = Ritjt 1 and vart 1(R
i
t) = vart 1(R˜it), where R˜it is the forecast
error Rit   Ritjt 1. These quantities are a direct by-product of the Kalman
filtering procedure, such that the construction of the likelihood function is
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straightforward.
In the conditionally Gaussian model described above in Section 4.2.2.1, the
log-likelihood function depends only on the conditional mean and variance of
Rit and can be written as:
log L(Ri; qi) =  T
2
log 2p   1
2
T
å
t=1
log(Sit) 
1
2
T
å
t=1
(R˜it)
2(Sit)
 1, (4.16)
where I denote the variance of the forecast error by Sit  vart 1(R˜it) =
H0tPitjt 1Ht + s
2
i,t.
This log-likelihood is an implicit function of the structural parameters qi.
To estimate qi, the log-likelihood can be maximised by using a numerical
optimisation routine after the Kalman filter estimates of the latent state have
been constructed.
The parameter vector qi  ( f i, gi, s2u,i, s2v,i, suv,i, ai0, ai1, ai2) collects all struc-
tural parameters of the state-space model (4.9)–(4.10). The covariance matrix
of the state innovations Sin =
"
s2u,i suv,i
suv,i s
2
v,i
#
has three parameters to estimate;
there is therefore eight structural parameters in total to be estimated in the
model. I discuss the parameters estimates in Section 4.3.3.
4.3 The data and empirical strategy
In this section, I first describe the data used in the estimation and present some
descriptive statistics. Next, I discuss the estimation strategy, and in particular,
the priors used in the estimation of the Kalman projections (4.11)–(4.15). The
estimation results are presented in Section 4.4.
4.3.1 Description of the data
To gauge the beliefs of investors in the residential housing market during the
housing boom of the late 1990’s to early 2000’s and the financial crisis of the
late 2000’s in the U.S., I focus on regional markets in different parts of the
U.S. A portfolio of investment into residential housing in a given region then
represents an asset i in the conditional CAPM.
To measure returns on these regional portfolios, I use monthly regional
Case & Shiller U.S. Home Price indices from 17 metropolitan statistical areas
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Figure 4.1: Regional Case-Shiller home price indices in the U.S. in 1987–2016
Note: January 2000 = 100. Thick solid black line: Case-Shiller National Home Price
index. Thin lines: regional home price indices from 17 metropolitan statistical areas.
(MSAs), which cover the years 1987–2016, published by Standard & Poor’s.
Monthly returns are computed from each series as month-on-month percent-
age changes in the price index.13
As the market portfolio used to price the risk in the regional housing mar-
kets, I use the monthly Case & Shiller U.S. National Home Price index, which
pools together the development in residential house prices in the whole U.S.
It is constructed as a weighted sum of the regional series and published by
Standard & Poor’s. Similarly to the regional indices, I compute the return on
this market portfolio as month-on-month percentage changes in the index.
To compute excess returns in each regional market i, denoted by Rit in
the model, I subtract the one-month Treasury bill return from the returns
computed from the house price indices.
Figure 4.1 shows the residential house price development in the 17 differ-
13Ideally, data on mortgage-backed security (MBS) yields would be used in the estimation.
Unfortunately, there is no index on MBS prices or yields that would cover the pre-crisis years that
I am aware of. An early MBS index (the ABX index), launched by the market analytics company
IHS Markit, starts from January 2006, only a few months before house prices peaked. Although
the house price appreciation computed from the house price indices does not necessarily directly
map to returns on MBS, it is a measure of returns on investment in residential housing, the asset
class underlying MBS.
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Figure 4.2: Excess returns on the national and selected regional Case-Shiller
home price indices in the U.S. in 1987–2016
ent MSAs, as well as the aggregate national house price index (plotted with a
thick black solid line), from 1987 to 2016. January 2000 is the base period of all
indices. Three features stand out in the data. First, price developments in the
various regions were rather homogeneous prior to 2000. Second, after 2000,
the price patterns diverge considerably, with some regions (such as Las Vegas,
Nevada; Tampa, Florida; and San Francisco, California) experiencing large
booms and busts, while in others prices stayed rather stable (such as Denver,
Colorado; and Cleveland, Ohio). Finally, cross-sectional price dispersion has
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remained remarkably high even after the subprime crisis.
Figure 4.2 displays the monthly excess returns on the national home price
index — i.e. the excess return on the market portfolio — as well as monthly
excess returns on four regional indices, which will be discussed in more detail
in Section 4.4. The figure shows that excess returns on the national index
are relatively close to zero and not very volatile over the whole sample; the
average excess return on the national index is 4 basis points in the sample,
with a standard deviation of 0.5%.
The regional indices are more volatile. Their standard deviations are 1.2%
for San Francisco; 1.0% for Tampa; 0.9% for Minneapolis; and 0.6% for Denver.
San Francisco and Tampa, which experienced strong house price booms in the
2000’s prior to the subprime crisis, exhibit positive excess returns all through
this period, while Minneapolis does not. All three, however, suffer big depre-
ciations in house prices from 2006 onwards. In Denver the price index, and
consequently excess returns, stay relatively stable through the crisis period.
4.3.2 Setup of the Kalman filter
I run the Kalman filter for each region i separately. The implicit assumption
is then that excess returns in a given region are only correlated with returns
in other regions through the returns on the national price index, and not di-
rectly. For MSAs geographically removed from each other, this assumption is
reasonable. However, from some large states (notably California and Florida),
more than one metropolitan area is represented in the data sample. A pos-
sible extension to the framework presented here would be to jointly estimate
the latent risk loadings in metropolitan areas in these states.
The estimation proceeds in three steps. First, I estimate the structural
parameters of the model for each region by maximum likelihood constructed
with the Kalman filter. In the estimation of the parameters, I use the full data
series for each region. In the second step, for each region, I re-run the Kalman
filter with the estimated parameter values to extract an estimate of the ex-ante
beliefs on the latent state z it, given by the filtered estimate z
i
tjt 1. In the final
step, I run this ex-ante estimate through the Kalman smoother to extract the
ex-post estimate of the latent state, given by the smoothed estimate z itjT .
The ex-ante estimate z itjt 1, which uses observations only up to a given
period t  1, is the estimate of investor beliefs in period t  T about the true
risk loading of each regional housing market on the national housing portfolio
in that period. The ex-post estimate z itjT gives the econometrician’s best estimate
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of the true risk loading in period t  T, given the full sample of observations
up to period T. This ex-post estimate therefore allows to evaluate whether
investors, at the time, under- or overestimated the systematic risk in housing
investment in a given region i.
In what follows, I drop the superscript i from variables that refer to the
risky asset or portfolio; here, it refers to the regional housing portfolio that is
being compared to the overall market portfolio.
4.3.3 Structural parameter estimates
The maximum likelihood estimates of the structural parameters of the Kalman
filter are summarised in Table 4.1. All MSA region parameters are estimated
independently. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The parameters are
estimated rather precisely due to the relatively long monthly data series.
Notably, most regions display considerable persistence in the autoregres-
sive process for the latent state. In almost all regions, either f , g, or both are
estimated to be very close to unity, or sometimes even equal to unity, up to
the numerical precision used in the estimation. These results reflect those dis-
cussed in Trecroci (2014). In the context of stock market returns, he argues that
the time-varying coefficients at+1 and bt+1 are likely to be very persistent. He
does not estimate them, but rather assumes them to be random walks and sets
f = g = 1, whereas I have estimated them from the data. The autoregressive
coefficients f and g have very important implications for the behaviour of the
beliefs on the latent state.
The second notable feature is that all states exhibit statistically significant
heteroskedasticity in the idiosyncratic innovation #t: all or part of the GARCH
coefficients a0, a1, a2 significantly differ from zero for all MSAs. This is another
feature common to many data series on financial returns.
To start off the Kalman filter recursion, I use a diffuse prior with z0j0 =
0 (4 1) and P0j0 = kI4, where k is a large scalar value. In the estimation,
I use k = 50. The data samples are large enough that neither the structural
parameter estimates nor the estimates of the latent state zt are sensitive to the
choice of priors.
I find that in all cases, the null hypothesis of normally distributed forecast
errors R˜it cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level, which suggests that
the state-space model is not misspecified. This is not the case when the model
is estimated under the assumption of homoskedastic idiosyncratic innovati-
nons. Thus the conditionally Gaussian GARCH structure for the variance of
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Region N Parameter
f g s2u s2v suv a0 a1 a2
Atlanta 263 1.00 0.33 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.54
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Boston 359 0.78 0.83 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.27 0.23
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Charlotte 359 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.52
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Cleveland 359 0.88 0.77 0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.36 0.38
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Denver 359 0.64 0.97 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.85
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Las Vegas 359 0.89 0.47 0.07 0.19 -0.06 0.00 0.33 0.40
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Los Angeles 359 1.00 0.94 0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.14 0.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Miami 359 0.89 0.94 0.04 0.11 -0.03 0.00 0.16 0.62
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Minneapolis 311 0.97 0.58 0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.06 0.89
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
New York 359 0.95 0.81 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.91
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Phoenix 311 0.41 0.98 0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.10 0.49
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
Portland 359 0.91 0.96 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.17 0.61
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
San Diego 359 0.89 0.96 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.32 0.31
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
San Francisco 359 0.87 0.86 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.45
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Washington 359 0.89 0.96 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.25 0.46
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Seattle 289 0.66 0.91 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.94
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tampa 359 0.87 0.94 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.95
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Table 4.1: Maximum likelihood estimates of structural parameters
Note: Estimated individually for each MSA region. Standard errors in parentheses. N:
number of monthly observations. Parameters: f , g: AR(1) coefficients for bt and at,
respectively. s2u , s2v , suv: elements of the state innovation covariance matrix Sn. a0, a1,
a2: GARCH(1,1) coefficients of the idiosyncratic innovation #t.
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the idiosyncratic innovation #it is crucial for a good fit of the model to data.
4.4 Estimation results
In this section, I describe and discuss the estimation results for selected MSA
regions: San Francisco, CA; Tampa, FL; Minneapolis, MN; and Denver, DN.
These regions are chosen to display the various different patterns observed in
the data as well as the latent state estimates. These data patterns are displayed
in Figure 4.2 and discussed in Section 4.3.1.
For the sake of space, the Kalman filter estimates for the majority of regions
are relegated to Appendix 4.A. All results reported here as well as in the
appendix omit a burn period of 50 months (13% of observations) from the
start of the sample to mitigate the potential effect of the choice of priors on
the estimates.
Out of the regions discussed here, San Francisco and Tampa experienced
very strong booms and subsequent busts in residential house prices. Min-
neapolis, on the other hand, followed rather closely the evolution of the na-
tional index. Finally, in Denver, residential house prices did not experience a
significant boom-bust episode.
Before discussing the time-varying Kalman filter estimates, Table 4.2 shows
naive OLS estimates from regressions of each regional excess return series on
the national excess returns. The OLS regressions are estimated individually
for each region. These estimates correspond to a static CAPM model, where
the estimation equation is:
Rit = a
i + biRMt + e
i
t. (4.17)
The results in Table 4.2 are ordered by the R2 statistic of each regression. It
measures how well movements in national excess returns explain movements
in the regional excess returns.
Two main observations emerge from Table 4.2. First, a high R2 coin-
cides with high estimates of the regional housing market betas b, which are
above unity and statistically significant for cities such as Miami and Tampa
in Florida, San Francisco and Los Angeles in California, and Las Vegas in
Nevada. These are places that also experienced the strongest booms and busts
in the residential housing markets. On the other hand, the national excess re-
turns have no explanatory power for Atlanta and Phoenix; these areas have
estimated housing market betas that do not statistically significantly differ
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4.4 Estimation results
from zero. They also did not experience a housing market boom prior to the
crisis.
Second, the estimated Jensen’s alphas (a) do not statistically significantly
differ from zero for seven out of seventeen regions. In the regions where
it differs from zero, there is no clear pattern on the sign and magnitude of
the coefficient. This suggests that there was no widespread and systematic
mispricing of the regional housing market portfolios over the sample period.
The time-varying estimates for Jensen’s alpha will be discussed in more detail
below.
These naive CAPM estimates assume that the relationship between the ex-
cess returns stays stable over the whole period. However, as will be seen from
the Kalman filter estimates, this is not the case: investor beliefs about the
coefficients fluctuate quite a lot over the sample period, when a conditional
learning CAPM model is estimated. However, these static estimates should
correspond to the final estimates of the long-run means of the latent states,
a¯ and b¯, at the end of the sample period. In the Kalman filter estimations
discussed below, the final estimates of the long-run means do not statistically
significantly differ from these static coefficients in regions for which a station-
ary autoregressive process for the latent state is estimated.14
Figure 4.3 shows the estimates on the latent state in San Francisco. Panel
(a) shows the beliefs on the time-varying intercept at+1, and Panel (b) the
beliefs on the time-varying risk loading bt+1. In both panels, the grey solid
line with bullets shows the prediction on the state in period t+ 1 given infor-
mation up to period t, updated each period as new observations are made.
This corresponds to the ex-ante belief of investors at the time. The black solid
line shows the smoothed estimated formed by using the whole sample, which
represents the econometrician’s ex-post estimate of the latent state. The gray
dashed line shows the ex-post estimate of the time-invariant mean of these
latent processes. The gray shaded areas represent 80% confidence intervals
for the smoothed estimates, computed from the root mean squared errors
(RMSE), or the square roots of the elements of PtjT .15 Finally, Panel (c) shows
the estimated time-varying variance of the idiosyncratic innovation #t+1, given
information up to period t.
14This does not hold for the regions for which a unit root process for the latent state is estimated;
in this case, the observed signals do not reveal any information about the long-run means, and as
a consequence, the filtered estimates of the long run mean do not converge to the OLS estimates.
15The RMSE captures both estimation uncertainty and fundamental uncertainty, stemming
from the structural innovations to the latent state. The confidence interval depicted in the fig-
ures is therefore not a conventional measure of estimation uncertainty only.
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Figure 4.3: Ex-ante (filtered) and ex-post (smoothed) beliefs on the latent state,
San Francisco, CA
Note: Panel (a): estimates of at+1 and its mean a¯. Panel (b): estimates of bt+1 and its mean b¯. Panel
(c): estimated forecast error variance s2t for the observed regional house price return. Estimated
on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence interval for the
ex-post (smoothed) estimates at+1jT and bt+1jT computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.4: Ex-ante (filtered) and ex-post (smoothed) beliefs on the latent state,
Tampa, FL
Note: Panel (a): estimates of at+1 and its mean a¯. Panel (b): estimates of bt+1 and its mean b¯. Panel
(c): estimated forecast error variance s2t for the observed regional house price return. Estimated
on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence interval for the
ex-post (smoothed) estimates at+1jT and bt+1jT computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Panel (b) of Figure 4.3 shows, first, that the ex-ante belief about the sys-
tematic risk loading bt+1jt is below the ex-post estimate bt+1jT in the 1990’s
and early 2000’s, although it is within the 80% confidence interval of the lat-
ter: there is no evidence of a systematic mis-estimation of undiversifiable risk,
as evaluated ex-post. The ex-ante belief is revised upwards from below unity
in the late 1990’s to above two during the financial crisis. Both the ex-ante
and the ex-post beliefs are above the estimated ex-post long run mean b¯t+1jT
during this period.
On the other hand, the ex-ante estimate at+1jt is very close to the ex-post
estimate at+1jT , in Panel (a), and fluctuates around zero. at+1jt can be inter-
preted as an estimate of Jensen’s alpha, or the extent of systematic mispricing
of the asset. A Jensen’s alpha below (above) zero implies that the asset sys-
tematically under-performs (over-performs) the overall market in terms of its
average expected return.16 Here, there is no evidence of such mispricing.
However, as the pricing model here is simple and univariate, no strong inter-
pretation on the estimated value of at+1, and its deviations away from zero,
should be made.
Finally, the idiosyncratic uncertainty has peaked before both recessions in
the sample period, as seen from Panel (c).
Figure 4.4 shows a similar pattern for Tampa, in Florida. California and
Florida were both among the states that experienced the biggest booms and
busts in house prices. Here, there is some evidence that the ex-ante belief
about bt+1 is significantly below the ex-post estimate in the 1990’s and early
2000’s. The beliefs about the systematic risk loading are also strongly updated
upward in 2005, as house prices peak. On the other hand, estimates for at+1 do
not significantly differ from zero, suggesting that there was no mispricing of
the housing portfolio in terms of Jensen’s alpha. The idiosyncratic uncertainty
depicted in Panel (c) increases in volatility, but also in level, in the run up to
the crisis starting from 2000. This suggests a greater uncertainty about future
returns to residential housing, at the time, even as house prices were still
rising.
Figure 4.5 shows the estimation results for Minneapolis. The pattern is
again similar to the ones discussed before, although Minneapolis experienced
a much milder appreciation in house prices than San Francisco or Tampa.
The pattern in house prices in the Minneapolis region followed quite closely
the national average. Here, ex-ante beliefs about bt+1 are significantly below
the ex-post estimates in the 1990’s. Starting from 2000, both ex-ante and ex-
16See Black et al. (1972) for a detailed discussion.
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Figure 4.5: Ex-ante (filtered) and ex-post (smoothed) beliefs on the latent state,
Minneapolis, MN
Note: Panel (a): estimates of at+1 and its mean a¯. Panel (b): estimates of bt+1 and its mean b¯. Panel
(c): estimated forecast error variance s2t for the observed regional house price return. Estimated
on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence interval for the
ex-post (smoothed) estimates at+1jT and bt+1jT computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.6: Ex-ante (filtered) and ex-post (smoothed) beliefs on the latent state,
Denver, CO
Note: Panel (a): estimates of at+1 and its mean a¯. Panel (b): estimates of bt+1 and its mean b¯. Panel
(c): estimated forecast error variance s2t for the observed regional house price return. Estimated
on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence interval for the
ex-post (smoothed) estimates at+1jT and bt+1jT computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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post estimates are updated downward before the crisis, reaching a level below
zero in 2005–2006, significantly below the estimate of the long-run mean. This
suggests that investors believed residential housing investment to be very safe,
in fact hedging against aggregate risk in the national housing market at the
time. Up until 2005, idiosyncratic uncertainty, depicted in Panel (c), is also
regarded very low. These beliefs are swiftly updated upward starting in 2006.
Finally, Figure 4.6 shows the estimates for Denver, in Colorado, where
house price appreciation was more subdued than the national average during
the run-up to the crisis, and where residential house prices never dropped
much even during the crisis. Here, as seen in Panel (b), the ex-ante belief about
bt+1 never diverges much from the ex-post estimate. The ex-post estimate
broadly stays below one, suggesting low systematic risk. The idiosyncratic
uncertainty in Panel (c) also stays relatively low through the whole sample.
Interestingly, in Panel (a), beliefs about at+1 are very low during the run up to
the crisis, both ex-ante and ex-post, suggesting a view that the housing market
in Denver was under-performing relative to the national market during the
years 2001–2006. This is reflected in a negative Jensen’s alpha.
Appendix 4.A shows the estimates for the rest of the MSA regions. The
patterns are heterogeneous, but most share a few general common features
already discussed in this section. In particular, most regions show, first, a
general revision of beliefs about the systematic risk loading upward during
the run-up to the crisis, starting from the late 1990’s and the early 2000’s;
and second, a marked increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty at the onset of the
subprime crisis, starting from 2006.
4.5 Conclusions
In this essay, by using time series on residential house price appreciation in
different MSA regions in the United states and excess returns computed from
these series, I study investor beliefs about undiversifiable risk in the residential
housing market. I focus on the beliefs of institutional investors who are able to
invest in large regional housing portfolios and only care about the risk/return
trade-off of their investment, and therefore on the supply side of financing in
the housing market.
Based on this data, I present evidence on a broad pattern in investor be-
liefs. First, in the early 1990’s, beliefs about undiversifiable risk were at low
levels in most regional housing markets. Second, these beliefs were slowly
updated upward in the run-up to the crisis. Regardless, in many regions, in-
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vestors seemed to believe that systematic risk was relatively low even during
the boom years in the early and mid-2000’s. At the onset of the subprime
crisis, these beliefs were swiftly updated upward most prominently in regions
that had experienced the biggest booms. In regions where house prices had
stayed more stable, fluctuations in beliefs were much more subdued. Eval-
uated ex-post, there is no evidence of a broad mis-estimation of systematic
risk, however: in most cases, ex-post estimates are similar to the ex-ante pre-
dictions. In some regions, however, the ex-ante and ex-post estimates on the
latent systematic risk significantly diverge.
The main contribution of this essay to the literature is to empirically iden-
tify these belief patterns in U.S. data. I model the relationship between excess
returns in regional housing market portfolios and the national portfolio by us-
ing the conditional CAPM, with the additional assumption that investors do
not observe the underlying state of the economy that governs the risk load-
ing of the regional portfolio on the national market. Instead, they attempt to
learn the state by observing realised returns on these portfolios. As a result,
although investors believe the conditional CAPM relationship to hold in equi-
librium, there may be ex-post mispricing of assets and portfolios because of
uncertainty about the true state. Using this model, I estimate the implied laws
of motions of investor beliefs with the Kalman filter. The results are robust to
the specific parametric assumptions and priors.
The empirical results lend support to the prominent narratives of the fi-
nancial crisis of 2007–2009. First, although in hindsight there was a clear
boom-bust pattern in the real estate market, it would have been difficult to
see this ex-ante: the ex-post estimates on the true systematic risk in most
cases do not point to an elevated risk before the crisis. In the context of
the model, the investors believed the unobservable state of the economy to be
favourable. This is consistent with beliefs of most investors and policy-makers
in the early 2000’s: economic fundamentals were indeed believed to be very
strong, and house prices were believed to keep rising. This likely contributed
to the loosening of lending standards in housing finance.
This observation is also consistent with the boom in mortgage securitisa-
tion that started in the 1990’s. Mortgage-backed securities, which pool to-
gether large amounts of individual mortgages, were believed to be very safe,
because they were thought to be very well diversified. Of course, it later
turned out that they were not, but instead, the default probabilities of the
individual mortgages were quite correlated with each other.
As a final note, the results presented in this essay are empirical and based
on the conditional CAPM, which is a reduced form relationship between the
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risk premia of different assets. However, the results suggest that partial in-
formation and investor beliefs may have important implications on macroeco-
nomic dynamics. In particular, asset price bubbles may very well be driven by
genuine but misguided beliefs on robust fundamentals. This opens up many
possibilities for future research.
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Figure 4.7: Predicted and smoothed latent coefficients in New York, NY
Note: estimated on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence
interval for the ex-post (smoothed) estimates computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.8: Predicted and smoothed latent coefficients in Miami, FL
Note: estimated on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence
interval for the ex-post (smoothed) estimates computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.9: Predicted and smoothed latent coefficients in Las Vegas, NV
Note: estimated on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence
interval for the ex-post (smoothed) estimates computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.10: Predicted and smoothed latent coefficients in Phoenix, AZ
Note: estimated on the sample 1989:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence
interval for the ex-post (smoothed) estimates computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.11: Predicted and smoothed latent coefficients in Los Angeles, CA
Note: estimated on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence
interval for the ex-post (smoothed) estimates computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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4.A Kalman filter estimates of the latent state
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 4.12: Predicted and smoothed latent coefficients in San Diego, CA
Note: estimated on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence
interval for the ex-post (smoothed) estimates computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.13: Predicted and smoothed latent coefficients in Washington, DC
Note: estimated on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence
interval for the ex-post (smoothed) estimates computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.14: Predicted and smoothed latent coefficients in Boston, MA
Note: estimated on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence
interval for the ex-post (smoothed) estimates computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.15: Predicted and smoothed latent coefficients in Atlanta, GA
Note: estimated on the sample 1991:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence
interval for the ex-post (smoothed) estimates computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.16: Predicted and smoothed latent coefficients in Charlotte, NC
Note: estimated on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence
interval for the ex-post (smoothed) estimates computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.17: Predicted and smoothed latent coefficients in Cleveland, OH
Note: estimated on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence
interval for the ex-post (smoothed) estimates computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.18: Predicted and smoothed latent coefficients in Portland, OR
Note: estimated on the sample 1987:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence
interval for the ex-post (smoothed) estimates computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.19: Predicted and smoothed latent coefficients in Seattle, WA
Note: estimated on the sample 1990:2–2016:12. The gray shaded areas denote the 80% confidence
interval for the ex-post (smoothed) estimates computed from the RMSE. The light shaded bars
represent NBER recessions.
176
Bank of Finland Publications
Scientific monographs
 
Series E (ISSN 1238‑1691, print) (ISSN 1456‑5951, online) 
From year 2009 new ISSN numbers (ISSN 1798‑1077, print) (ISSN 1798‑1085, online)  
(Series E replaces the Bank of Finland’s research publications series B, C and D.) 
E:1 Jukka Vesala  Testing for Competition in Banking: Behavioral Evidence from Finland. 
1995. 206 p. ISBN 951‑686‑447‑3.
E:2 Juha Tarkka  Approaches to Deposit Pricing: A Study in the Determination of Deposit 
Interest and Bank Service Charges. 1995. 166 p. ISBN 951‑686‑457‑0.
E:3 Timo Tyrväinen  Wage Determination, Ta xes, and Employment: Evidence from Finland. 
1995. 212 p. ISBN 951‑686‑459‑7.
E:4 Sinimaaria Ranki  Realignment Expectations in the ERM: Causes and Measurement. 1996. 
164 p. ISBN 951‑686‑507‑0.
E:5 Juhana Hukkinen  Kilpailukyky, ulkomaankaupan rakenne ja taloudellinen kasvu 
(Competitiveness, structure of foreign trade and economic growth). 1996. 134 p.  
ISBN 951‑686‑512‑7.
E:6 Eelis Hein  Deposit Insurance: Pricing and Incentives. 1996. 120 p. ISBN 951‑686‑517‑8.
E:7 Vesa Vihriälä  Banks and the Finnish Credit Cycle 1986–1995. 1997. 200 p.  
ISBN 951‑686‑537‑2.
E:8 Anne Brunila  Fiscal Policy and Private Consumption-Saving Decisions: European Evidence. 
1997. 147 p. ISBN 951‑686‑558‑5. (Published also as A‑131, Helsinki School of Economics 
and Business Administration, ISBN 951‑791‑225‑0, ISSN 1237‑556X)
E:9 Sinimaaria Ranki  Exchange Rates in European Monetary Integration. 1998. 221 p.  
ISBN 951‑686‑564‑X.
E:10 Kimmo Virolainen  Tax Incentives and Corporate Borrowing: Evidence from Finnish 
Company Panel Data. 1998. 151 p. ISBN 951‑686‑573‑9.  
(Published also as A‑137, Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration,  
ISBN 951‑791‑290‑0, ISSN 1237‑556X)
E:11 Monica Ahlstedt  Analysis of Financial Risks in a GARCH Framework. 1998. 181 p.  
ISBN 951‑686‑575‑5.
E:12 Olli Castrén  Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination and Central Bank Independence. 1998. 
153 p. ISBN 951‑686‑580‑1.
E:13 Antti Ripatti  Demand for Money in Inflation-Targeting Monetary Policy. 1998. 136 p. 
ISBN 951‑686‑581‑X.
E:14 Risto Koponen – Kimmo Soramäki  Intraday Liquidity Needs in a Modern Interbank 
Payment System. A Simulation Approach. 1998. 135 p. ISBN 951‑686‑601‑8.
E:15 Liisa Halme  Pankkisääntely ja valvonta. Oikeuspoliittinen tutkimus säästöpankkien 
riskinotosta (Banking regulation and supervision: A legal policy study of risk taking by 
savings banks). 1999. XLIV + 560 p. ISBN 951‑686‑606‑9, print;  
ISBN 951‑686‑607‑7, online.
E:16 Juha Kasanen  Ilmoitusvelvollisten osakeomistus ja ‑kaupat Helsingin Pörssissä  
(Corporate insiders shareholdings and trading on the HEX Helsinki Exchanges). 1999.  
146 p. ISBN 951‑686‑630‑1, print; ISBN 951‑686‑631‑X, online.
E:17 Mikko Spolander  Measuring Exchange Market Pressure and Central Bank Inter vention. 
1999. 118 p. ISBN 951‑686‑645‑X, print; ISBN 951‑686‑646‑8, online.
E:18 Karlo Kauko  The Microeconomics of Innovation: Oligopoly Theoretic Analyses with 
Applications to Banking and Patenting. 2000. 193 p. ISBN 951‑686‑651‑4, print;  
ISBN 951‑686‑652‑2, online. (Published also as A‑166, Helsinki School of Economics and 
Business Administration, ISBN 951‑791‑442‑3, ISSN 1237‑556X)
E:19 Juha Kilponen  The Political Economy of Monetary Policy and Wage Bargaining. Theory 
and Econometric Evidence. 2000. 180 p. ISBN 951‑686‑665‑4, print;  
ISBN 951‑686‑666‑2, online.
E:20 Jukka Vesala  Technological Transformation and Retail Banking Competition: Implications 
and Measurement. 2000. 211 p. ISBN 951‑686‑695‑6, print; ISBN 951‑686‑696‑4, online. 
(Published also as A‑184, Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration,  
ISBN 951‑791‑518‑7, ISSN 1237‑556X)
E:21 Jian‑Guang Shen  Models of Currency Crises with Banking Sector and Imperfectly 
Competitive Labor Markets. 2001. 159 p. ISBN 951‑686‑711‑1, print;  
ISBN 951‑686‑712‑X, online.
E:22 Kari Takala  Studies in Time Series Analysis of Consumption, Asset Prices and Forecasting. 
2001. 300 p. ISBN 951‑686‑759‑6, print; ISBN 951‑686‑760‑X, online.
E:23 Mika Kortelainen  Edge: a model of the euro area with applications to monetary policy. 
2002. 166 p. ISBN 952‑462‑001‑4, print; ISBN 952‑462‑002‑2, online. 
(Published also as A‑204, Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration,  
ISBN 951‑791‑715‑5, ISSN 1237‑556X)
E:24 Jukka Topi  Effects of moral hazard and monitoring on monetary policy transmission.  
2003. 148 p. ISBN 952‑462‑031‑6, print; ISBN 952‑462‑032‑4, online. 
E:25 Hanna Freystätter  Price setting behavior in an open economy and the determination of 
Finnish foreign trade prices. 2003. 84 p. ISBN 952‑462‑045‑6, print;  
ISBN 952‑462‑046‑4, online.
E:26 Tuomas Välimäki  Central bank tenders: three essays on money market liquidity auctions. 
2003. 232 p. ISBN 952‑462‑051‑0, print; ISBN 952‑462‑052‑9, online. 
(Published also as A‑218, Helsinki School of Economics, Acta Universitatis Oeconomicae 
Helsingiensis, ISBN 951‑791‑762‑7, ISSN 1237‑556X)
E:27 Heikki Hella  On robust ESACF identification of mixed ARIMA models. 2003. 159 p.  
ISBN 952‑462‑112‑6, print; ISBN 952‑462‑113‑4, online. 
E:28 Heiko Schmiedel  Performance of international securities markets. 2004. 275 p.  
ISBN 952‑462‑132‑0, print; ISBN 952‑462‑133‑9, online. 
E:29 Tuomas Komulainen  Essays on financial crises in emerging markets. 2004. 173 p. 
ISBN 952‑462‑140‑1, print; ISBN 952‑462‑141‑X, online. 
E:30 Jukka Vauhkonen  Essays on financial contracting. 2004. 134 p.  
ISBN 952‑462‑172‑X, print; ISBN 952‑462‑173‑8, online. 
E:31 Harry Leinonen (ed.)  Liquidity, risks and speed in payment and settlement systems –  
a simulation approach. 2005. Compilation. 350 p. ISBN 952‑462‑194‑0, print;  
ISBN 952‑462‑195‑9, online.
E:32 Maritta Paloviita  The role of expectations in euro area inflation dynamics. 2005. 88 p. 
ISBN 952‑462‑208‑4, print; ISBN 952‑462‑209‑2, online.
E:33 Jukka Railavo  Essays on macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy rules. 2005. 150 p.  
ISBN 952‑462‑249‑1, print; ISBN 952‑462‑250‑5, online.
E:34 Aaron Mehrotra  Essays on Empirical Macroeconomics. 2006. 243 p. 
ISBN 952‑462‑290‑4, print; ISBN 952‑462‑291‑2, online.
E:35 Katja Taipalus  Bubbles in the Finnish and US equities markets. 2006. 123 p. 
ISBN 952‑462‑306‑4, print; ISBN 952‑462‑307‑2, online.
E:36 Laura Solanko  Essays on Russia’s Economic Transition. 2006. 133 p.  
ISBN 952‑462‑316‑1, print; ISBN 952‑462‑317‑X, online.
E:37 Mika Arola  Foreign capital and Finland Central government’s first period of reliance on 
international financial markets, 1862–1938. 2006. 249 p.  
ISBN 952‑462‑310‑2, print; ISBN 952‑462‑311‑0, online.
E:38 Heli Snellman  Automated Teller Machine network market structure and cash usage.  
2006. 105 p. ISBN 952‑462‑318‑8, print; ISBN 952‑462‑319‑6, online.
E:39 Harry Leinonen (ed.)  Simulation studies of liquidity needs, risks and efficiency in  
payment networks. 2007. Proceedings from the Bank of Finland Payment and Settlement 
System Seminars 2005–2006. 320 p. ISBN 978‑952‑462‑360‑5, print;  
ISBN 978‑952‑462‑361‑2, online.
E:40 Maritta Paloviita Dynamics of inflation expectations in the euro area. 2008. 177 p.  
ISBN 978‑952‑462‑472‑5, print; ISBN 978‑952‑462‑473‑2, online.
E:41 Charlotta Grönqvist Empirical studies on the private value of Finnish patents. 2009. 162 p. 
ISBN 978‑952‑462‑498‑5, print; ISBN 978‑952‑462‑499‑2, online.
E:42 Harry Leinonen (ed.) Simulation analyses and stress testing of payment networks. 2009. 
Proceedings from the Bank of Finland Payment and Settlement System Seminars  
2007–2008. 340 p. ISBN 978‑952‑462‑512‑8, print; ISBN 978‑952‑462‑513‑5, online. 
E:43 Hanna Freystätter  Essays on small open economy macroecomics. 2012. 169 p.  
ISBN 978‑952‑462‑793‑1, print; ISBN 978‑952‑462‑794‑8, online.
E:44 Vesa Ronkainen  Stochastic modeling of financing longevity risk in pension insurance. 2012. 
124 p. ISBN 978‑952‑462‑801‑3, print; ISBN 978‑952‑462‑802‑0, online. 
E:45 Tatu Laine and Matti Hellqvist (eds.)  Diagnostics for the financial markets – computational 
studies of payment system. Simulator Seminar Proceedings 2009–2011. 
2012. 458 p. ISBN 978‑952‑462‑813‑6, print; ISBN 978‑952‑462‑814‑3, online.
E:46 Tuuli Koivu  Monetary Policy in Transition – Essays on Monetary Policy Transmision 
Mechanism in China. 2012. 188 p. ISBN 978‑952‑6699‑00‑4, print;  
ISBN 978‑952‑6699‑00‑4, online.
E:47 Katja Taipalus  Detecting asset prices bubbles with time-series methods. 2012. 211 p.  
ISBN 978‑952‑462‑823‑5, print; ISBN 978‑952‑462‑824‑2, online.
E:48 Risto Herrala  Essays on the limits of borrowing. 2012. 113 p. ISBN 978‑952‑462‑825‑9, 
print; ISBN 978‑952‑462‑826‑6, online.
E:49 Juha V.A. Itkonen  Essays on the economics of climate change and networks. 2015. 104 p. 
ISBN 978‑952‑323‑037‑8, print; ISBN 978‑952‑323‑038‑5, online.
E:50 Tatu Laine (ed.) Quantitative analysis of financial market infrastructures: further 
perspectives on financial stability. 2015. 289 p. ISBN 978‑952‑323‑084‑2, online
E:51 Pasi Ikonen  Financial Depth, debt, and growth. 2017. 204 p. ISBN 978‑952‑323‑159‑7, 
print; ISBN 978‑952‑323‑161‑0, online.
E:52 Aino Silvo  Information and credit cycles. Causes and consequences of financial instability. 
2018. 177 p. ISBN 978‑952‑323‑227‑3, print; ISBN 978‑952‑323‑228‑0, online.
Inform
ation and credit cycles 
Scientific m
onographs    E:5
2
 · 2
0
18
ISBN 978-952-323-227-3
ISSN 1798-1077
(print)
ISBN 978-952-323-228-0
ISSN 1798-1085
(online)
Grano Oy
Helsinki 2018
